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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to develop a general theory of concrete systems
and to apply it to educational problems and issues at both the organiza-

tional level (schools) and the organismic level (students in schools).

Part

I

presents the need for a general theory which is applicable at dif-

ferent levels.

The importance of maintaining an appropriate level of

generality is stressed; appropriateness being determined by the ability of
the theory to distinguish clearly the systems it pertains to from the

systems it does not pertain to, as well as the comprehensive application
of the theory to all systems it perports to pertain to.

Part

I

also dis-

tinguishes between concrete systems - those which exist and change in space/
time - and abstracted systems - ideas, theories, and models which, while

contained in concrete systems, are not themselves concrete.

The paper con-

tends that while theories may apply to both concrete and abstracted sys-

measuretems, only concrete systems can be analysed through observation and

ment

.

2

Part II develops the general theory.
are distinguished.

ways

;

First, closed and open systems

Open systems are then classified into three
types:

1)

non-adjusting systems which have unchanging lines of
behavior;

2)

adjusting systems which can change their behavior in
pre-determined

and
3)

learning systems which can change both their behavior and their

organization through self-regulation.
The relationship between these

types of systems, their capacity for

change, and their relationships with changing environments is explored.

The particular characteristics of learning systems are analysed in terms
of their inputs, subsystem processes, and outputs.

Psrt III applies the theory to schools and students.

As concrete

learning systems, both the school and the student are seen to share certain

general characteristics; they are open, they control their own transformations, and they are probabilistic.

environments.

They are well-adapted to their concrete

They tend towards increasing complexity; including more

differentiation of subsystems, more decentralization of decision-making,

more interdependence of subsystems, and more elaborate adjustment processes.
Their capacity to learn depends upon the quantity and variety of information
stored in the system, the structure of their communications network, the

pattern of subsystem allocation, the function of feedback loops, the memory
facility, and the program determining the systems structure and behavior.

These general characteristics are developed with reference to common

problems and issues faced by educators, including the development of

appropriate learning environments, the relationship between learning and
behavior, and the capacity of both school, and student to learn under different environmental conditions.

iii
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1.1

CHAPTER

I

THE IDEA OF GENERAL THEORY

1.1

This paper attempts to develop a way of thinking about puzzling

and complex educational issues which may be new and unfamiliar to a great

many educators.

Part of its novelty may be terminological; its concep-

tual constructs are drawn from relatively recent developments in system

theory and information theory.

However, its intrinsic novelty - and the

test of its ultimate value - extends beyond mere vocabulary.

It rest

instead on two fundamental premises, the first shared by steadily in-

creasing numbers of specialists and theorists in diverse disciplines,

while the second is less widely accepted.
1.2 The first premise is that there is an appropriate level of

generality which permits a non-reductionist analysis of complex phenomena

.

It develops general principles of organization and of transaction with

environment which all phenomena share.

It assumes the Aristotelian dictum

that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and adds to this that
the behavior of the whole is a function both of its parts and of the

relationships among its parts.

When rigorously applied, this premise

leads to the discovery of formal isomorphisms among systems of different
types and levels.

Non-rigorously

,

it facilitates the development and

analysis of suggestive and fruitful analogies which can lead to new
insights about familiar systems.
1.3 The second, and more controversial, premise is that all behavior

system whose
is well-adapted to the particular environment of the

behavior is being observed

.

Behavior, from this viewpoint, is a recip-

its environ
rocal and transactional relationship between the system and

2
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ment.

An analysis based upon this premise must be both non-j udgmental

and non-normative

.

While the notion of being "non- judgmental” is familiar

and comfortable to most scientists, the notion of a "non-normative” analysis is strange to a great many.

This Introduction will develop and

elaborate these premises as a context for the theory which follows in
Part II and the application of the theory to educational concerns in

Part III.
1.4 The idea of general theory has been the impossible dream of

poets and philosophers, scientists and mystics, throughout the centuries.
The idea that all knowledge and behavior could be explained by one all-

embracing set of simple ideas or formulae has informed the thinking of
both fools and scholars, and has led theologians to God, physicists to
energy, psychologists to thanatos and eros

hedonists to pleasure.

,

aestheticians to beauty, and

Among scientists pursuing what Kuhn has called

"normal science’,” the search for theory which would relate the concerns
of their disciplines to those of other disciplines has been skeptically

received, unless the theory could be shown to adher rigorously to their

own accepted paradigms.

The notion of a "discipline,” with its own

fundamental principles, rigorous vocabulary, and distinctive methodology
has been inmical to less rigorous efforts to find commonalities or "hidden

likenesses”^ among the disciplines.

The creation of new disciplines is

slow and cumbersome, and generally requires practitioners who are both

skilled and credentialled in the disciplines being combined.

The psycho-

in
linguist is trained in both psychology and linguistics, the biochemist

^Bronowski, J., Science and Human Values (New York:

Harper, 1965).
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both biology and chemistry.

As communities of psycholinguists and bio-

chemists continue to grow, eventually university departments are
created,
and these new disciplines develop their own paradigms and methods.

Their

practitioners, however, tend to guard the boundaries of their new disciplines just as vigorously as their forerunners had guarded theirs.
1.5 No matter how skeptically regarded, then, the search for theories
of greater generality has been a driving force in the history of ideas,

and we need not be apologetic to be a part of an intellectual tradition

which seeks to discover and analyze commonalities among disparate phenomena.

We must be aware, however, of the pitfalls and dangers which beset

the path of general theorists.

The first, and perhaps the most important,

is the tendency of general theorists to overlook significant differences

in the phenomena they are exploring

.

To say that different phenomena are

alike in some ways is not to say that they are alike in other ways as
well.

It is inevitable that the more phenomena are subsumed under a

general theory, the fewer aspects of those phenomena will be dealt with
by that theory.

A theory of fat, green frumkins will apply to all fat,

green frumkins, while a theory of frumkins will apply to fat, thin, red,
and green frumkins.

It is tempting for the theorist dealing with

frumkins to assume that all frumkins are alike, but the truth is that they
are alike only in their

f rumkinness;

they are different in size and color,

and these may be significant differences, indeed.

Toynbee has been

severely criticized within the historians* guild for ignoring the
differences among the societies whose commonalities he explicated.

Freud

childhood
has been criticized by psychiatrists for assuming that early

experiences are similar for most people.

General systems theorists have

4
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been charged with transforming provocative analogies into general principles.

It is true that general theory cannot account for idiosyn-

chratic behavior, and it is equally true that some general theorists, in
their enthusiasm, seem to forget this.

General theory can be a powerful

analytic tool, but it is frequently a weak predictive tool.
1.6 Another danger of general theory is its tendency towards

triviality

The more general the theory - the more distinct types and

.

levels it encompasses - the less likely it is to illuminate important pro-

perties or characteristics of the particulars it is applied to.

That a

theory is trivial does not mean that it is untrue, only that it is obvious.
Of course, one

man's triviality may be another man's profound insight.

We tend to overlook the obvious, and sometimes it is helpful to restate
the obvious in a new and different context.

For example, the statement,

"all concrete things change over time," may appear to be a trivial

observation, although the corollary, that different kinds of concrete
things change in similar ways, may be novel and significant to many readers.

Likewise, the distinction between concrete things which change over time,
and abstract things (like models and theories) which need not change

over time may well illuminate a difficulty in applying abstract models and

theories to concrete systems.

However, the general theorist must still

guard against the possibility that in applying new terminology to old

situations he is merely obfuscating the obvious.

The emperor may, in fact,

have new clothes and still be the same old emperor.
level of
1.7 Finally, there is the problem of maintaining a given

generality

.

have at
If we think of a continuum of theories, we might

and pertinent
one extreme "content-bound" theories, highly specialized

5
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only to a given class of phenomena.

At the other extreme, we would find

"content-free” theories, generally mathematical, which are internally
consistent and axiomatic, but without reference to anything, whether
concrete
or abstract, other than themselves.

Within these extremes there is a lot

of room to wiggle, and general theorists frequently wiggle a lot.

To

avoid the conceptual problems which wiggling can lead to, general theorists

most constantly ask themselves two questions:

first, does the theory

clearly distinguish the things it pertains to from the things it doesn't

pertain to; and, second, does the theory always pertain to all things it
purports to pertain to?

prove the rule.

In general theory there are no exceptions which

Any exception questions either the validity of the

theory or the level of generality at which the theory operates.

statement which begins "In general.

.

." is

a

Any

wiggly statement and ought

not be a part of a general theory at a given level.
1.8 This paper develops a general theory of concrete learning systmes.

It attempts to avoid the first pitfall by stressing that the system

one is studying is a set of variables drawn from the object one is

interested in (2.4 and 2.11), not the object itself.

To look at a human

being as a biological system does not mean that a human being is only a

biological system.
1.9 It attempts to avoid the second pitfall by applying the theory
to the world of schools and students so that the significance of the

theoretical propositions can be judged against their utility.

Ultimately,

perhaps, triviality, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.

Whether

this paper successfully avoids it must be decided by the reader.
level of
1.10 Finally, this paper attempts to maintain a consistant

classes of systems
generality by clearly delineating at every step the

6
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to which the theory refers.

in the following manner;

abstracted or concrete.

These classes are successively restricted

Chapter One deals with all systems, whether
Chapters Two and Three and subsequent chapters

restrict consideration to the subclass of systems called concrete sysChapter Four further partitions concrete systems into open and

tems.

closed systems, and then classifies open concrete systems as non-adjusting, adjusting, or learning systems.

concerned only with learning systems.

The remainder of the paper is

All statements made are true of all

learning systems, and unless otherwise indicated, true only of learning
systems
The following tree may help the reader visualize this classification scheme.

systems

it
Some words about this classification scheme are in order, since

in this paper.
has profound significance for the mode of analysis used

7
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Concrete Systems

the distinction between concrete and abstracted systems
is paramount.
1)

The tests of a concrete system are two-fold

The system and its components consist of matter-energy and

occupy physical space
2)

:

;

The system and its components change over time

.

Any system not having these two characteristics is excluded from
this inquiry, not because it is unimportant or unreal, but because it is

fundamentally different and requires a fundamentally different mode of
analysis.

It is also a contention of this paper that much social science

theory confuses abstracted and concrete systems, that indeed the pre-

vailing mode of social science analysis is based upon the application of
abstracted systems to concrete systems.
1.12 What sorts of things are abstracted systems?

They are theories,

ideas, and models that don’t have reference to concrete systems.

They are

found in books and heads and frequently have great internal plausibility.

While all theories, including this one, are abstracted systems, they

may have reference to either concrete systems or to other abstracted
systems, which can be then called "abstractions.”

While a "general

theory of concrete learning systems" is itself an abstracted system (its

elements being abstracted from the class of concrete learning systems),
all of the systems to which it pertains meet the criteria listed above
for concrete systems.

All of its statements can be applied to actual

physical entities.
1.13 Some examples may help to clarify this point.

Maslow

s

hier

which applies
archy of needs" is a good example of an abstracted system
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1.13
to an abstraction, not a concrete system.

Maslow postulated a hierarchy

of basic human needs, ranging from physiological needs at the
bottom to
r\

"self-actualization" at the top.

SE L P

-

^ e TU»L /ZAi rtO Aj
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Presumably, each level of need requires some degree of satisfaction before
the next level emerges into dominance.

This theory has intrinsic plaus-

ibility and undoubtedly represents a valuable contribution to human
psychology.

It is, however, not a concrete system for two reasons.

First,

the elements of the system, "needs," are not concrete according to the

first criterion above, and the system itself does not meet the second

criterion; namely it does not change over time.

Second, the system refers

to an abstract entity called "man" and not necessarily to any or all con-

crete persons.
theory.

A particular individual may or may not exemplify the

A psychologist working therapeutically with a great many particu-

lar individuals may find that the theory is generally true.

Abstracted

theory may indeed be generally true, or statistically true, without being
true of particular instances.

I

must stress that this is not a deficiency

of abstracted systems, it is a characteristic of them.

We shall mention

below, however, that one of the fallacies which infects social science
exemplify
is the presumption that a particular instance which does not

of
^Adapted from Hersey, Paul and Blanchard, Kenneth H. Managem ent
18.
p.
1969),
Prentice-Hall,
Organizational Behavior (Englewood Cliffs:
,
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the abstracted theory is in some way deficient,
maladjusted, or deviant.

1.14 Organizational theory is rich in examples of
abstracted theories

which are essentially models of abstracted systems.

Mersey and Blanchard

develop a three-dimensional model of "leader behavior" with a relationship dimension, a task dimension, and an effectiveness dimension.^

Low

H ICH
R

E

U
A

r
I

o
w
5
H
/

e

Low
Presumably, those occupying "leadership roles" in organizations will have
a style which falls somewhere within this cube.

Mersey and Blanchard

also maintain that successful leadership calls for an adaptable style, one
that can change as circumstances dictate.

attractive plausibility.

Again, this is a theory of

It is undoubtedly a useful tool for analysing

leadership styles in concrete organizations, particularly those in which
"leadership" is localized in the "leadership role."

Unlike Maslow's

theory, Mersey and Blanchard’s model does not suggest an invariant model
of behavior, but rather stipulates definitional boundaries within which

leadership behavior may take place.

Nonetheless, the components of the

system, "leadership" "relationship behavior" "task behavior", and

"effectiveness" are not concrete.

Two intelligent trained analysts could

disagree about the nature of these abstracted components.

Ibid.

,

pp.

73-80.

It is interesting
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to note that if the components of an abstracted
system are themselves

abstractions, then the variables of that system are concrete:

the actual

leaders and followers with their particular personalities and
styles.
1.15 This can be generalized to say that whereas the components
of

concrete systems are themselves concrete, the components of abstracted
systems are relationships among concrete entities.

Miller comments:

To some it may appear that the distinction between
concrete and abstracted systems is something like
the difference between saying "A has the property
and saying
is a property of A".
This translation is logically trivial. In empirical work,
however, there can be an important difference between discovering that A has the property r and
finding an A which has the property r.^

Miller is a strong advocate of focusing on concrete rather than abstracted
systems.

He suggests five reasons:
1.

In the first place, it is easier.
.We are
used to seeing the world as a collection of objects in space- time.
.

.

2.

Variations in the units of systems appear to
contribute as much or more to the tool variance in the systems than variations in their
relationships.
.

3.

.

.

Theory which deals with concrete systems avoids
the sort of confusion that arises when theory
in social science or other areas appears to
assume that actions, roles, or relationships
carry on a life of their own, independent of
other aspects of the people or other concrete
systems whose processes they are.
.

4.

.

.Behavioral scientists, if they deal with
abstracted systems, easily forget the intra~
system relationships in concrete systems which
influence processes within and between those
.

.

systems.

.

.

"Living Systems: Basic Concepts" in Gray, Duhl,
^Miller, James G.
Little
(Boston:
and Rizzo, eds.. General Systems Theory and Psychiat^
Brown, 1969), p. 78.
,
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5.

If the social sciences were to formulate their
problems, whenever possible, in the way which
has proved most convenient for the natural
sciences over centuries, unification of all the
sciences would be accelerated
.

1.16 Miller,

I

believe, has overstated his position.

Natural science

could not exist without abstracted systems any more than social science can.

Natural scientists are increasingly coming to realize that in many instances

variations in relationships are more important to system behavior than

variation in units.

Nonetheless, this paper attempts to follow Miller's

advice for three reasons
1)

Most of the work in system theory of Interest to students of human

behavior has been abstracted theory;
2)

Most of the theory included in educational training of school

people has concerned abstracted theory;
3)

An emphasis upon concrete systems provides a novel way of looking

at familiar phenomena.

Learning Systems

1.17 The distinction between learning systems and other types of

concrete open systems is also fundamental, and while the technical differences will be described in Chapter Four, it is appropriate to describe them

generally in this Introduction.

The term "learning” is used in this paper

to mean both more and less than it means in colloquial usage.

It means

more in the sense that it does not necessarily connote either consciousness
It means less in the sense that it does not necessarily

or purpose.

^Ibid

.

,

pp.

80-82.
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Include all new behaviors that a system may manifest.

Put most simply, a

learning system is on e which has the capacity to exercise some
control over
j^ts

own behavior,

in

from the environment

contrast to those systems whose behavior is controlled
.

The behavior of a learning system cannot be con-

trolled by controlling the inputs into the system.
are essentially linear:

Non-learning systems

the output can be predicted given the input; the

input can be inferred given the output.

Learning systems, on the other

hand, are non-linear; their output can range from highly improbable
(and therefore highly predictable) to a high degree of probable (random

and therefore unpredictable) behavior.

Given the same input, a learning

system can produce different outputs; given different inputs, a learning
system can produce similar outputs.
1.18 The behavior of a learning system depends upon both its inputs

and its organization.

It is undoubtedly true that learning systems will

vary greatly in their capacity to learn, but it is equally true that

a

learning system will learn - not necessarily what another system might want
it to learn - but because it can learn, it must learn.

Theory based upon

linear system analysis is clearly not applicable to this special class
of systems.

1.19 The case for a special treatment of learning systems has been

persuasively presented by Miller, Gal^nter, and Pribram
admittedly not in a systems context.

,

although

Looking at human behavior, they

argue that both molecular and molar behavioral acts emanate from "plans”
for action.

These plans are formed from the individual's prior exper-

iences, his internal representation of reality, as well as inputs from the

^Miller, Galenter, Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).
York:
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environment.

Taken together, these form the image of the
way things are.

Successful plans are "filed" in the image, to be
drawn upon again.

Unsuccessful plans are discarded or revised, tested, and
further revised
in a continuous process of modification and
adaptation.

A plan, thus, is

any process, or combination of processes, in the system
which controls the

sequence of behaviors which constitute the system's output.

behavior as a strategy is to tactics.

A plan is to

Just as there can be strategies

which can generate other strategies, so too there can be plans which
generate other plans.

The capacity of a system to learn will depend to

some extent on how well it can learn "how to learn," that is to say,

whether it can generate "metaplans" for generating plans, or whether it is
a prisoner of its program.

Nonetheless, any system that has some degree

of control over its behavior is a learning system, and requires a differ-

ent mode of analysis than does a system whose behavior is uniquely deter-

mined by its input.

14
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CHAPTER II
TOWARDS A NON-NORMATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE

2.1 All concrete systems behave in concrete ways.

cannot

not behave."

A concrete system

An analysis of a concrete system must start with

the way it does behave, not with the way it might behave
or the way it

ought to behave.

If a class of concrete systems, such as automobiles,

fourth grade students, petunias, or hospitals, customarily behave
in certain ways, students of these systems are likely to see a particular
systme in terms of the customary behavior of the class to which it belongs.
If the behavior of the particular system diverges from the customary or

expected behavior of the class, it is often viewed as "abnormal,"

maladjusted," or "deviant."

These are common and useful concepts in

social science as it is generally practiced.

They can create serious

analytical problems, however, if the class of systems to which the

behavior of a particular system is compared is not a class of concrete
systems but rather is an abstracted system.

The abstracted system has

a "normal" way of behaving which may be unlike the way in which any

concrete system in that class behaves.

Any statistical treatment, of

course, will be an abstracted system which may be a reliable indicator
of the way a class of systems behaves but is not necessarily a reliable

indicator of the way any particular concrete member of that class will

behave
2.2 A particular concrete learning system behaves the way it does

not only because of the class of systems to which it may belong, but also

because of its own organization and the character of the particular environment it inhabits.

Norms, therefore, can be blinders which inhibit the

15

2.2

analyst or observer from really seeing the
behavior of the particular

system under study.

It is the contention of this paper that
every con-

crete learning system is well-adapted to its
environment.
of saying this is that all behavior is adaptive

.

Another way

From the point of view

of the analyst or observer, the behavior may be
good or bad, normal or

abnormal, desireable or undesireable
the behavior itself.

but these judgments are external to

,

Laing and his colleagues have adopted this point of

view in their study of schizophrenia

,

maintaining in essence that mental

is an adaptation to an untenable social or familial situation.

In an insane world, Laing suggests, it is the sane person who is mad.

This was the catch in Heller's Catch-22

allowed to fly air missions.
missions.

Only sane airmen could be

.

Only insane airmen would want to fly bomber

Therefore, any pilot trying to get out of flying was clearly

sane and able to fly.

In less whimsical terms, this is the dilemma of

all who try to act justly in an unjust world or rationally in an irrational
society.

If we remove the blinders which our labels and judgments impose

on our study of behavior, and limit ourselves to a purely descriptive

language of analysis, we can come to a better realization of the trans-

actional nature of behavior.

We.

are arguing for what some sociologist's

Buckly states that "behavior

have called a "field view" of behavior.

is a function of the tendency-system and situational field, not of the

tendency-system alone.

In a word, it cannot be supposed that ready-made

behavior is carried around in the head."

g

^Laing and Esterson, Sanity, Madness and the Family (London:
stock, 1964).

Tavi-

^Buckley, Walter, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs
Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 117.
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We may add to this the qualification that it is the
internal representation of the situation field, as well as the field itself,
that is an

element in the behavior.

That the "subject" may have a different inter-

nal representation of a given field than the analyst means that
they in-

habit different environments, regardless of their physical proximity.

It

is the analyst’s tendency to objectify his own internal representation

of the field - to assume that his internal representation

^

the field -

that allows him to apply normative constructs in analyzing behavior.

This

paper attempts to avoid this fallacy by assuming that all behavior is

well adapted to the system's environment.
2.3 There is another kind of construct that a theory of concrete

systems must do without; the construct is exemplified by the concept of
"need."

A "need" is the absence or lack of

or process.

a particular thing,

quality,

The thing, quality, or process that is needed is not present

and is, therefore, not a component of the concrete environment.

Since

concrete systems exist only in concrete environments, their behaviors cannot be described or explained in terms of "needs."

As Ashby points out,

the absence of an entity can always be converted
to a reading on a scale simply by considering the
entity to be present but in zero degree. Thus,
"still air" can be treated as a wind blowing at
0 m.p.h., "darkness" can be treated as an illumination of 0 foot-candles; and the giving of a drug
can be represented by indicating that its concenhas risen from its usual
tration in the tissues
Q
cent.
value of 0 per

When the thing needed is not concrete, however, and is not susceptible
to either observation or measurement, its lack cannot be used either to

^Ashby, W. Ross, Design for a Brain
Hall, 1960), p. 15.

,

2d ed.

(London:

Chapman and
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describe or to explain the behavior of a concrete system.
need

An Infant may

love, a schoolchild may "need” a positive self-image, but
to explain

behavior on the basis of these needs Is to build castles In the sand.
Schools frequently talk about "meeting the needs" of children, or even

"meeting the needs of the Individual child," but most often these needs
are abstractions based upon the observer’s preconceptions.

The easily

distracted child "needs" to learn to concentrate because the observer feels
that concentration Is good and dlstractlblllty Is bad.

The Introverted or

shy child "needs" to socialize for the same reason.
2.4

I

must stress that

1

am not saying that needs do not exist, only

that they cannot be used either to understand or explain the behavior of

concrete systems.

Statements of needs and feelings of need both exist;

the first are concrete data and can be dealt with within the theory of

concrete systems, while the second can be considered Implied statements
of a sentient system.

feelings of need, but

I
I

can explain my own behavior In terms of my own
cannot similarly explain another's behavior.

I

may choose to accept another's explanations of his feelings of need as a

sufficient rationale for his behavior, or
or specious.

I

may consider It Inadequate

One of the advantages of a general theory of systems which

Is applied to human systems Is that It Is easier to avoid talking about

the needs of systems In general than It Is with human systems In part-

icular

.

2.5 Finally, a theory of concrete systems must do without sociological

concepts such as "Institution" and "role."

The presence of these terms In

an analysis Indicates that the analysis Is dealing with abstractions

rather than concrete systems.

An "Institution" Is a abstracted social

system, the components of which are roles.

The organizational chart of a
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company or school is the model of that organization as an
institution.
It defines roles and role-relationships.

The actual role-incumbants are

variables that may change without altering the structure of the institution or the relationships among the roles.

In a concrete system, however,

it is not roles that relate to one another but concrete components.

In a

human system, human beings are the components, and role-perceptions are
among the myriad variables which may affect the actual behavior of the

human beings.

This distinction is well-defined in a colloquy between

Jurgen Reusch, a psychologist, Talcott Parsons, a sociologist, and
Anatol Rapoport, a mathematical systems theorist.
Ruesch:

Previously I defined culture as the cumulative
body of knowledge of the past, contained in memories and assumptions of people who express this
knowledge in definite ways. The social system
is the actual habitual network of communication
between people.
If you use the analogy of the
telephone line, it corresponds to actual calls
made.
The society is the network - the whole
telephone network. Do you agree with these
definitions?

Parsons:

No, not quite.

In the limiting conception a society is composed of human' individuals organisms;
but a social system is not, and for a very important reason, namely, that the unit of a partial
social system is a role and not the individual.
,

Rapoport:

The monarch is not an individual, but is a site
Is that
into which different individuals step.
your unit of the social system?

Parsons:

It
Yes.
A social system is a behavioral system.
is an organized set of behaviors of persons interacting with each other: a pattern of roles. The
roles are the units of a social system. We say,
"John Jones is Mary Jones' husband." He is the
same person who is the mail carrier, but when we
are talking about the mail carrier we are abstractSo the mail
ing from his marriage relationship.
On the other
role.
a
just
person,
carrier is not a
subsocial
of
aggregate
an
hand, the society is
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systems, and as a limiting case it is that
social system which comprises all the roles
of all the individuals who participate.
2.6 This paper will employ a mode of analysis in which John and
Mary

Jones are the components of the system, not their roles.

We shall do

this for the simple reason that in the concrete world it is individuals,

not roles, who interact.

In rejecting Parson's approach, we do not deny

its usefulness in analysing concrete situations.

susceptible to abstracted analyses.

Many real situations are

Two Individuals can, indeed, have

conflicting role definitions; there can be ambiguity and confusion about
role expectations in human organizations.

Nonetheless, it remains true

that it is the individuals who are conflicting or confused, not their

roles
2.7 Therefore, instead of "institutions," we shall be talking about

"systems," and instead of "roles" we shall be talking about "critical

subsystem processes," those processes necessary for the system to function.

We shall see that these processes can be allocated among the com-

ponents of systems in different ways, and that the system's organization
is really its pattern of allocation of its critical subsystem processes

among its components.

10

quoted by Miller in

cit

.

,

p.

77.
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CHAPTER III
TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF COMPLEXITY

3.1 Most of the systems of interest to an analyst are exceedingly

complex.

Their components are so numerous and are interrelated in so many

ways that any analysis which attempts to understand them in terms of their
components or the interaction among their components is doomed to frustration.

This is particularly true of learning systems, whose essential non-

linearity makes any causal analysis impossible.

The selection of relevant

variables from the literally infinite number of variables which comprise
the system is frequently an impossible task, particularly with concrete

systems which change over time.
3.2 One of the significant contributions of general systems theory
to the study of complex phenomena is the proposition that the behavior of
a complex system can be analyzed according to certain principles of

organization which all systems share, regardless of the nature or the
number of their components.

notion of "hierarchy."

Pre-eminent among these principles is the

The organization of both the natural and man-made

environments appears to be according to hierarchical principles.

Any

system one is observing is comprised of other systems and is itself a component of a larger system.

Given the system one is looking steadily at,

its components can be called sub-systems.
it is a part can be called suprasystems

system.

.

The system or systems of which

An individual human being is a

Physiologically he consists of a great many subsystems.

he is a subsystem in a great many suprasystems.

A.t

Socially,

an appropriate level of

generality, principles of organization which can be observed and measured
at one level of system will also be true of systems at both lower and
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higher levels.

This is a profoundly useful insight but also one
which is

highly susceptible to misuse.

For example, human beings and other organ-

isms have sense organs which bring information into the system.

However,

at the sub-organismic level and at the supra-organismic level
systems do

not have sense organs.

They do have, nonetheless, subsystem processes

which bring information into the system, although the components of these
subsystems may have no physical or analagous similarity to organismic
sense organs.

Miller's term "input transducer" is at an appropriate level

of generality to refer to a systemic prerequisite at all levels.

Miller

states that
the importance of interindividual, intertype, or
interlevel formal identities among systems, and
what makes them of absorbing interest, is that
very different structures, if they can be shown
to carry out similar processes, may well turn out
to perform in ways which are so alike that they can
be very precisely described by the same formal
model.

Such a formal model would be a part of a rigorous general theory.

This

paper cannot claim to be a formal model in the sense that scientists and

mathematicians use that term.

It can claim,

though, that it is a step

in that direction - that both the approach and the terminology are con-

sistent with the rigor that mathematical scientists strive towards.

It

remains for specialists in particular disciplines or systems theorists

competent in different disciplines to advance the search for formal

identities which will allow our understanding of complex phenomena to
grow in sophistication.

11

Miller, o£. cit

96

.
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The Use of a General Theory

3.3 School people can be excused if they view with
suspicion the

contention that they need more theory, and yet this paper
suggests that
a general theory of concrete systems can challenge
much of the conventional

wisdom which abstracted theory has supported about schools and
the process of learning.

Some of the insights about education that can be gained

from this approach are listed below.
3.4 The American public day school, with its myriad purposes, is a

poorly-defined system.

This is not a deficiency, it is a characteristic.

Neither its inputs, its boundaries, nor its outputs can be well-defined.
To make the school a well-defined system, we would have to design a society
in which no learning took place outside of school, or design a school

whose pupils and teachers could never leave, watch television, or read newspapers.

There is no point in trying to analyze schools according to models

of well-defined systems, or in comparing schools with business or other

human orgainzations which are well-defined.
3.5 Both the school and the student, as learning systems, will, over

time, adapt to their environments and take on the characteristics of

their environment.

It must be remembered, however, that whereas the

community is the environment for the school, the school is only a portion of the environment for the student.

part of the student’s environment.

Nonetheless, it is a significant

Schools that want students to learn

how to learn must be organized in such a way as to develop this competence.
3.6 The movement towards performance objectives, one of the domin-

ant trends in American schools, can be seriously questioned from a

general systems viewpoint.

It can be argued that the more precisely
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desired outputs are specified, the more the student
will perform as an

adjusting system, and the less likely his performance
will result from
learning.

Put another way, the more specific the conditions
under which

specified behavior is to take place, the more likely that the
behavior will
occur only when those specified conditions are present.
3.7 Learning performance appears to be based upon something we
may
1^3.rning competence.

A strict input~output analysis of the learning

process and approaches to teaching which emphasize the relationship between

given inputs and desired outputs seem to short-circuit the development of
learning competence.

The familiar phenomenon of children who have "mastered"

their performance objectives but do not know what they have learned is a

manifestation of this problem.

The issue is not one of objectives, which

have great value, but rather one of the relationship between behavior and
learning
3.8 It is the ultimate purpose of this paper to give educators a new

way of thinking about the situations they are in.

Synecticians talk about

"making the strange familiar" and "making the familiar strange."

paper is an exercise in making the familiar strange.

This

It provides a differ-

ent set of cognitive tools for those who wish to think seriously about

educational problems and issues.

Hopefully, it may lead researchers to

develop new designs for exploring the educational enterprise, designs based

upon theories of schools and students as open learning systems inter-

acting reciprocally with their environments.

This approach may also sug-

gest a meeting ground for behavioral and cognitive psychologists, although
the prospects for this are neither Immediate nor promising.
3.9 Finally,

this approach may set a direction fro a more rigorous

generalism and allow scholars and scientists in diverse fields to have a
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common, technical vocabulary which, while preserving
the integrity of part-

icular disciplines, allows the commonalities to be explored
in accord with

accepted scientific principles and methods, to the end that the ancient
dream of poets and philosophers may become more than a pious hope.

PART II

A GENERAL THEORY OF CONCRETE SYSTEMS
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4.1

CHAPTER IV
THINGS

4.1 We shall begin by talking about "things."

anything — an object, an idea, an organization.

A "thing" can be

It can be an extremely

complex aggregate of many inter-related parts, or it can appear to be a
simple, undifferentiated, unitary type of phenomenon.

It can be a leaf,

the branch on which that leaf hangs, the tree to which the branch belongs,

the forest in which the tree is located, or the geographic area which

includes the forest.

The only requirement we make of a thing is that we

can differentiate it from other things and look staeadily at it.
the object of our attention, whereas other things are not.

be substituting the term "system" for the term "thing."

It is

Soon we shall

This is not

because there is any difference between things and systems; there is only
a difference in the language we use in talking about things as systems.

It is a more rigorous language and more helpful in examining some of the

interesting properties of things, particularly the most interesting and
complicated sorts of things that we have found it difficult to talk and
think about.

No matter how complicated our language, however, it will

still be things we are talking about.
4.2 One characteristic which is true of all things is that they

are real - they exist.

Some things exist in time and space and are com-

posed of matter, expend energy, and process information.

Trees and auto-

mobiles are things of this sort; so are people and groups of people.

One

property of such things is that they change, and because they are palpable
things, their change can be measured and spoken about.

Two people observ-
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Ing the same thing are likely to notice the same changes
and are likely
to agree about what they see.^

tence will be called concrete

Such things which have a palpable exis-

.

4.3 Other real things exist in other ways.

oranges together are five oranges.

Two oranges and three

These are concrete things.

"2 + 3 = 5," while just as real, is not concrete.

But

Although it is a pro-

perty of concrete things that they can be added together, the property itself is not concrete.

It is no less real than concrete things, but it

exists independent of them.

Such things, which are properties or attri-

butes of concrete things, will be called abstract things.

Abstract things

may be true of great numbers of concrete things; the additive property,
for example, is true of all concrete things.

concrete things.

Weight is a property of all

Growth is a property of many concrete things.

with the environment is a property of most concrete things.
property of all concrete things.
concrete.

Every concrete thing

abstract things.

Interaction

Change is a

None of these things, however, is
is a particularized exemplification of

Without abstractions we would be unable to think about

or talk about concrete things.
4.4 Many things are neither concrete nor abstract.

real and we have to deal with them.

They are still

False statements (or true statements,

for that matter), hypotheses, and statistics are examples of things that

are neither concrete nor abstract.

All symbol systems exist without being

^Later on (7.35) we shall want to admit that this statement is not
A landscape artist and an astronomer looking at a sunset probably
true.
However, since we want to introduce complicado not see the same thing.
tions very gradually, we shall say that this statement is truer of concrete things than of abstract or conceptual things to be treated below.
See Hanson, Patterns of Discovery Ch. 1, for the arguments against this
,

statement
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concrete or abstract.

Abraham Lincoln was, at one time, a concrete thing,

but when the palpable Abraham Lincoln was assassinated, "Abraham
Lincoln"
remained.

The idea of

Abraham Lincoln," the words of Abraham Lincoln,

statements about Abraham Lincoln still exist.
^ conceptual thing.

conceptual things.

"Abraham Lincoln" is now

All ideas are conceptual things.

All statements are

All symbols are conceptual things.

real; they may be true or false, important or trivial.

Concepts are

They may refer to

concrete things or abstract things or other conceptual things, but they
are real.
real.

All things are real.

Myths, fantasies, and delusions are

Monsters, ghosts, and purple cows are real.

Concrete things,

abstract things, and conceptual things are all real.
4.5 Every thing is composed of things.

3

The thing we are looking

steadily at is composed of things called parts

.

The parts, of course,

are also things, and every thing is a part of some other thing.

There

is no concrete thing so minute and undifferentiated that it is not composed

of other things.

Likewise there is no concrete thing so grand and all

encompassing that it is not part of something else.

4

The world is made

up of parts which are things and things which are parts.

What we look

steadily at, however, is a thing, and the things of which it is composed are its parts.

Things which affect the thing we are looking

^The acutal markers which bear the concepts are, of course, concrete
when they are committed to writing. These distinctions can lead us into
muddy waters, but they are important.
See
^This scheme of classification is taken from J.G. Miller.
27716.
Science
Behavioral
and
1965,
193-237,
Behavior Science 10:
310, 1971.

not con^We can postulate such things, but they are conceptual and

crete

.
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steadily at, or which are affected by it, compose the thing's environment

.

Things which do not affect the thing we are looking steadily at, or
which
are unaffected by it are of no interest to us.

They are not part of the

thing's environment.
4.6

We have made some fundamental distinctions.

The distinction

between concrete, abstract, and conceptual things is intrinsic.
way of classifying reality.

It is a

We have seen that abstract things are the

properties of concrete things, and that concrete things are the data for
abstract things.

Conceptual things are the tools for thinking and talking

about both concrete and abstract things.

All of them are real.

The

distinction between part, thing, and environment is a conceptual thing.
It is, of course, real.

observer or student.

It is also wholly arbitrary and depends upon the

No thing is intrinsically part, thing, or environment.

4.7 We may now do away with the ungainly term, "thing.”

This paper

is about systems, concrete systems, abstracted systems, and conceptual

systems.

It is concerned with the relationships between systems,

parts, and their environments.

If it is helpful,

the reader may continue

to substitute the term "thing" for the term "system."

ence

.

their

There is no differ-
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CHAPTER V
SYSTEMS

5.1 Everything we say in this chapter will be true of all concrete

systems; that is to say, all statements, definitions, and propositions will
be true of everything that exists in time/space.

In subsequent chapters

we shall be making useful distinctions between various types of concrete
systems, but for now we make no distinctions.
5.2 We shall start by developing a vocabulary with which to talk

about concrete systems.

The vocabulary will necessarily be very general,

since we are talking about systems in general rather than any kind of

system in particular.
however.

Generality should not be confused with vagueness,

The test of our terms is that they

are useful in making distinc-

tions; while not all systems are alike, they are all alike in some ways

.

The terms we use will be helpful in determining these ways and will thus

allow us to make comparisons between very dissimilar things.
5.3 A concrete system is whole thing composed of inter-related parts.
We do not need the term "whole” because the term "system" means the same
thing.

We do have to come to terms with the notion of "part," however.

Systems are composed of components

,

which have attributes

,

or properties

.

The number of attributes which a component may have may be very small or

very large.

They may be changing or unchanging.^

They may appear rele-

vant to the concerns of the observer or irrelevent to his concerns.

While

may
the component is always matter/energy, the attributes of the component

attributes
^Some theorists would disagree with this and claim that all
the
\^^hether
of concrete systems change, some slowly and some quickly,
and
system
the
of
chnage is observed depends on the relative time scales
of
Theory
d
See Reusch, in Grinker, ed.. Toward a Unifie
the observer.
317.
Human Behavior, 2d ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p.
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be quantities, qualities, or conditions.
5.4 The important point is that the parts of concrete
systems are both

components and their attributes.
a source of

This may be a simple point, but it is

fundamental confusion among those who think about systems,

particularly in the field of education.

It is the reason why models of

abstracted systems so rarely apply well to concrete systems.
of abstracted systems can be postulated

concrete systems)

,

The components

(and are usually the attributes of

while the components and attributes of concrete systems

must be selected from those that in fact exist in time/space.
5.5 Some examples will help.

The components of a human group are

people, but the parts of that human system include not only the people but

also their personalities, perceptions, ideas, habits, expectations, mannerisms,

feelings, prior experiences.

.

.and so on.

We could also include

their heights, weights, complexions, bank accounts, clothing, hobbies, political and religious affiliations.

.

of attributes that people can have.

of interest to the observer.

.and so on.

There is no end to the list

Not all of them, of course, will be

Most likely, not all of them will influence

the behavior of the human group to which these people belong.

Some of

them will, however, and those that do are parts of the system.
5.6 As I write,

childrens* swing set.

I

can look out the window of my study and see a
The components of this swing set are swings, ladders,

poles, a slide, and support braces.

Each of these components, however,

has a set of attributes which are part of that concrete system.
of the material,

The strength

the length of the ropes, the angle of the slide, the

parts of
stress on the braces are just a few of the attributes that are
the system which is that swing set.
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5.7 A wristwatch is a collection of many specialized components,
but
the ratio of the gears and the tautness of the spring are also
parts of

the system.

5.8

Further reflection makes it clear that in fact a "component" is

nothing more than a collection of attributes.
example, size, weight, shape, and composition.

Any tangible thing has, for

A large, red, wodden tri~

angle can only be described in terms of its attributes.
al,

can always be described in terms of their attributes.

Things, in generWe may choose

to describe them in terms of their purposes and relationships, also, but

again, closer examination will show that these, too, are functions of

their attributes.
5.9 It would be perfectly possible, therefore, to talk about con-

crete systems without reference to their components but it would be impossible to talk about concrete systems without reference to their components*

attributes.

A component is a particular disposition of a set of attributes

at a specific point in time.

5.10 The reader may be tempted to ask whether this approach means
that the entity or "wholeness" of components is unimportant.
tems point of view, the answer is "yes."

From a sys-

If we recall from 4.1 that a

system is a thing we are looking at steadily, it is, in fact, helpful to
look at its components as particular dispositions of attributes.

It pre-

vents us from inadvertantly shifting the focus of our attention and

viewing the component as a system.

Whether components exist as entities

is a question of philosophical and legal interest, but of little concern
to our inquiry.

The changes which a neonate goes through as he passes

death
through infancy, childhood, adolescence, maturity, old age, and
of attributes.
can all be described in specific terms as dispositions
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Whether the infant, child, and adult are the same person is ultimately
an unanswerable question.

If the large,

red, wooden triange changes and

one of its attributes, we will recognize the change and call it a differ-

ent object.

That we tend to consider some attributes more essential to

a thing than others is a habit of our thought rather than a quality of the

thing.

5.11 The preceding discussion indicates both why we are justified
in considering a system to be an ensemble of attributes and why it is

preferable to do so.
icular point in time.

Components are complexes of attributes at a partThe complex of attributes at a subsequent point in

time might be very different.

Moreover, at any given point in time

some of a component's attributes may be of interest to the observer of a
system, while others may be of no interest.

To take into account both

the difference in time and the focus of the observer without having to

explain in every instance what we mean, we will use the term variable to
describe those attributes which, according to the interests and needs
of an observer, are parts of the system.

A system can thus be described

in terms of its variables, which are those attributes selected from an

often limitless list of attributes which may be ascribed to the system's
components.

While the identification of a system's variables is dependent

in some measure upon the interests and needs of the observer, it is not

by any means an arbitrary process; it is based upon relationships that
are observed to exist in the system.

A system may be described in terms

complexof a limited and specific number of variables, regardless of the
ity and large number of the attributes of its components.
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5.12 The condition of a variable at a given point in time
will be

called its state

.

We shall assume that variables may have more than one

state and thus are capable of change.

The particular disposition of a

system's variables at a particular point in time will be the state of the
system.

The state of the system will thus change as a function of the states

of its variables; however, we must avoid assuming that a system's perfor-

mance will vary with its states.

Many systems achieve stability through

the change in their internal states; the human being is such a system.

5.13 A truly rigorous treatment of variables would limit them to

attributes whose changes could be measured and quantified. 2

We shall fall

short of that rigor, but shall attempt to treat non-quantif iable changes
as though they were quantifiable.

This procedure has real pitfalls, as

many social scientists have found, but as long as we limit ourselves to
dealing with concrete systems whose changes can be observed, we will be
able to avoid these pitfalls.
5.14 For the purposes of illustration, we shall hypothesize a con-

crete system of three variables, each of which can have states.

We shall

call the variables "A," "B," and "C" and we shall designate their states
as "+" and

12345678
A

+ + + +

B

+ +

C

+ - +

++
-

+ - + -

The above diagram lists the eight possible states that the system might be
in.

pp

.

The reader might want to imagine a traffic light with three bulbs,

^See Ashby, Design for a Brain
14-15, 33.

,

(London:

Chapman and Hall, 1960),
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A=red,

B=yellow, and C=green, to help him visualize this system, but
if he

does so, he must remember that we are not talking about a traffic
light

but about any system of three variables which can have two states.

This

system could just as well be a human being with
A = mood ("+" happy/”-” unhappy)
B = alertness
C =

(”+” awake/”-” asleep)

occupation (”+” busy/”-” idle)

The possible states of our system, then, can be determined by listing all

possible combinations of the states of the variables.

If there is an equal

probability that each variable will be in either of its states, then any
of the eight states of the system is equally likely to occur at any point

in time.

5.15 It is important to note that this mode of analysis can be used

with any system that has a finite number of variables which can take a
finite number of states over a finite period of time.

The addition of

variables or of states of variables does not change the mode of analysis,

although it will greatly increase the number of states of a system.

The

addition of one variable with two states to the system in 5.14 would
increase the number of possible states in the system from eight to sixteen:
1 2 3 4 5 6

7

8

A

+ + + +

B

+ +

--

+ +

C

+-

+

+

D

+ + + + + + + +

-

-

+

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

+

----

+

+

+

+

+

--

+

+

--

-+

-

+

+

-

+

-

-

--------

a
The addition of a third state to our three-variable would result in

system of twenty-seven possible states:
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1 2

3 4 5 6

7

8 9 10 11 12 13

A

+ + + + + + + + +

_

_

_

_

B

+ + +

-- -000

+

+

+

+

C

+-0

+

+

-

o

+

-0

+

-0

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

^

~~~~~oooooooo

B

+

~ooo"l" + +
“0 + -0 + -0

C

—

—

+

-0

—

oo
+

-

5.16 Of course, most systems in which observers would be interested

have many more than three variables and their variables have many more than
three states.

The fact that it is possible to ennumerate and specify the

possible states of a system does not mean that it is often practical or
useful to do so.

One of the problems with much research, especially in

the field of education, is the lack of a methodology to deal with complex

systems consisting of a great many variables capable of having a great many
states.

Researchers are thus obliged to reduce the number of variables to

a manageable number and are therefore no longer dealing with concrete

systems but with abstracted systems.

There is a definite need, therefore,

for a method of dealing with complex systems which does not require a

specification of all of their possible states.
5.17 We can get closer to such a method by realizing that concrete

systems do not often behave in such a way that all of their states are

equally probable.

Instead, systems are organized in such a manner that

certain states are more probable than other states.

The more organized

a system is, the more improbable its behavior becomes.

A perfectly

organized system would have absolutely predictable behavior.

Most systems
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of interest to us fall between the two

extremes of being unorganized (in

which any state is equally probable) and being perfectly
organized (in which
every state is absolutely predictable).
5.18 The movement of a system from state to state over time is
its

behavior

3
.

The line of behavior thus is change from state to state

A system with a single line of behavior is a tightly organized system.

.

If

the observer knows the state that the system is in at a given point in

time he can predict with certainty the state of the system at some following point in time.

The line of behavior may or may not include all the

possible states the system may take.

A traditional traffic light, for

example, which alternates among red, yellow, and green states, utilizes
only three of its eight possible states.
and

7

These would be states 4, 6,

in the system of 5.14.

5.19 Some systems have more than one line of behavior and under

certain conditions will change from one line of behavior to another.

If

the traffic light has a "Walk" signal, for example, it has the capability
of interrupting one line of behavior (its regular cycle) to follow

another line of behavior, one with only a single state.
this would correspond to state

2

in 5.14, since the red and yellow

together serves as the "walk” signal.)

Following Ashby, we shall desig-

nate the change from one line of behavior to another

^Ibid

(In Massachusetts,

a

transformation

.

^Ashby

,

Introduction to Cybernetics

1961), pp. 10-16, 42-46.

,

(London:

Chapman and Hall,

4
.
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5.20 We are now in a position to make a fundamental distinction:
the distinction between change from state to state and change from
trans-

formation to transformation.
than the former.

However, a change
mation.

The latter is clearly of a different order

All behavior consists of change from state to state.

behavior is moving from transformation to transfor-

If a system has only one line of behavior, no matter how varied

and intricate, it will be unable to chapge its behavior

;

that is to say,

it will be unable to change the way in which it changes.

5.21 The importance of this distinction cannot be overemphasized.
Some systems may have a great number of richly varied states to pass

through and yet have only a single line of behavior.

Other systems may

have a limited number of states and yet a great many lines of behavior.
The first system may be capable of richer and more varied behavior than the
second, yet in one crucial respect it is more limited; it cannot change
its behavior.

It can neither adjust to different conditions nor adapt

to changing conditions.

The point is not that it can behave more richly;

the point is that it must behave more richly.

While its behavior consists

of more change, it cannot change its behavior.

5.22 Students of change, and those who consider themselves "change

agents" frequently get trapped by this distinction,
why.

It is frequently Impossible to determine from the system* s behavior

whether
If,

and it is easy to see

following

^

single line of behavior or changing its behavior

.

for example, a system cycles regularly among its transformations, so

that one line of behavior is followed regularly by another line of behavior,
it will appear to be following a single line of behavior.

If, on the

another.
other hand, the system moved randomly from one line of behavior to
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an observer would be hard put to determine
whether or not that system had

one or more lines of behavior.
5.23 It is, therefore, very difficult to distinguish
between those

a^

changes which

behavior alone.

behavior and changes

behavior from the system's

More knowledge is needed; not knowledge of the system's

states, but knowledge of the system's organization.

This is particularly

helpful to realize when we are dealing with complex systems.

The system's

behavior is a function of how it is organized rather than how its variables
can behave.

Any organization which limits the lines of behavior (usually

infinite) introduces powerful constraints into the system, for it means
that the state a variable may assume is a function of either a prior state
of that variable or the state of another variable, or both.

5.24 We can intuitively recognize that without constraints, that is
to say, without organization, it would be impossible to gain any useful

information either from or about the system.

If a system did, in fact,

follow all the lines of behavior which it was possible for it to follow,
the practical consequences for the observer would be the same as if the

system had only one line of behavior.

Being absolutely predictable and

absolutely unpredictable have the same information value.
5.25 In looking at concrete systems, therefore, we shall be more

interested in the nature of the constraints than in the nature of the
variables.

Systems of widely differing types can have similar sorts of

constraints, and we can learn much about all systems by studying the

various ways in which systems are organized.

This will be the approach

of this paper.

^See sections 8.6-8.20 below for elaboration.
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CHAPTER VI
ENVIRONMENT

6.1 The system we are looking steadily at exists
in a field of many

other systems, only some of which affect it or are
affected by it.

Just

as system components may have an infinite number of
attributes which are

not variables in the system, so, too, the system’s field may
contain an

inflnte number of variables which are not part of its environment.

Only

those variables which do affect a system or which are affected by
it are

parts of that system’s environment.
6.2 Environmental variables will be called parameters to distinguish

them from system variables.

Most of the systems of interest to us exist

in a rich environment; that is to say, they interact with a great many

parameters.

It will frequently be the case that the environments will

manifest some degree of organization; parameters will be subject to similar
sorts of constraints as system variables.

We may make the same sort of

observation about environments that we made about systems in sections
5.23-5.24.

An unorganized environment, one without constraints, would

be chaotic; parameter values would be completely unpredictable.

The only

system which could exist in such an environment would be a system without
constraints.

While we can hypothesize such environments and such systems,

no such concrete system or environment can really exist.

On the other

hand, a tightly-joined, completely organized environment, one in which

parameter values were completely predictable, would be appropriate for
systems with only singe lines of behaviors ~ that is, completely organized
systems
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6.3 Most environments, and certainly
those in which human beings exist,

are loosely-joined.^

They fall between being unjoined and
tightly-joined

just as most systems fall between being
unorganized and completely organized.

This observation is highly significant, for
it allows us to draw

parallels between the degree of organization in
"joined-ness” in the environment.

a

system and the degree of

It will be particularly useful in the

case of complex systems all of whose variables and
constraints are not

known to us.

If the environment is known to us and the system is
surviv-

ing, we can make highly probable Inferences about
the organization of the

system from our knowledge of the organization of the environment.

Even

more significant, if we wish to "change” the behavior of a complex
system
(or induce the system to change its behavior, which is not at all
the same

thing)

,

we can manipulate the environment by increasing or decreasing the

degree of organization which inhers in it.

Generally speaking, the greater

the degree of organization in the environment, the easier it is to control, and therefore change, the system.

Conversely, the more loosely-

joined the environment, the more necessary it is for the system to develop
self-control, that is, to be able to change itself.
6.4 The reverse is, of course, also true.

We can infer the degree of

organization in the environment from the behavior of the system.
lines of inquiry are useful.

Both

While the relationship of a system to its

environment will be the topic of the next chapter, for now it will suffice
to note that there is a relationship between the degree of organization

in the system and the degree of organization in the system’s environment.

6.5 Parameters, like variables, ordinarily can have a range of values

which fall within specified limits.

^Ashby, Design for a Brain

,

pp.

If the system variables can assume the

193-196.
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same

rai^

of states as the system's parameters,

capacity to be well-adapted to Its environment.

then that system has the
If the system's variables

have a more limited range of states, then
the system Is mal-adapted and
Its survival Is In jeopardy, or, at the
very least. It will be dystunc-

tional.
6.6 Some simple examples will illustrate this
important point.

If,

in a particular locality, winter temperatures
are likely to fall to -50

degrees and a car owner puts enough anti-freeze in his
radiator to protect
it to -30 degrees,

then the car is not well-adapted to its environment.

If a piece of music has a range of seven octaves and
a particular instru-

ment has a range of only four octaves, then the instrument will
not be
able to play that piece.

A language which has a great many terms to

describe the nuances of affection and love cannot be well-translated into
a language which has only a few such terms.

6.7 If, on the other hand, the variables have a wider range than the

parameters, the parameters will constrain the behavior of the system.
is to say,

That

the system will not be able to utilize the full range of its

available behavior.

If the environment is regularly more tightly organized

than the system, the system, if it is able to change, will become more

tightly organized; its range of behaviors will become more restricted.

Unneeded organs atrophy, unused knowledge disappears, unpracticed skills
leave the repetoire.

What remains, after a period of time, is a system

which is well-adapted to a more restrictive environment.
6.8 These remarks suggest what will have to be the central theme of
the following chapters:

environments.

the processes whereby systems relate to their

What we have said thus far has been true of all concrete
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systems.

What we say hereafter will be true
of only certain kinds of

systems:

those that have the capacity to change.

We will accept as

axiomatic an environment which falls between
being unorganized and being
tightly organized, between being unpredictable
and totally predictable,

because most concrete systems exist in such
an environment.

Given such

an environment, the fundamental question
we shall be asking is how systems

maintain themselves within it.

A4

7.1

CHAPTER VII
OPEN SYSTEMS

7.1 It is time to make some distinctions
among concrete systems.

What

we shall do in this chapter is classify
concrete systems in accordance with
their capacity to adapt to a changing
environment.

Closed Systems

7.2 We must first consider a class of systems
which are impervious
to their environments.

It is easy enough to conceive of such systems;

classical physics is based upon the study of such systems.
c losed

systems

;

We call them

they conduct no transactions with their environment.

They can receive neither matter nor energy nor information from
their

environment; they transmit neither matter, nor energy, nor information
to
their environment.

The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that closed

systems over time tend toward disorganization and attain their most

probable (random) distribution of matter and energy.
called entropy

.

This tendency is

We can see in nature many examples of entropy; indeed,

nature, when left alone, will always assume its most probable, least

organized state.

An untended garden is a clear example of this.

both Norbert Wiener

1

and Buckminster Fuller

to the best of our knowledge,

2

As

have reminded us, the universe

is a closed system which now contains all the

matter and energy it will ever contain.

Spaceship Earth is a closed

system.

^
2

1969)

The Human Use of Human Beings

,

(Garden City:

Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth

,

Doubleday Anchor, 1954)

(New York:

Simon and Schuster,
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7.3 Except for this cosmic level, however,
it is doubtful that any

concrete system can be completely closed.

Certainly the untended lawn

IS part of the eco-system and receives
nutrients from its environment.

Aside from trivial examples of hermetically sealed
caskets and the like
(trivial from the point of view of our analysis
but not necessarily

scientifically trivial), the closed system can be regarded
as the logical
limit towards which systems might tend, rather than
a state which concrete

systems can manifest.

Open Systems

7*4 The systems with which we are concerned, then, are open systems

which are involved in transactions with their environments.

There are

degrees of openness; some systems will conduct more transactions than
others.

The degree of openness is clearly significant to system survival;

the richer and more changeable the environment, the more openness becomes
a necessary

(though not sufficient) condition of system survival.

7.5 The transactions between a system and its environment consist

of exchanges of matter, energy, and information.

these are called inputs

;

When entering the system,

when leaving the system, they are called outputs

.

While we may talk about transactions with the environment in terms of
larger purposes systems are intended to serve, our point of view in this

chapter will be that open systems depend upon inputs and outputs in order
to maintain themselves so that they may serve what may be considered to

be larger purposes.

System survival is the first concern.

7.6 The significance of this viewpoint is by no means widely recognized.

To anticipate our argument somewhat, we may mention that many social
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scientists have developed models of social systems
which are essentially

based upon the theory of closed systems.^

The system is seen as ener-

gizing itself, finding its own level of optimal
performance which is

described as a state of equilibrium.

Inputs from the environment are

seen as intrusions or disturbances, upsetting the equilibrium.

System

processes are thus devoted to restoring the system either to its
previous
state of equilibrium by extruding the disturbances, or to a new state of

equilibrium by 'assimilating the inputs into the system.

The "norm" in

such conceptual systems is thus seen to be a tension-less, disturbancefree condition.

System processes are devoted to counteracting deviations

from this norm.
7.7 Open systems, on the other hand, thrive on deviation.

The

characteristics of open systems with which we are most concerned

- growth,

change, learning, and complexity - are based as much on deviation- amplifying

processes

4

as upon deviation-counterbalancing processes.

Without devia-

tions, such systems would not survive.
7.8 We may state axiomatically , therefore, that open systems main-

tain themselves through transactions with their environments.

We shall

now proceed to classify open systems in accordance with their ability to

maintain themselves in changing environments.
Non-adjusting systems

.

7

.

9

We begin with those systems which cannot

survive significant environmental change.

Such systems have only one line

of behavior, and that line of behavior can occur only at specified para-

3

see Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 19671 for a critique of closed system models.

^Maruyama, "The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual
Causal Processes," in Buckley (ed.). Modern Systems Research for the
Behavioral Scientist, (Chicago: Aldine, 1968).
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meter values.

It makes no difference whether we speak
of one parameter,

as in the case of an electrical

appliance which either has an energy source

or doesn’t, or of several parameters, as in the
case of a hothouse flower

which can survive only in an environment in which
temperatures, light,
moisture, and soil condition are carefully controlled.

In either case,

any significant change in parameter values will make it
impossible for
the system to maintain itself.

The essential point is that the system has

no way of changing or correcting its performance, since it can
perform in

only one way.
7.10 One characteristic of such systems is that they are easily con-

trolled.

If one can control the parameter values, one can control the

system absolutely.

If, however, one cannot control the parameter values,

ot if the parameter values fluctuate a great deal, the system's chances for

survival are slim.

Hospitals are equipped to provide carefully controlled

environments for patients who can survive only in those environments.
Incubators, for example, effectively limit the range of parameter values
to those within which the premature infant can survive.

7.11 Systems that can only behave in one way are well-adapted to envir-

onments that behave in only one way.

non-adjusting maintenance systems

.

We will refer to such systems as

The world is full of them and they are

of little interest to us.

Adjusting systems

.

7.12 Of much greater Interest is the class of

concrete open systems which we may call adj us ting systems

.

These systems

have the capacity to adjust their outputs to predetermined environmental
parameters.

The thermostatically controlled heating system is the classi-

cal example of an adjusting system.

Such a system must have a pre-set
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standard of performance "built in" to
the system against which it can
measure its actual performance.

The process by which it compares its
actual

performance against its desired performance is
called feedback

.

7.13 "Feedback" has gained currency in the
language as referring to

any information a system may receive about
its performance, but we shall

be using the term in a more restrictive sense
to refer to any information
a system receives from its performance which
serves to regulate its sub-

sequent performance.

The essential notion is regulation through a test-

ing of output values against parameter values.

values can be pre-determined
them.

,

If desired parameter

the system can be designed to adjust to

Thus, the thermostatically-controlled heating system will maintain

room temperature at a predetermined level.
level.

It cannot,

It cannot, however, vary that

for example, decide that the night-time temperature

should be 65 degrees and the day-time temperature should be 72 degrees.
These decisions come from outside the system.
at any given time is the system,’ s output.

or not the furnace is running at that time.

The actual room temperature

Note that this is true whether
The system has two states,

"on" and "off," and it is performing just as well when it is off as when
it is on.

better.)

(From the home-owner’s viewpoint, the more it is "off" the
If the house "holds" the heat produced by the furnace so that

the output variable and the environmental parameter approximate the same

value, the system will be performing optimally.

System variables thus

include the amount of space to be heated, the quality of insulation, the

height of the ceilings, and so forth, as well as the states of the components connected by circuitry.
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7.14 The "purpose" of the
thermostatically-controlled heating system,
then, is to maintain constancy of output
when measured against a pre-

set and pre-determined environmental
parameter.

We can generalize from

this example and make the same statement about
adjusting systems in general.

Through the mechanism of feedback, the adjusting
system can regulate

its actual output by measuring it against its
desired output as determined

by the environment.

The system will change from state to state depending

on the deviation of the actual output from the desired
output.

If there

were no deviation, of course, or if deviation within limits
was tolerated
by the environment, there would be nothing for the system
to adjust to.

While adjusting systems are designed to counter— balance deviation, they
also require deviation as a sine qua non of their existence.
is conceptually vital to the argument.

This point

Adjusting systems avoid large

and significant deviations from desired outputs by allowing small and

insignificant deviations from the output.

It is the deviations which

activate the system and initiate its line of behavior.

To speak metaphori-

cally, adjusting systems thrive on small deviations; they cannot survive

without them.
7.15 For all practical purposes, the difference between adjusting

systems and non-adjusting systems is slight and more a matter of convenience
than anything else.

After all, in place of the thermostat, one could have

a mere switch that would turn the furnace on and off;

the same purpose

would be accomplished with only slightly more inconvenience to the
residents of the house.

Conceptually, however, the difference is great

and powerful, for the adjusting system is self-regulating

.

Admittedly,

it is a very simple and limited sort of self-regulation, one that is

appropriate to very simple and limited sorts of environments, but the
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principal of self-regulation is the basis of
organization and life itself.
The simplicity of the adjusting system in
actuality, as well as its lack
of adaptability, should not blind us to the
significance of this difference.

7.16 At the same time, the attractiveness and
conceptual simplicity
of the adjusting system should not lead us into
equating adjustment and

self-regulations.

Adjustment is a special type of self-regulation

appropriate to special types of environments.

Many sophisticated social

and behavioral scientists have developed models of society
using the adjusting system as their point of departure.

institutions

Societal ''norms,” "roles," and

are seen as the parameters; actual behaviors of individuals

and groups are the system outputs, and the system performs by reducing
the deviation between the actual human behaviors and normative societal

expectations.

Such theories are attractive but inadequate to deal with

the phenomena of human systems.

To show why this is the case, we must

deal more specifically with the limitations of adjusting systems.
7.17 In the first place, adjusting systems have pre-set and pre-deter-

mined lines of behavior corresponding to the pre-set and pre-determined

parameter values the system is to match.
is inconsequential,

The number of lines of behavior

as is the number of pre-determined parameters.

Adjust-

ing systems may be extremely complex, but they are never unpredictable

Adjusting systems are, therefore, deterministic

(unless they malfunction).

Ashby defines determinancy as that situation in which "each part, if in
a

particular state Internally and affected by particular conditions

externally, will behave in one way only."^

^

Design for a Brain

,

p

.

9

.
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7.18 Hare gives a beautiful example
of an exceedingly complex adjusting system

6

- an automatic elevator
system which must test and adjust its

performance to a complex set of conditions.

However, if at any given time

those conditions are known, the system's behavior
can be infallibly pre-

dicted

.

7.19 In the second place, and following from
the first, adjusting

systems are appropriate only in environments whose
parameters can be con-

trolled and specified.

Each state of the system depends upon the testing

of its performance against these parameters.
is controlled by the environment.

The behavior of the system

This, of course, is a severe limitation

upon the system's ability to regulate itself.
7.20 The popular television series. Mission

:

Impossible

is based upon

,

the premise that the crooks and tyrants to be thwarted and destroyed are

adjusting systems who will react in predictable ways to specified environmental conditions as contrived by the team of heroes.

The entertainment

value of the show is due in large measure to the juxtaposition of a
totally predictable response to a totally improbable contrived environment.

The same comment can be made about Rube Goldberg's marvelously

complicated adjusting systems which accomplish very simple tasks.
7.21 Finally, the system has no choice.

It cannot decide whether or

not to counterbalance deviations from its desired performance.

It must

decide to take a lunch break and come back to its job later.
act upon its feedback.

If it does not,

It cannot

it is malfunctioning.

7.22 The simplist way of summarizing the limitations of the adjusting

system is to say that it must be programmed by its environment.

Systems Analysis: A Diagnostic Approach
and World, 1967), pp. 61-63.

,

(New York:

Given

Harcourt, Brace,
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the program, its behavior is uniquely
and specifically determined.

The

horror of HAL, the computer in ”2001: A Space
Odyssey,” was that it some7.23
how had "learned” to behave without a program.
Before any given concrete system is construed to be
an adjusting
system, therefore, the observer must decide whether the
system is subject
to these limitations;
1.

The system's lines of behavior can be specified;

2.

Environmental parameters can be specified;

3.

The system's behavior is programmed by the environment.

Learning Systems

7.24 The next class of systems we consider can exist in environments

which cannot be either entirely predictable nor entirely controlled.
shall designate such systems as learning systems

.

We

Learning systems have

the capacity to adapt their behavior to new and continually changing

environmental circumstances.

While adjusting systems can vary their

outputs, learning systems can change their internal organization as well.

While adjusting systems require small deviations in order to prevent
large deviations from desired parameter values, learning systems may

amplify deviation.

While adjusting systems maintain a pre-determined

level of organization, learning systems tend towards elaborated structures and higher levels of organization.

While adjusting systems are

deterministic, learning systems are probabilistic.
7.25 In sum, while adjusting systems cannot be responsive to environ-

mental change, learning systems can, and because they can, they must.
they do not, they will not survive.

The difference between adjusting

and learning systems is one of kind, not of degree.

Adjusting systems

If
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and learning systems occupy very different
environments, regardless of
their physical proximity.

Since the environments in which human beings

exist are neither completely predictable nor
completely controllable, the

human being is the best example of a learning
system.

Phylogenetically

the evolution of the species is evedence of
learning.

Ontogenetically

the life cycle of the organism provides the same
evidence.

7.26 In using the human being as our prototypical
learning system,

we must recognize that we have changed our point of
view somewhat from
that of the system designer to that of the system analyst.

We shall not

enter the controversy over whether learning systems can be designed,
a

controversy which has tended to divide cyberneticians and organismic
theorists.

We shall instead ask:

given a learning system, how does it

adapt to a changing environment?
7.27 The simple answer, of course, is that it adapts by changing -

both its output and its internal organization

- to

counter-balance those

environmental changes which would jeopardize the survival of the system.
While the states of environmental parameters at any given time may be

neither predictable nor controllable, the range within which parameter
values may fall is roughly predictable.

If the range is larger than the

system can tolerate, the system will create what is, in effect, an internal

environment which will keep those system variables essential to the survival of the system within the range necessary for their survival.

In

other words, the system has the capacity to maintain a steady state in
the presence of an environment which changes unpredictably , but within

predictable limits.
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7.28 The notion of "steady state" has
come to have two meanings in
the literature of systems theory.

work of Walter

B.

On the one hand, following the classical

Cannon^, it has come to be identified with
homeostasis

,

the complex and intricate processes by which
an organism adapts to

variability in the environment.

The physiological stability an organism

achieves is not due to the stability of physiological
structures or
materials.

Indeed, the most vital of these structures and materials
are

so unstable that the most minute fluctuation or change
in their environment

could well be fatal to the organism.

Taken individually, the vital

physiological systems are non adjusting, yet taken together they form
a
marvelous learning system.
When we consider the extreme instability of
our bodily structure, its readiness for disturbance by the slightest application of external forces and the rapid onset of its
decomposition as soon as favoring circumstances are withdrawn, its persistance through
many decades seems almost miraculous. The
wonder increases when we realize that the
system is open, engaging in free exchange
with the outer world, and that the structure
itself is not permanent but is being continuously broken down by the wear and tear
of action, and is continuously built up
again by processes of repair.®
7.29 This notion of "steady state," then, emphasizes the processes by

which a system composed of inherently unstable components creates its own
internal stability through a high degree of specialized functions, division

^

The Wisdom of the Body

^Ibid

.

,

p

.

20

,

(New York:

Norton, 1963).
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of labor, and checks and balances.

The steady state of the whole system

is achieved through the incessant
activity and changing relationships of

Its parts.

Change is of the essence of steady state; a
system that cannot

change its internal organization cannot survive
in an unpredictably changing environment.

7.30 On the other hand, there is a common view of
"steady state" which

makes "growth" of the essence.

This school of thought views the learning

system over time, and notes that the steady states achieved by
the systems
themselves change - that homeostasis can be dynamic.

Adapting (learning)

systems not only maintain their organization through change, but
also change
their organization through elaboration of structure and differentiation of
function.

Cannon's notion of homeostasis does not adequately allow for

structure-elaborating processes.

The biologist, Emerson^, is one of the

most persuasive advocates of extending the notion of homeostasis to

structure-elaborating processes.

Cannon, himself, encouraged and

indulged in such extentions of his concept.
Bodily homeostasis
results in liberating those functions of the nervous system
that adapt the organism to new situations,
from the necessity of paying routine attention to the management of the details of
bare existence.
The main service of
social homeostasis would be to support
bodily homeostasis.
It would therefore help
.

.

.

.

.

9

in Grinker, ed.. Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior
Basic Books, 1967), pp. 147-163.

,

(New York:

^^Talcott Parsons acknowledges his debt to Emerson ("On Building Social
System Theory," Daedalus Fall, 1970, p.831) in reinforcing his movement
from equilibria! to homeostatic models of social processes.
,
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to release the highest activities
of the
nervous system for adventure and achievement.
With essential needs assured, the
Priceless unessentials could be freely
sought
.

7.31 Cannon, in my view, has been richly
misunderstood by those who

would extend his physiological notion of homeostasis
to non-physiological
domains.

While there is no doubt that learning systems require
the abil-

ity to maintain steady states among their critical
subsystems, we may

question whether the structure-elaborating processes can best
be viewed
as

dynamic

homeostasis.

Intuitively we observe that many learning

systems appear to move out of steady states towards greater disequilibrium,
tension, and deviation.

What we shall later (13.6B-) call "proactive"

learning describes the learning system’s propensity for creativity,
discover, and inquiry, for dealing with hypotheses, conjectures, and
fantasies.

Attempts to subsume these propensities under the rubric of

"dyanmic homeostasis" robs the term of much of its rigor.

Learning

systems which manifest these propensities achieve new steady states only

incidentally, and not necessarily as a response to environmental variety.
7.32 In dealing with learning systems, therefore, we shall Incline

towards the first, more restrictive, usage of "homeostasis," and shall

view the steady state as one which achieves stability in a changing en-

vironment through internal change.

At the same time, we acknowledge

that change in learning systems can extend beyond homeostasis, that

learning systems require the generation as well as the resolution of
tension, instability, and deviation.

In other words, change in learning

systems cannot be ascribed solely to change in their environments.
11

Cannon,

cit

.

p.

323.

The
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capacity to dream, to wish, and to hope are
among the "priceless unessentials" which, from our point of view, are
non-homeostatic in nature.
7.33 Unlike the adjusting system, in which
desired environmental

parameters were "built in" to the system, the
adapting system must receive
a steady flow of information from the
environment, and this information

must be in a form which is understood by the system.

The learning system

must include some sort of decoder, and the decoder
must be capable of

handling as much information as the system will need to
represent the environment for Its purposes.

The adaptability of the system will frequently

depend upon the ability of the decoder to handle the variety
which exists
in the environment.

We have all had the experience of attending foreign-

language films in which we know that the English sub— titles were only
pale

approximations of the spoken dialogue.
deal, but not what it was.

We knew that we were missing a

Similarly, the usefulness of any code

depends upon its ability to handle all the variety that exists in the
environment.

The Morse Code can handle all possible messages because it

has the same variety as the alphabet it is encoding.
7.34 We must remind ourselves that the environment, according to
6.1, consists only of those parameters which do affect the system.

A blind

person and a deaf person walking down the same street would inhabit very
different environments, regardless of the fact that they may occupy nearly
identical physical space.

Visual data would not affect the first, and

auditory data would not affect the second.

There is an important concep-

tual difference, however, in thinking of each as an impaired system unable
to encode important environmental data and thinking of them as different

systems inhabiting different’ environments

.

The second approach, of course.
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Is the one we are using In this paper.

If the blind person and the deaf

person were to join forces the result would be
a single system able to
encode both visual and auditory information.
7.35 It is worth adding here that two persons
with fully functioning

sensory apparatus walking down the same street
may also be inhabiting

different environments.

If one is hurrying to make an appointment for
which

he is late and the other is ambling down the street
taking in all the

sights and sounds, each will be encoding very different
information from
the environment.

The implication of these examples is that for concrete

learning systems there are no normative environments, only an
infinite

number of different environments which may co-exist for different
systems
in the same space/time field.

12

7.36 Once the information has entered the system as input and has been

encoded into a form that can be processed by the system, the system must
be capable of at least as much variety as the environment it is adapting
to.

"When the internal organization of an adaptive system acquires

features that permit it to discriminate, act upon, and respond to aspects
of the environmental variety and its constraints, we say that the system

has mapped part of the environmental variety and constraints into its

organization."

13

It is this process of mapping which activates the

homeostatic mechanisms so that at all times they are responding to the
actual environmental conditions which exist.

see footnote
13

Cliffs:

1

to section 4.2.

Buckley, Walter, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory
Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 63. Emphasis added.

,

(Englewood
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7.37 We must note that if it were possible
to map in advance all

possible environmental variety into the system
we would have

a

very complex

adjusting system which would behave in precisely
the same way as a learning
system.

To construct an adjusting system which behaves
as though it were

learning is well within the capability of science
and engineering.

To

assume, however, that in so doing we have explained
learning is a serious

error 14

^
,

^
or the
learning system is not one which has a greater number of

built-in possible behaviors, but instead has a built-in plan for
generating
appropriate behaviors for a great number of environmental situations.
7.38 The learning system can thus adapt its behavior in a way
that the

adjusting system cannot.
tinction.

The

adaptable

Colloguial language has alwyas made this dis-

person — or organization

- is one

who can change

his behavior appropriately to the situation at hand without knowing in

advance what the situation may be, thus enhancing his ability to survive
in a wide variety of situations.

The question that system designers and

system analysts must ask is whether the environment is more suitable for
an adjusting system or an adapting system.

The ability to survive in a

wide variety of situations can be disf unctional if there are not a wide

variety of situations to adapt to.

As Ashby has pointed out^^, no part-

icular form of system organization is intrinsically good or bad, but is

relative to the environment in which it exists.

An adapting system is not

It is an error that limits the usefulness of Ashby's two extraordinary books. Design for a Brain and Introduction to Cybernetics
To simulate learning is not the same thing as accounting for it in
learning systems.
.

^^in Buckley, Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist
(Chicago:
Aldine, 1968), pp. 111-113.

,
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"better" than adjusting system in any
absolute sense; it is wasteful and

inefficient in a restircted environment.

Again, our common vocabulary re-

flects this destinction; we talk of "adapting"
to new situations, but of

adjusting

to,

of children

say, army life.

We might comment that we ordinarily talk

adjusting" to school, which says something, probably
true,

about the school as an environment.
7.39 We may now return to our arguement in 7.36 and
ask what enables

an adapting system to both behave appropriately
and maintain a steady state.

An essential part of the answer is that the adapting system
has a memory

which can store properly encoded environmental input as well as
previously
successful plans for behavior.

It must be stressed that the use of the

term "memory" implies no vitalistic explanation of adaptive behavior; we
are talking about organization which can both be designed, observed, and

modeled.

The memory function stores the inputs and the plans in highly

discrete segments so that the system can not only retrieve the input
but can combine the input data in a limitless number of ways so that the

"interior environment," or the system's image of the external environment,
is extraordinarily flexible.

We need think only of the linguistic

capacity of human beings who live constantly with the need to respond

verbally to unpredictable utterances from the environment.

A finite num-

ber of sounds and a finite set of combinatorial rules can generate an

infinite number of understandable utterances, none of which was in the
system's memory.
7.40 Thus, in addition to storing the environmental input, the

adapting system can store plans for combining the input data and for
acting upon the various combinations of data that it can generate.
in effect, organize Itself to meet new environmental conditions.

It can,
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7.41 The ability of a system to adapt
to environmental change by learn-

ing is limited by the plans built-in to
the system’s memory.

system does not have the capacity to change
its plans.

The adapting

It can neither

change its template nor adapt to crises or
emergencies wherein environ-

mental parameters may assume values beyond their
customary limits.
systems are essentially re-active, not pro-active.

Adapting

They can follow rich

and complex plans for changing both their lines of
behavior and their

organization, but they cannot change these plans.

Just as adjusting sys-

tems are slaves to their input, so are learning systems
slaves to their

plans.
less.

It is a higher order of slavery, to be sure, but slavery
nonethe-

A system which is to survive in an environment characterized by
changing limits of variation must have the capacity to change

its plans as well as its behavior.

how to learn.

Such a system must be able to learn

We shall be considering such systems shortly.

7.42 Before we leave learning systems, however, we must stress two

characteristics which distinguish them from adjusting systems, both of which
can be inferred from the preceding treatment.

First, the enhanced survival

value of learning systems is due to their ability to achieve steady states

independent of initial conditions or prior steady states.

Their stability

is always with reference to actual environmental conditions rather than

reference to a set of assigned variable values.

For this reason, it is

impossible to predict with certainty what the values of any future steady
state might be from the values of a given steady state.

Depending on the

number and complexity of its plans, a learning system can arrive at a
steady state through a wide variety of ways of re-ordering its internal

organization.

A steady state may require

a greater degree of organization
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(if the environment becomes more highly
organized) so that the system must

elaborate its structure and continually amplify
the deviation from its
prior conditions.

Ecology provides splendid examples of the difference

between an adjusting system and a learning system in
this regard.

Every

schoolchild knows that there is a relationship between the
size of

a

species population

in a given area and the availability of food.

Adjust-

ment mechanisms regulate the size of the population to that
which the
supply of food can accomodate.

Ordinarily this is accomplished by dim-

inishing the size of the population through death, disease, and declining
birth-rate.

Human beings, however, also have the option of increasing

the supply of food to accomodate an increasing population.

illustrates

X6

As Maruyama

the growth of cities can be explained as an example of

,

deviation-amplifying adaptation.
7.43 This suggests the second important point.

Learning systems

can act upon their environments to maintain them within the limits that
the systems can adapt to.

There is a nonlinear relationship between

system inputs and outputs; each influences the other.

The inputs re-

ceived by the system are more likely to be encodable because they have

been influenced by the system’s outputs.

Just as earlier we spoke of the

adapting system's capacity to map environmental features into its internal organization, so, too, the system can project aspects of its own

organization into the environment.^^

X6
°0p.

cit

.

,

Not all learning systems have this

in Buckley, p. 305.

^^Laszlo, Ervin, System, Structure, and Experience
and Breach, 1969), pp. 5-6.

,

(New York:

Gordon
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capacity, but most living systems do.

This kind of circular causality,

of course, enhances the chances of system
survival by exercising some con-

trol over the environment to which it must
adapt.
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CHAPTER VIII
INPUTS

8.1 ''Input” is a generic term denoting the
environmental features

which enter the system to be processed, transformed,
and utilized both
to maintain the system and to produce outputs
which re-enter the envir-

onment.

All open systems have inputs as a condition of their existence,

although systems will vary widely in their ability to accept differing
amounts and differing kinds of inputs.

All systems have boundaries and

threshholds which serve to limit inputs to those which can be processed
by the system.

The boundary and threshhold act as filters to protect

the system from inputs which would disturb system functioning or threaten

system existence.

If a system exists in a space/time field which contains

many potentially dangerous inputs, the boundary and threshhold functions

become of paramount importance (7.10).
to process environmental variety

The greater the system's capacity

(7.33) when that variety is, in fact,

present, the more stable the system will be and the less its survival will

depend upon the vigilant maintenance of boundaries and threshholds.

This

hypothesis receives striking corroboration from history; the more energy
a political entity devotes to its boundary functions - to preventing

"harmful” inputs from entering the system - the more "harmful” those
inputs become if they do, in fact, enter.
8.2 By definition, our taxonomy in Chapter Four indicates the cap-

acity of the system to process both varied kinds and varied amounts of
input.

The non-adjusting system accepts only specified kinds and

specified amounts of input.

system will malfunction.

If either amount or kind of input varies,

In an electrical system, fuses and circuit-

the
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breakers act as threshholds to prevent
overloaded circuits.
there are minimal as well as maximal
threshholds.

^

However,

Too little Input Is as

damaging to the non-adjusting system
as too much or too varied Input.
If the energy Input to a
non-adjusting system falls below the threshhold,

the system will also malfunction.

8.3 Adjusting systems require a greater
range in the amount of input,

although not necessarily in the kind of input.

Generally speaking, the

output of an adjusting system will vary Inversely
with the input; thus

variation of input from a specified norm is a
precondition of an adjusting
system

s

existence.

The threshholds must therefore be wide enough to
per-

mit minor deviations to enter the system but narrow
enough to prevent

major deviations to injure the system's processes, which cannot be
changed.
8.4 Learning systems require great

variety in both the amounts and

kinds of inputs, to the extent that if the environment does not
naturally

contain sufficient variety, the system, through its outputs, will enrich
the environment to provide sufficiently varied inputs.

The boundaries of

learning systems are less easily ascertained than the boundaries of less

adaptable systems.

They are dynamic, as the system is; their threshholds

may be indetectable to an observer whose threshholds are narrower than
theirs.

The threshholds of learning systems are idiosynchratic

may expand or contract over time.

;

they

Two interacting learning systems may

have very different threshholds, even if we remember that we are talking
about the admissability of input, not its interpretation.

There is the

story of the child who, when asked by his teacher to describe "infinity,"

^This should not be confused with adjustment processes which use
negative feedback. The circuit-breaker terminates system performance;
it does not correct it.
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replied, "Infinity is like a Quaker
Oats box."
be serious.

The boy was chastised to

Test of creativity, or "divergent
thinking" are usually

based upon the assumption that the
investigator is more divergent than the
subject and can, therefore, ascertain the
degree of the subject's creativity.

8.5 Inputs may be classified in several
ways.

between matter-energy and information inputs.^

Miller distinguishes

We shall not develop the

notions of "matter" and "energy," for while the
reaer may not be know-

ledgeable in the disciplines dealing with them, he
will know the appropriate domains in which they fall.

"Inforamtion,

"

hoever, is used in the

special sense developed by communication theory and requires
special
explanation.
8-6 Information is a measure of the degree of uncertainty in a given

situation, and is related both to the number of choices the sender of a

message has to select his messages from and to the knowledge that the
receiver has of the number of choices from which a particular message
was selected.

The Information value of any message will vary directly

with
the greater number of possible messages from which the particular

a.

message was selected;
the degree of organization in the environment sending the message.

b.

The information value of a message will vary inversely with:
a.

the constraints upon the transmitter

b.

the degree of probability in the environment.

2

Miller, James G., "The Nature of Living Systems" in Behavioral
Science vol. 16, 1971, pp. 279-281.
,
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8.7 We can see this more clearly by
forming the following table
oR6ftNuar/oA/

t

/

3
\

environment, ranging from high on the left to
low on the right.

The vert-

ical continuum represents the degree of choice
of the sender, ranging from

high at the top to low at the bottom.

Box One represents a highly-organ-

ized environment, one with a high degree of
predictability and constraint
and a low degree of probability.

The sender has a high degree of choice

in selecting the messages he will send.

Because the environment is

highly organized and highly predictable, it will require fewer
messages
to describe that environment, and each message will convey more
informa-

tion about it.
In Box Two, the environment is poorly organized with a low degree of

predictability.

It will take more messages to describe that environment,

and each message will contain less information about the environment.

The

sender, however, has a high degree of choice, and so, despite the environ-

ments low degree of organization, given enough time, he can still describe
it, although it will require many more messages to do so.

Box Three posts a highly-organized environment, but a sender who is

highly constrained, with little or no choice; let us say that he is constrained to send only one message.

Whether or not that message contained

much information for the receiver would depend upon the receiver's

knowledge of both the environment's organization and the sender's constraints.
Because the environment is highly-organized, it is possible for a con-

strained message to convey information about it; however, there is no
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possibility for the accuracy of the message
to be ascertained.

Put another
way, there would be no room for
error since the sender could not
correct

his message.

Finally, in Box Four, the environment has
little organization and the

sender has little choice.

Since it would take a great many messages
to

describe that environment, and since the sender
is constrained to

a few

messages, it will be impossible for the sender
to describe the environment, and the information value of the message will
tend towards zero.
8.8 To illustrate, let us imagine an automobile
engine and the

dashboard guages.

A smoothly- running engine is a highly-organized system;

the performance of each component is dependent upon the
performance of

other components.

The gauges provide a variety of information

about the

performance of this system: temperature, oil level, speed, gas level,
and so forth.

Assuming that the gauges are working smoothly, they will

at any given time provide accurate information about the system as a

whole.

Note that the driver need not know much about how the engine works

to know that it is working smoothly.

This is an instance of a Box One

situation
8.9 Now let us assume that the engine begins to malfunction through

some diminution in its degree of organization.

erature guage begins to indicate overheating.
something is wrong, but not what is wrong.

Let us say that the temp-

The gauge indicates that

More information is needed,

and the driver will either examine the engine or take the car to a mechanic
to find out whether the difficulty is a leak in the radiator, evaporation

of fluid, a loose fan-belt, or whatever.

The mechanic will have a systema-

tic way of examining the problem, based upon the ease of investigation and
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the probability of error.
in an organised system.

Some malfunctions are more likely
than others
As the system becomes Increasingly
disorganized

It takes an Increasingly greater
number of messages to describe it.

This

is an example of a Box Two situation.

8.10 So far we can generalize to say
that the more organized the

system (or the environment) the less
information is necessary to describe
it,

to predict its behavior, and, as we
shall soon see,

to control it.

Likewise, the more organized the system, the
greater the information value
of any given message.

Conversely, the less organized the system, the

more information is necessary to describe,
predict, or control it, and
the less the information value of any given
message.

8.11 Now let us assume a well-functioning, highly-organized
engine,

but a very limited gauge, perhaps a light that goes on when
the system is

overheated.

In this instance, the gauge can give only two messages -

either the system is overheated or it is not overheated.
erature passes the threshhold, a light goes on.

When the temp-

The gauge cannot indicate

that the system is becoming overheated, only that it has become overheated.
Or, let us assume a more extreme case:

bulb is burned out, or a fuse is blown.

the gauge is broken, the light
If the driver does not know

that the gauge is not working, he may assume that the lack of a light

indicates that the system is not overheated.

Most of the time he will

be right, but some of the time he will be wrong.

Since the gauge can

only sense one message, there is no way of validating its accuracy.

In

this case, the driver is getting no information about the cooling system,

but he doesn’t know that he is getting no information.

When he dis-

covers that the gauge is malfunctioning, he must either get it fixed or
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make extra effort to maintain the system
in a high degree of organization.

Whenever he stops for gas, let us say, he will
check the fluid level and
the fan belt to get the information that
the gauge, because of its limited

choice, cannot give him.

This illustrates a Box Three situation, and

demonstrates that a limitation on the freedom choice
of the message
sender reduces the information value of the message.
8.12 Finally, we come to Box Four, the loosely organized
system and
the highly constricted transmitter.

If the engine doesn't work and the

gauges don t work, the driver can get no information about the
system.

When his car is towed in to the mechanic, the mechanic will start
probing
the system according to the same two principles we mentioned in 8.9:
the ease of investigation and probability of malfunction.

If the car

has been really neglected, the chance that any one repair will restore
it to proper functioning is minimal.

The mechanic will have to put the

car through a great many tests, each of which will provide minimal infor-

mation about the whole system, but taken together will provide a great
deal of information.

If the mechanic is trained to send a wide variety

of messages to the car, ultimately he will be able to restore it.

If,

however, like many do-it-yourself mechanics, he can only kick it, the

chances of restoration are slim.
8.13 Our illustration has chosen a deterministic system, the car
engine, to explain the concept of information.

It should be clear to

the reader that the more probabilistic the system and the more that the

system's organization is continually changing, the more difficult it

becomes for a constrained transmitter to send messages about the system.
The messages describing the state of a changing system at any given point
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in time may not, in fact, describe
the system at the point in
time that
the receiver receives the message.

8.14 It will frequently happen that
the receiving system will not

know the range of the transmitter's
freedom of choice of messages.

I

can recall with both delight and dismay
the first time my baby daughter

pointed to me and said "da-da.”

My bubble soon burst when she pointed at

other members of the family and said "da-da."

It may take repeated trans-

missions under a variety of circumstances before
the range of choice can
be roughly ascertained.

The driver may not discover that the needle in

the gas tank gauge is stuck until he runs out of
gas.

8.15 There is one more observation we must make about
information
inputs.

The more probable the message, the less information it
contains.

Probability, in this sense, is the inverse of organization; the law
of
entropy, developed within the theory of closed systems, states that
without inputs a system will ultimately assume its most probable,
that is to

say its least organized, state.

While open systems are by definition

negentropic, some systems are more open than others and are more capable
of maintaining a high degree of organization.

good evidence of this.

Language systems provide

Given the phrase, "once upon a

,"

most

school children could predict the missing word with almost perfect
accuracy, for the high degree of organization of our language makes it

improbable that the missing word would be other than "time."

If it were

to turn out to be "mattress" we would receive more information that if
it were "time," since "mattress" is less probable than time.

If the

missing word turned out to be "the," this would be so very unpredictable
that we would suspect an error in transmission.

Certain words follow
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other words with great regularity
In our language.

If this were not the

case, If any word were equally
probable after any other word, we would
be

unable to conmunicate at all.

Just so. If our environment were not

organized similarly, if any event or
situation with equal probability,
we would be unable to survive in it.
8.16 This is one area where our common
vocabulary plays tricks on
us;

if we say that a given outcome or result
is "highly probable," it

is only because the environment

(or the system) is highly improbable.

It IS only because of the constraints in the
environment which limit the

probable behavior of its components that any given event or
situation
becomes more probable.
8.17 Miller has constructed the following table^ to show
the rela-

tionships between various terms used to talk about information
and organ
ization.

Each term is the antonym of the other in the same row; the

terms in each column are roughly synonymous in that they are different

ways of describing the same phenomenon.

Information

Uncertainty

Negentropy

Entropy

Signal

Noise

Accuracy

Error

Form

Chaos

Regularity

Randomness

Pattern or form

Lack of pattern or formlessness

Order

Disorder

Organization

Disorganization

Regular Complexity

Irregular Complexity

3

"Living Systems:
Basic Concepts" in Gray, Duhl, and Rizzo, General
System Theory and Psychiatry (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 67.
,
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Heterogeneity

Homogeneity

Improbability

Probability

Predictability

Unpredictability

8.18 The value of information to the
system will thus depend upon
the character of the environment presenting
the input.

It will also de-

pend upon the capacity of the system to process
the information which

enters it.

We shall be talking about system processes
in the next chapter,

but for now we shall suggest that the ability of
the environment to control the system is directly related to its ability
both to provide infor-

mation to it and to gain information from it.

The ability of the system

to control the environment is likewise directly
related to its information

processing capacity.

If the system is capable of acting upon more infor-

mation than the environment or a particular system in the environment,
is
able to send, the environment will be unable to control the
system.

reciprocal is also true.
of Chapter Four;

The

This is but another way of stating the message

that there must be (and therefore is) congruence be-

tween the system and its environments.
8.19 Control is closely related to predictability.

The abount of in-

formation necessary to predict the behavior of a system is also the amount
of information necessary to control that system.

If,

in the following

diagram, systems A and B stand in interaction and A must control

B,

i.e., A*s output will be B's input, and A requires output ”x" from B, A

must know not only all the ways "y" can be transformed to "x" but also

all the ways in which "y” might be transformed to some other output, say
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"z,” instead of ”x."

If, given ”y," B can produce
either "x" or "z,”

A’s control over B is lacking.

To increase its control, A tnust
reduce

the variety in B, and to do this it
must have greater variety than

B.

It

must be able to produce input into B which,
in addition to "y" will con-

strain B’s ability to produce "z.”

If, by failing to produce ”x,"
B

in some way jeopardizes A, then B's
control over A is greater than A's

control over B.

Let us say that B desires or needs input
"v.”

By pro-

ducing "z" instead of

”x,''

or in place of, "y.”

If A produces "v” and "y,” B will produce
"x.”

B can induce A to provide ”b" in addition
to,

However, "x” input into A leads to "y” output
which, in turn, produces
z

as frequently as it produces "x."

Viewed as B's environment, A must

be able to provide both "v" and "y" to be able
to insure that B will

produce "x."

Viewed as A's environment,

B

must be able to provide both

"x" and "z" to insure that A will produce "v."

In such a mutually

causitive system, we can say that control is shared; each system has
enough information a variety to control the other.
8.20 Control and prediction are not identical, however.

I

may pre-

dict with absolute accuracy that the sun will rise tomorrow, that a train
on a track will run in a given direction, or that a child will sneeze if
I

throw pepper at his nose.

Control Implies the ability to produce differ-

ent results from the same initial conditions or similar results from

different initial conditions.

Knowledge of a deterministic relationship

between initial conditions and subsequent states may give the appearance
of control to those who are unaware of the deterministic nature of the

system.

Thus there can be predictability without control.

be control without predictability, however.

There cannot
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8.21 The distinction between matter, energy,
and information has helped
us focus on some distinctive properties of
the latter, but we should not

forget that the distinction is highly artificial.

Any given input into

the system is likely to be composed of both
matter/energy and information.

This is similar to the distinction in Chapter Two
between components and

variables.

Just as we said that it was appropriate to look at a
system

component as a particular disposition of variables at a given
point in
time, so, too, we can look at an input datum as a particular
disposition

of matter/energy and information at a particular point in time.

8.22 Berrien has provided another helpful way of classifying inputs

according to function.
signal inputs.

4

He distinguishes between maintenance inputs and

Again, this tends to be an artificial distinction, since

many, if not most, inputs will have both maintenance and signal functions,
t>ut

it is helpful, when dealing with open systems, to distinguish between

those inputs which are essential if the system is to function properly
and those inputs, the processing of which

^ the

system’s function.

8.23 Maintenance inputs are essentially those which are necessary to

counteract the inevitable entropy which would occur if they were not
available.

All open systems require an energy input to maintain them-

selves; all living systems, at least through the level of the organism,

require matter inputs so that metabolic processes may occur.

We add the

qualification because it is difficult to conceptualize the nature of
maintenance matter-input at the supra-organism level, e.g. group or
organization, except as new members are added to replace members who
leave the group for one reason or another.

Open systems above the non-

^Berrien, F. Kenneth, General and Social Systems
1968), p. 25.

,

(Brunswick:

Rutgers,
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adjusting level require some information
inputs to permit the adaptive
processes to occur.

Non-adjusting systems do not require
information in-

put, since they cannot process it;
nonetheless every matter or energy trans-

mission from the environment will contain
some information value.
8.24 For the learning system, maintenance
inputs are those which

activate the homeostatic mechanisms which enable
the system to maintain
a steady state.

In the human being,

for example, a steady maintenance

input IS required for life, although signal Inputs
may fluctuate a great
deal.

We might say that the human being when asleep,
is receiving only,

or primarily maintenance inputs.

8.25 The case is put nicely by Lashley:^

"...

the input is never into a quies-

cent or static system, but always into a

system which is already actively excited
and organized.

In the intact organism,

behavior is the result of interaction of
this background of excitation with input

from any designated stimulus."
It is the maintenance inputs which provide and maintain the excitation.

Before any system can process signal inputs, therefore, maintenance inputs

must be present.
8.26 Signal inputs are those that the functioning open system receives

which, through its processes, are transformed into outputs.

The non-

adjusting system will accept only specific signal inputs that it has been

^in Berrien, ££. cit

.

,

p.

25.
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designed to accept, and these will be
task-specific inputs.

The adjusting

system will accept a wider range of signal
inputs, although the modes of
their values will be restricted to those
the system can process.
Thus,
a thermostatically-controlled heating
system will accept as signal inputs

both the desired temperature as determined
by the environment and the
actual temperature as determined by its output.

humidity or dust-content signal inputs.

It will not accept

The learning system will accept

all those inputs, both ranges and modes, that
it can encode.

8.27 Human beings receive signal inputs primarily
through their sen-

sory organs, which also act as filters.

signal

The presence of a particular

in the environment does not necessarily mean that it
is accepted

by the system as input.

Learning systems are highly selective in accept-

ing signal Inputs, much more so than is the case with maintenance
inputs.

8.28 The distinction between maintenance and signal inputs is

partiuclarly helpful in looking at groups and organizations as systems.
It helps us to distinguish,

for example, between working conditions (main-

tenance inputs) and the work itself (processed from signal inputs).

Some

useful and researchable hypotheses can be formed about the relationship

between maintenance and signal inputs and the portion of a system's energy
devoted to the processing of each.

We might expect, for example, that

the more the system must process maintenance inputs, the less adaptable
it may be.

As a corollary, we can suggest that the more components in-

volved in maintenance input processing, the less likely that those components or that the system will be learning systems, although the greater the

likelihood that the maintenance functions will be performed.
8.29 If, for example, an organization must expend a great deal of

energy and time determining the rules, regulations, and protocol under
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which it will operate, the less energy
and time it will have to operate
those rules, regulations, and protocol.
The more members who are
engaged in these activities, the less
time and energy these members will
have to process signal inputs.
8.30 This discussion of inputs has been
extended because everything

said in this chapter is true of processes
and outputs as well.

Whether

any phenomenon is considered input, process,
or output depends largely

upon the system one is looking steadily at.

Since any concrete thing

may be viewed as system, as environment, and as
"system and environment,"

what will be input from one perspective will be process
or output from
another perspective.

This is why it is so important not to change per-

spective in mid-analysis.
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CHAPTER IX
PROCESSES

9.1 We shall limit our attention in this
chapter to the most inter-

esting and pertinent classes of systems, the
learning systems and the

morphogenic systems, since these are the systems
which change their internal processes, and because all living systems
apparently fall into these
classes.

If we think conceptually of a system as
a "black box" with

identifiable inputs and identifiable outputs, everything
within that black
box will be subsumed under the heading, "process."
9.2 This treatment attempts to minimize the distinction
between

process

and

structure,

a distinction which has engendered lively de-

bate among philosophers and social scientists, without ignoring the
of the distinction for certain analytical purposes.

Miller that "the structure of

a-

We agree with

system is the arrangement of its subsys-

tems and components in three-dimensional space at a given moment of time

This always changes over time."^

Since one of the characteristics of

open systems is the relative instability of their structures (7.28 and
8.25), and since the instability of system structures appears to have no

direct relationship to the stability of the system as a whole in relationship to its environment, we are stressing the dynamic rather than the

static approach by focussing on the processes rather than structures.

This

is also consistent with our distinction in 5.9 between components and

variables.

The structural approach tends to regard system parts as com-

ponents - entities having a spatial configuration at a point in time,

^in Behavioral Science, vol. 16, 1971, p. 284.
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whereas the process approach
will view the syste. parts
as subsvste.s
which may or may not be identical
with components.
9.3 We acknowledge, however,
that systems do have a "deep
structure"
which remains relatively unchanging
when compared to the processes
observed
over time. As the song says,
"Fish gotta swim and birds gotta
fly.
.

and the phylogenetic template
of living systems is, for all
practical purposes. unchanging.
This is to say both that there
are effective limits
to structural change and that
there are certain essential
processes which

systems must have, regardless of how
these processes are carried out.
This chapter will identify these
critical processes and describe various

modes of system organization for
carrying on these processes.
9.4 Several preliminary observations
are necessary.

First, this

inquiry into system processes would be
unnecessary if system processes were

deterministic and if there were an Invarlent
relationship between input
and output.

If the environment could control the
system’s outputs solely

by controllng the inputs, it could treat the
system as a black box.

The

more probabilistic the system - that is to say, the
more variety the

system contains

- the

more knowledge of system processes is necessary if

the environment is to exercise control over system
outputs.

It follows

axiomatically that if the system is to exercise self-control,
the more
knowledge of its own processes it must have.
ily to be construed as

''Knowledge'' is not necessar-

consciousness," but rather in the more general

sense of being able to process internally generated information.
9.5 Second, it may appear that the system one is looking steadily at
is not performing all the critical processes necessary for system sur-

vival.

Miller distinguishes between totipotentlal systems which are
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capable of carrying out all critical processes, and partipotential
systems

which are dependent upon other^ systems for the carrying out of certain
critical processes.

2

Any partipotential system is necessarily a sub-

system of a totipotential system.

Totipotential systems may also be sub-

systems of totipotential systems.

Totipotential systems may also partici-

pate as subsystems of partipotential systems, and this gives rise to some

interesting complexities at the supra-organismic levels.

Presumably, all

organisms are totipotential, unless parasitic or symbiotic, although the
groups they belong to may be partipotential.

As members of groups they

must delegate some of their critical processes to the group and become

partially- functioning totipotential systems, while at the same time the
group they belong to is a fully-f unctioning partipotential system.
9.6 Thus, a public day school may be a fully-functioning partipoten-

tial system, depending upon its environment for the performance of certain

critical processes, while its students and teachers, while in school, are

partially-functioning totipotential systems.

Sociologists might say that

an individual can play many different roles, although at any given time

he is not performing all the roles in his repetoire.

We would say that

a fully-functioning partipotential system is only a portion of the envir-

onment for the partially-functioning totipotential components.

Both

students and teachers receive inputs from sources other than schools.

If

the observer is attempting to understand the behavior of a totipotential

subsystem in terms of the inputs from a partipotential supra— system, his
analysis is likely to be faulty.

Thus, a school may provide a fully-

Systems
^"Living Systems! Basic Concepts" in Gray, Duhl, Rizzo, General
Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 74-75.
(Boston:
Theory and Psychiatry
,
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functioning learning environment, but it will only
be a part of a child's
learning environment.

The rhetoric of educators frequently acknowledges

this, but their practices just as often deny it.

9.7 It is frequently difficult to determine the boundaries
of parti-

potential systems and thus distinguish between inputs, processes,
and
outputs.

For example, are the students in the school to be seen as inputs

or system components?

What are the outputs of a school?

These are diffi-

cult questions to answer with any degree of rigor because it is difficult
to look steadily at a school as a system without shifting focus inadver-

tently to another level of analysis.

We frequently resort to metaphors

from the world of business and industry where boundaries, inputs and outputs are more readily identifiable.

This has led us to organize our

schools as though they were businesses and has led the public to hold the

school accountable as though schools' "products" were as clearly identifiable as businesses'.

However, an industy dealing in products is in fact

a totipotential system, whether or not fully functioning.

All the processes

transforming the inputs into outputs can both conceptually and concretely
be located within tempero-spatial boundaries.

9.8 The third and final preliminary consideration has to do with the

relationship between system components and critical subsystem processes.

Miller states that "systems differ markedly

...

in their patterns of

allocation of various subsystem, processes to different structures.
a process may be

(1)

localized in a single component;

others in a single component
in the system;

(4)

;

(3)

(2)

Such

combined with

dispersed laterally to other components

dispersed upward to the suprasystem or above;

persed downward to subsystems or below; or

(6)

(5)

dis-

dispersed to other systems

83

9.8

external to the hierarchy it is in."^

This consideration is of great sign-

ificance to those who are interested in changing systems.
9.9 It will be helpful to illustrate these patterns of
allocation

schematically.

In the following diagrams,

the heavy rectangle will represent

the system we are looking steadily at; the external dashed rectange
will

represent the suprasystem (environment); the internal dotted squares will

represent components; the small heavy squares will represent subcomponents.
The circle or oval will represent the critical subsystem process.
9*10 Local subsystem — If the critical subsystem process is carried
out by a single component which carries out no other subsystem processes,
this is a local subsystem.

9.11 Combined subsystem - If a component is involved with more than
one critical subsystem process, each of the subsystem processes is a com-

bined subsystem.

^Ibid

.

,

pp.

102-103.
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Laterally dispersed subsystem - If a critical subsystem process
involves more than one component of a system, that subsystem is
laterally

dispersed
I

9.13

Upwardly dispersed subsystem

- If the

critical subsystem process

is performed for the system by a component or components in the supra-

system (environment), that subsystem is upwardly dispersed.

Such a system

is by definition partipotential

9.14

Downwardly dispersed subsystem - If the critical subsystem process
is localized in or laterally dispersed among subcomponents, it si a down-

dispersed subsystem.
wardly9.15

Outwardly dispersed subsystem - If the system depends upon another

system which would not naturally be considered part of its suprasystem for
outwardly
the performance of a critical subsystem process, that process is

dispersed.

The two systems together do, of course, form a single system
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with respect to that process, but the distinction is conceptually useful
to accomodate the difference between, for example, a father carrying his

infant upstairs, which would be an upwardly dispersed subsystem, and a

blind man with a seeing-eye dog, which would be an outwardly dispersed
subsystem.

Miller suggests that outwardly dispersed subsystems are either

parasitic or symbiotic,
systems are not.
seems to imply.

4

whereas upwardly or downwardly dispersed sub-

The distinction, however, is not as clear as Miller
He says that "such assistance [outwardly dispersed sub-

systems] is required for all partipotential systems and all totipotential

systems which are not functioning fully.

It seems, however, that a

fully-functioning partipotential system would require upward dispersal,

while only the partially-functioning totipotential system would require
outward dispersal.

Of course, the distinction between a fully-functioning

partipotential system and a partially functioning totipotential system
is not an easy one to make.

^

Ibid

.

,

p

^Ibid.

,

p.

.

104
105.
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9.16 Miller identifies nineteen critical subsystems, two of
which

process both matter/energy and information, eight of which process matterenergy, and nine of which process information.

The following chart

lists these subsystems and shows a rouch relationship between the matter-

energy processing subsystems and the information- processing subsystems.

Matter-Energy
Processing
Subsystems

Subsystems which
Process both Matter-Energy and
Information

Information
Processing
Subsystems

Reproducer

Boundary

Ingestor

Input Transducer

Internal Transducer

Distributor

Channel and Net

Converter

Decoder

Producer

Associator

Matter-Energy storage

Memory
Decider
Encoder
Output Transducer

Extruder
Motor
Supporter

Miller's definition
In discussing these subsystems, we shall first quote

Miller's most recent writ^The categorization scheme and chart come from
Earlier papers
vol 16, 1971).
ing on these issues (Behavioral Science,
somewhat differently. Miller s d
(1964, 1965) classified these processes
for 1972 publication by Wiley
flnitive book. Living Systems, is promised
but not available as of this writing.
taken £to” "The Nature of
Quoted definitions in section 9.17 - 9.37 are
vol. 16, 1971, pp. 289 29
Living Systems" in Behavioral Science
.

,
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and then provide examples of these processes, using the
school as the sys-

tem we are looking steadily at.

9*17 Reproducer —

the subsystem which is capable of giving rise to

o <-her systems similar to the one it is in.”

Few schobls engage in this

process, which is usually upwardly dispersed to the suprasystem of the

school system, school board, and community.

In some senses, however, the

notion of the "school within a school,” most frequently observed at the
secondary level, wherein a large school is divided into smaller semiautonomous schools, might be seen as an example of a reproducer subsystem.
9.18 Boundary - "the subsystem at the perimeter of a system that holds

together the components which make up the system, protects them from

environmental stresses, and excludes or permits entry to various sorts of

matter-energy and information.”

Most literally, the school building is

the boundary of the school, with the doors and windows permitting the

entry of inputs.

Occasionally, the front office will be a part of the

boundary subsystem and admit or exclude certain inputs.

Viewed thus

the perimeter of the school system is a localized subsystem.

,

More real-

istically, however, the boundary processes should be seen as both laterally
and upwardly dispersed among the members of the school community as well,

particularly in terms of information processing.

Information which is

literally within the physical boundary of the school may well be effectively

excluded from the system if it is considered to be harmful or inappropriate
to the system.

Consideration of "controversial

topics such as sex

education can be seen as a discussion of the boundary subsystem process.
course, the more dispersed the boundary subsystem, the more difficult
it is to control the entry of inputs into the system.

As of this

the Amish
writing, the Supreme Court is about to consider the case of

Cf
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in Wisconsin who do not wish their children to attend secondary
school.

Disregarding the legal implications of the case, this can be seen as an
effort by the Amish to control the boundary subsystem of their community.®
Similarly, the stationing of uniformed policemen in school corridors is
an effort to control the boundary subsystem of the school.
9.19 Ingestor - "the subsystem which brings matter-energy across
the system boundary from the environment."

Literally, school buses,

delivery trucks, and the postal service perform this process which is
thus both upwardly and outwardly dispersed.

We would also include per-

sonnel who unpack boxes, open mail, and perform similar functions which

prepare matter-energy for internal distribution within the system.
9.20 Distributor - "the subsystem which carries inputs from outside
the system or outputs from its subsystems around the system to each compon-

ent."

This subsystem is laterally dispersed among many components, and
The secretary who distributes mail

is also combined with other subsystems.

to the teachers

’

boxes

,

the teacher who hands out paper and pencils to

students or who collects milk money are both participating in the distri-

buting subsystem process.
9.21 Converter - "the subsystem which change

certain inputs to the

system into forms useful for the special processes of that particular
system."

Cafeteria workers who cook the food for a hot lunch program

are clear participants in this subsystem process.

makes copies of a prepared ditto— master

transparency from a chart in a book.

,

and the teacher who makes a

There are clearly numerous examples,

mostly trivial, of this process.

®see Saturday Review

,

So is the teacher who

January 15, 1972, p. 52.
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Producer - "the subsystem which forms stable associations that
endure for significant periods among matter-energy inputs to the system or

outputs from, its converter, the materials synthesized being for growth,
damage-repair, or replacement of components of the system, or for providing energy for moving or constituting the system's outputs of products or

information markers to its suprasystem.

"

Since schools are generally seen

as information-processing systems, it is difficult to think of non-trivial

examples of this crucial subsystem process.

Of course, physical plant

maintenance would be a part of the producer subsystem, but also the organization of students and teachers into groups such as classes, teams, and
special interest clubs would be an example of this subsystem.

The organ-

ization of a learning center or a materials resource center would also be
an example.

This subsystem is ordinarily dispersed upwardly, downwardly,

and laterally, which is another reason that it is difficult to conceptu-

alize

.

9.23 Matter-energy storage - "the subsystem which retains in the
system, for different periods of time, deposits of various sorts of

matter-energy."

Storage and supply closets provide this subsystem, as

to teachers' and childrens' desks, cubbies, and pockets.

9.24 Extruder - "the subsystem which transmits matter-energy out of
the system in the form of products and wastes.

Children take home pic-

tures and worksheets they have completed in school.

wastebaskets at the end of the school day.

Custodians empty the

Of course, if one views students

outputs.
as inputs, one could also view them as matter-energy

parts of it
9.25 Motor - "the subsystem which moves the system or

moves components of its
in relation to part or all of its environment or
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environment in relation to each other."
ment to be taken quite literally.

Miller intends the notion of move-

On the level of the organism this is

easy to conceive, but at the level of the organization it is more
difficult.
School field trips would be examples of motor functions, as would choral
groups singing at nursing homes, but aside from these atypical examples
it is significant that this subsystem is mostly lacking in schools.

Schools— without— walls attempt to provide this subsystem, but most schools
do not literally move in relation to their environment.

9.26 Supporter - "the subsystem which maintains the proper spatial

arrangements among components of the system, so that they can interact

without weighting each other down or crowding each other."

Walls, doors,

furniture arrangement are all part of this critical subsystem.

The

term "proper" may be unfortunate, since it introduces a matter of judgment
into what is otherwise a relatively value-free description

processes.

of system

Schools vary widely in terms of their organization to maximize

flexibility of spatial organization and to combine the supporter sub-

system with other subsystems.

Thus, a portable blackboard may serve this

subsystem as well as several information-processing subsystems such as
internal transducer (9.28), decoder (9.30), and memory (9.32).

The more

flexible a school, the more laterally dispersed this subsystem will be.
It is only recently that school people have recognized this as a critical

subsystem.

The work of Hall

9

and Sommer

10

^Hall, Edward T., The Hidden Dimension
1966).

suggests that possibly this

,

(Garden City:

Doubleday,

The Behavioral Basis of Design
^^Sommer, Robert, Personal Space:
1969).
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,

,

91

9.26

subsystem should be seen, along with the reproducer and boundary,
as
processing both matter-energy and information.
9*27 Input transducer - "the sensory subsystem which brings markers

bearing information into the system, changing them to other matter-energy
forms suitable for transmission within it.”

This is a widely dispersed

subsystem which is combined with many other subsystems in the school's
living and non-living components.

All persons in the school bring infor-

mation into the school with them and change the information into matterenergy forms - speaking and writing most frequently - that can be transinitted within the school.

It must be recalled from 8.6 that we are using

"information” in a technical sense having no necessary reference to the
content of the message.

Anything that can be seen, heard, smelled,

touched or tasted will have some information value.

This subsystem is

responsible for bringing information from the environment into the school
across the boundary (9.18).

Other subsystems are responsible

for gener-

ating and transmitting information within the school.
9.28 Internal transducer - "the sensory subsystem which receives, from
all subsystems or components within the system, markers bearing informa-

tion about significant alterations in those subsystems or components,

changing them to other matter-energy forms of a sort which can be transmitted

within it.”

It is a distinctive feature of the school as a system that

the internal transducer subsystem is combined with the input transducer

subsystem within the same components.

Children bring information with them

is
to school and presumably gain information within the school which

transmitted to their teachers and classmates as a "significant alteration.
its
While the school as a system can exercise significant control over
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internal transducer subsystem, it can exercise little control over
its
input transducing subsystem.

Some schools, recognizing the difficulty

that these combined subsystems entails, attempt to control their input

transducer by running a boarding school, by Increasing filter vigilence
and admitting only students who meet certain kinds of criteria of wealth,

background, intelligence, and so forth.

However, such boundary vigilence

is successful only to a degree; information introduced into the system

and information generated within the system are inextricably intertwined.

They are not always congruent or complementary; information brought into
the school may inhibit the internal transducing subsystem.

It is, of

course, also true that the system may generate incongruent or conflicting

information.

Interpersonal relationship theory stresses that verbal and

non-verbal messages sent simultaneously are frequently perceived as contradictory.

The school as a system is uniquely intended for information

processing; it is curious that so much of the information internally

transduced in the system is neither intended nor attended to.
9.29 Channel and net - "the subsystem composed of a single route in

physical space, or multiple interconnected routes, by which markers

bearing information are transmitted to all parts of the system."

Like the

other information processing subsystems we have considered thus far, the
channel and net is laterally dispersed and combined with other subsystems
in the components which make up a school.

Ignoring trivial examples such

in a
as public address systems, the essential channels of communication

school are comprised of unmediated human interactions, non-discrete,

multiple, and simultaneous.

Organizational theorists frequently distinguish

but from a
between "formal" and "informal" channels of communication,
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system theory point of view the distinction is of
little significance.

The

sorts of questions which systems theorists ask about
channels - their

capacity, reliability, and entropy - require no such
distinction.

Instead,

we can substitute the notion of a network of nodes of
interaction which

comprise the communication channels of an organization.

An observer

spending enough time in a school could observe and chart such a network
by

noting who talks to whom, under what circumstances, and with what
frequency.

Formal

channels, as when the principal holds a staff meeting,

or a teacher conducts a class lesson, would certainly be included in such
a network,

although they would probably be less significant than many

school people imagine.

The most acute observer, however, would be unable

to include in his network the essential channels of non-verbal communica-

tion which exist between individuals and groups in a school, communication

generated both consciously and unconsciously by body and eye movement.
Intonation and inflexion, dress and use of time and space.

Because human

beings are capable of transmitting and receiving simultaneous messages, we

may want to think of a school as having a number of superimposed networks,
through all of which information is being transmitted incessantly.^^
The channels which comprise these networks will have varying capacities
and characteristics.

For instance, the eye can "take in" and follow sev-

eral things happening at once by shifting focus very rapidly from one

phenomenon to another.

The ear, however, does not have the same sort

of capacity for simultaneous reception.

We cannot listen to two conver-

sations simultaneously; we must tune in and tune out.

Simultaneous sounds

of the same volume and frequency will be heard as a babble.

^^Cherry, Colin, On Human Communication
MIT, 1966), pp. 29-30.

,

second ed.,

Individuals

(Cambridge:
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will differ, too, in their capacity to process the rate of
information
being sent over these simultaneous channels, particularly if the
messages
are incongruent or contradictory.

It is not possible in a complex system

including human beings to calculate with any rigor the capacity of
communication channels.

It is possible, however,

to state axiomatically that the

channels will have finite capacities; that the capacity of any given
channels will be effectively reduced if other superimposed channels are

simultaneously carrying incongruent messages; and that if either the rate
of transmission or the number of simultaneous or proximal incongruent

messages transmitted exceeds the capacity or the number of channels available, the system will be unable to process the information either entering
it or generated within it.

ively.

Overloaded channels will not transmit effect-

Too much information can have similar consequences as too little

information.

Communication theorists have introduced the notion of

redundancy to describe characteristics of messages which serve to increase
the likelihood of reliable transmission in the face of limited channel

capacity.

Briefly and simply, if a message is repeated, or if it contains

elements which have relatively little information value, it is more likely
to be reliably transmitted than if the message is unrepeated or if every

element of the message is crucial to its reliable transmission.

The more

redundancy a message contains, the more likely a receiver is to receive
it accurately, even if he misses some of the message or if there is some
0]-ence

(called "noise" by the theorists) in the channel.

Lecturers

have long known that if a point in a lecture is important it had best
be repeated.
a

They also know (or should know) that the more important points

be rememgiven lecture contains, the less likely any given point is to

95

9.29

bered.

Redundancy is directly related to organization and
predictability,

and IS inversely related to the information value of a
given message.

In

other words, the less information a given transmission
contains, the more

likely that it will be transmitted reliably.

The more organized the envir-

onment sending the transmission, the more redundancy that transmission

will contain and the more reliable it will be.

The syntactic and semantic

redundancy of our language is such that much could be eliminated without
a significant loss in meaning.

Cherry illustrates this

by pointing out

that "the ventious crapests pounted raditally" can be parsed and trans-

lated into French ("Les crapets ventieux pontaient raditallement") even

though we have no idea of the meaning of the individual words.

Likewise'^'^,

the string of nouns "Woman, street, crowd, traffic, noise, haste, thief,

bag, loss, scream, police" tell a story to which the reader can add the

missing elements.

Given the multiplicity of channels in complex human

systems like schools, and the finite capacity and different characteristics of these channels, a significant degree of redundancy is necessary
for reliable transmission, even at the expense of the amount of informa-

tion transmitted.
9.30 Decoder - "the subsystem which alters the code of information
input to it through the input transducer or the internal transducer into
a

'private' code that can be used internally by the system."

subsystem process is widely dispersed and combined.

Again, this

At its most elemen-

tary level, the decoder assigns common meanings to words and other signals,

^^
^

Ibid

.

,

p.

120.

^Ibid

.

,

p.

121.
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both verbal and non-verbal.

More specifically, the decoder in schools

translates the common meanings of words into the technical
vocabulary and

symbols of education.

Frequently, this special ’private’ code appears to

outsiders (and some insiders) as obfuscating jargon, and frequently
it
is, but it does have the advantage of allowing a great
deal of information
to be processed with economy and uniformity.

The designation of students

as "slow learners," "bright," "emotionally disturbed," and so forth,
serves

as a private code, as do grades,

data.

test scores, inventories, and other such

Most curriculum materials produced for schools are decoded into a

language deemed appropriate for a particular group of children according
to age and ability;

to this extent,

this subsystem is outwardly dispersed.

A basal reader enters the system in its decoded form, whereas

a teacher

teaching economic theory to third graders using her old college text would
have to do a great deal of decoding.

In schools, as in many organizations

whose existence depends upon the reliability of human communication, the
decoding process is both essential and Ineffective.

What is frequently

called "a failure of communication" is often in reality due to the multi-

plicity of incongruent messages being sent simultaneously over different
channels, requiring different decoding processes.

Just as there are

multiple overlapping networks of channels, so there are multiple codes,
both verbal and non-verbal, requiring different decoding processes.

People who spend enough time in a given school, both adults and children,
find that their first priority must be to deciding which of the conflicting
or incongruous messages reflects the true intention of the sender.
the message is paradoxical, this task can be insoluble.

If

Consider, for

example, the following concotanationi of conflicting messages.
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A.

The open classroom is the approach to education
which
best encourages active learning in children.

B.

A school should be able to accomodate a variety of teaching styles and educational philosophies.

C.

It is important for teachers to feel comfortable with

innovations they introduce into their classrooms.
D.

Teachers should be able to specify learning objectives in
behavioral terms.

It is not, uncommon to find messages such as these coming from administrators

of progressive school systems.

How should they be decoded?

Is it more

important to have a variety of teaching styles or to have an open classroom?

Is it more important for teachers to feel comfortable or to use

behavioral objectives?

Is it more important to use behavioral objectives

or to have an open classroom?

does he really want?

What does the administrator want?

What

Children ask the same questions of conflicting

messages from their teachers.

The real communication problem in complex

organizations such as schools is that there is no rigorous and reliable
decoding process for dealing with Information about relationships, and
it is just in this area that messages are most likely to be incongruent

and conflicting.

9.31 Assoclator - "the subsystem which carries out the first stage
of the learning process, forming enduring associations among items of

information in the system."

We must remind ourselves at this point that

the system we are looking steadily at is the school, not the individual

learner, and while we can see that this subsystem is also dispersed and
subcombined, it is no easy task to distinguish between the associator
are the
system of the school and the associators of the individuals who

components of the system.

We must start with the assumption, by no means
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certain in all instances, that the school is a learning
system (7.24-7.43),
that it is capable of a dynamic homeostasis that allows
it to adapt to
a

wide variety of unpredictable input without jeopardizing its
survival,

that it is continually mapping environmental variety into its
internal

processes.

Many educational reformers, usually outside the schools, in

from the opposite assumption, that the school is an adjusting system with a highly developed boundary subsystem which filters out the

environmental variety that the school cannot adjust to.

However, if the

boundary is as v/idely dispersed as we claim (9.18), it is difficult to
see how this view can be supported.

Instead, we shall advance the hypo-

thesis in Part III that the school is ordinarily a well-adapted learning

system that inhabits a different environment than educational reformers
inhabit.

We assume that the school does have an associator subsystem,

but one that is not as widely dispersed or combined as the other infor-

mation processing subsystems we have thus far considered.

Instead, it

is usually quite centralized, and deals with what we might call second-

order information - information about information

-

which is the domain

of administrators, curriculum specialists, and psychologists.

The school

as a system does not learn reading, geometry, and current events; instead,
it learns about reading,

geometry, and current events.

Some schools also

fall into a radical confusion between these two orders of information and

assume, for example, that because structural linguistics does describe

how our language works, it is, therefore, the way to teach language.

Teaching language and teaching about language are two very different
things.

Second-order information is, of course, information, and is

processed by all of the subsystems we have discussed thus far.

It can
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enter the system from the
environment or It can be Internally
generated
by system components or ensembles
of components.
It travels through the
same channels and over the same
networks as first-order Information.
It
Is striking,

therefore, that the assoclator
subsystem Is less widely

dispersed than the other subsystems
which process Information.

Put an-

other way. we can say that the school
as a system uses only a small
portion
of the information it processes,
that it expends much energy
processing

information from which it does not learn.

This is not necessarily In-

appropriate nor Inefficient, since it does
leave the assoclator subsystems of
its components, i.e. students and
teachers, with energy to process second-

order information for their own purposes.

Put concretely, the more time

teachers and students spend on curriculum
committees, the less time they

will have to attend to their own Intellectual
growth.

This Is not unlike

the observation in 8.28-8.29 that the more
the system must attend to

maintenance inputs, the less it can process signal inputs.

Depending on

the size and complexity of the system, it may be both
efficient and pro-

ductive to have the associative processes less widely dispersed
than they
might be.

The danger, of course, is that the fewer the components engaged

in this process, the less enduring the associations are likely to be and
the more localized the learning is likely to be.

9.32 Memory - "the subsystem which carries out the second stage of
the learning process, storing various sorts of information in the system

for different periods of time."

At any given time, the school's memory

will be widely dispersed in all directions, among people and file cabinets
and bookshelves, but over time it is really the file cabinets and book-

shelves which serve as the enduring repositories of the school's memory.
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student records, curriculum
guides, test scores,
trled-and-true learning
activities are the components
of the school's collective
memory.
As
students and teachers leave the
school they take with them
irretrievable
information, both first-order and
second-order, and what is left is
only
the information committed
to writing, which tends to
remain forever
fossilized in the system’s archives.
The ability of the memory to
store
both second order and first-order
information corresponds to the
computer's
ability to store both programs and
data and allows associations to
be

made between the two, as well as
allowing a wide range of combinatorial

possibilities (7.39-7.41).

Thus the memory subsystem and the
associator

subsystem are closely related, and while
Miller describes memory as the
second stage in the learning process and
association as the first stage,
their relationship is reciprocal rather
than linear.

That the memory

subsystem is generally more widely dispersed than the
associator subsystem
means that much of the information stored in the
system is not used in its
learning, although it may be used by components for
their learning.
9.33 Before proceeding with Miller's definitions of
critical sub-

system processes, we must interject here a process which does
not appear
in Miller s list, but which, given his approach, seems to be
critical.

We may call it the disassociator

,

and define it as the subsystem which

breaks up associations among items of information which are either mal-

adaptive or inhibiting to new associations.

In everyday language, we

may say that the system, to learn, must be able to forget, and to forget
not only its mistakes but also its successes.

Successfully learned

behavior is the greatest inhibitor of new learning, and learning systems
tend to bind successful learning into their memories.

Learning systems
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totally lacking in dlsaasoclators
may over time evolve into
adjusting systems at the point that their
learned behavior precludes the
learning of
new behavior. The dlsassoclator
to be effective, should be
,
combined with
the assoclator in the same
components. This does not often
occur, since
few of us willingly diverge far
from behavior we find successful
to test

new behavior which has an element
of risk in it.

What many schools need

is not more efficient memories
but more efficient forgetting.

We shall

return to this topic in Part III.
9.34 De cider - "the executive subsystem
which receives information

inputs from all other subsystems and transmits
to them information on outputs that control the entire system."

Miller states that of the critical

subsystems, "only the decider is essential, in
the sense that a system
cannot be dependent on another system for its
deciding.

A living system

does not exist if the decider is dispersed upwardly,
downwardly, or out-

wardly.

From the point of view of the system analyst, this means
that

he should be sure to conduct his analysis at the level
that includes the

decider.

If,

for a particular school, all decisions were made by the

superintendent of schools, he would have to be considered a part of the
school, not a part of its environment.

ferring to living systems.

We must note that Miller is re-

A non-adjusting system - one that had no

decisions to make - could not be a living system.

On the other hand, it

is possible to conceive of adjusting systems, which are effectively

controlled by their environments, as having a built-in decider, since the
output of the system is measured against a specific criterion of performance.

Even though living systems at the human level must be learning

systems, they can and frequently do act as though they were adjusting
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systems with the decider upwardly
dispersed.

A concrete example of this

would be the football team whose plays
are decided by the coach on the
sidelenes and transmitted to the quarterback
by regular substitutions.
So the case is not as unambiguous
as Miller’s statement appears to
imply.

Whether the decider is dispersed upwardly
or outwardly seems to depend
upon system definition.

The organizational charts of schools
would seem

to suggest that the decider subsystem
is essentially localized in the

principal, and in some instances this is effectively
true, although in all
cases the principal is dependent upon the
information he receives.

Whether or not the decider is laterally dispersed
does seem to depend upon
the principal's style and preference, so that we
may say the basic decision,

whether and when to disperse, the decider subsystem, is
localized.

The

principal who chooses not to exercise all the control vested in
his role
could, in most situations, revert to a more controlling style if he
so
chose.

The decider is, of course, laterally dispersed among other members

of the school community , and if we were to take the organizational chart
as a model of system organization, we might be tempted to say that it
is dispersed downwardly, in contradiction to Miller’s statements.

How-

ever, whenever decisions regarding the school as a whole, as distinguished

from classrooms or other components, are dispersed, the dispersion is
always lateral, regardless of what positions the deciders may occupy on
the organizational chart.

9.35 We must, at this point, enter an important theoretical caveat

,

one which brings into question the: isomorphic relationship of human systems with other levels of systems.

In a profound sense, decision making

in a human group or organization is always shared.

Decisions made must
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be accepted by those who. the
decisions affect.

The outputs fro. the de-

cider .ust be received as
controlling Inputs by other
co.ponents of the
human system, i.e. by other
human beings. However, since
these other human
beings are learning systems,
not adjusting system, they will
„ot necessarily accept inputs from their
environment as controlling. They
must.
In fact, decide to accept the
control of the decider, or the
decider will
not control them.
If the human being, or group.
Is a true morphogenlc
system, it may well be impervious to
the attempts of the decider to

control it.

Revolutions, rebellions, and mutinies,
on both a grand and

minute scale, attest to the fact that
deciders frequently cannot control
the entire system.

This element of choice exists in all
learning and

morphogenic systems, and the fact that in most
functioning human systems,
decisions are accepted, must not blind us to the
realization that this

acceptance is itself a decision.
9.36 Encoder - "the subsystem which alters the code
of information

inputs to it from other information processing subsystems,
from a 'private'
code used internally by the system into a 'public' code
which can be

interpreted by other systems in its environment."

We saw in 9.30 the

difficulties inherant in the decoding process, and we might expect the

encoding process to be the mirror image of them.

However, the problems

attendant upon encoding are of a very different nature, since encoding
deals only with signal inputs, while decoding must deal with obth main-

tenance and signal inputs.

Information encoded by the school as a system

is often of a statistical nature - performance of students in aggregate

measured against national norms - and often of a platitudinous nature annual reports to the Board of Education.

Members of the school community
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take home with them each
afternoon Information which la
shared by parents,
spouses, and acquaintances.
The grapevine and the rumor
mill both are
vital parts of the encoding process.
Indeed, because it Is so difficult
to Identify Its encoding
processes. The problem Is exascerbated
by the
fact that the language of education
is so similar to the language
of the

vironment, with so little rigor and so
many euphemisms, that little

encoding appears necessary to allow
outsiders to interpret its information.

The only exception to this seems to
be when the school is proposing

or attempting a significant departure
from its traditional program or

organization and must gain community support for
its plans.

At this

point, significant attention is paid to the
encoding process and the

school becomes very sensitive to public opinion.

These occasions are

relatively rare, however, and atypical of the enterprise.

More typically,

the school's private code is so similar to the
environment's public code

that little encoding is required.

deal with is not

The essential issue that school people

how can the public know what goes on in school," but

rather "what should the public know?"

This is a boundary problem, not

an encoding problem.

^•37 Output transducer — "the subsystem which puts out markers bearing information from the system, changing markers within the system into

other matter-energy forms which can be transmitted over channels in the
system's environment."

Report cards, news releases, special announcements,

and Johnny's verbal dinner-table report on what he did in school today are
all parts of the output transducing subsystem.

Johnny himself, his be-

havior, attitudes, and opinions, is also an output transduced by the system.

Presumably, his performance outside of school over time conveys
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information about the school as a system.

Perhaps the same could be said

of the teachers in a school - they,
too, should grow and change as
a re-

sult of being components of the school
as a system, and their enthusiasm,
fatigue, interests and opinions should
convey information about the system
to the environment.

We must bear in mind, though, that if
we view compon-

ents as outputs, we are shifting our focus
and redefining the system to
the point where the school is now seen as
environment and the particular

individual is the system of interest to us.

Since the school is only part

of the individual's environment, we must avoid
the temptation to ascribe

any changes in the individual soley to the school.
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CHAPTER X
OUTPUTS

10.1 Outputs are those transmissions
of matter, energy, and informa-

tion which cross the boundary from the
system to its environment.

Berrien

distinguishes between "useful” and "useless" outputs\
suggesting that the

environment places some value on system outputs.

While this is undoubt-

edly true, no output is inherently useful or
useless; from the point of

view of the observer or analyst it is more appropriate
to classify outputs
as

used" or "unused," since these are more rigorously
verifiable, and do

not compel the analyst to accept the environment’s
evaluation.

Berrien’s

distinction becomes significant when one is interested in purposeful
or

goal-directed behavior.

In terms of attainment of a specific goal, whether

the system’s or the environment’s, it can be helpful to distinguish
be-

tween useful and useless outputs.

In a trivial sense, all behavior can

be seen as goal-directed, the goal being inferred from the behavior.

In

a non-trivial sense, goal-directed behavior is characteristic of adjusting

systems using negative feedback to meet behavior specifications.

Learning

systems may have a multiplicity of simultaneous goals, either congruent
or incongruent.

They are capable of instantaneously substituting one goal

for another, altering priorities, developing new goals and abandoning old
goals.

While cyberneticians have made great headway in "de-mystifying"

goal-directed behavior and in developing complex adjusting systems which
can simulate learning, the application of their work to concrete learning

systems has not yet arrived at a point which would permit an observer of

^Berrien, F. Kenneth, Op

.

cit

,

p.

24-25.
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a concrete learning system to
distinguish between useful and useless
out-

puts
10.2 This point is worth stressing
because the distinction between

useful and useless behavior is ubiquitous
in education as well as other
arenas of human activity in which evaluation
plays a significant part.

Out-

put is observable behavior, and what
behavior is observable depends in

large measure upon the observer

experience, and bias.

,

his characteristics, sensitivity, training,

The observer is very much a part of the system’s

environment, and which of the system's outputs the
observer will accept as
his inputs will vary with the characteristics
of the observer as a learning system.

Outputs which an observer does not notice are unused

not necessarily useless.

From the point of view of this analysis, there

are no useless outputs, only unused outputs.

A teacher may be insensitive

to - or unaware of - a students’ non-verbal behavior;

student-teacher dyad may find it very useful. Indeed.

y pose,

although

,

the observer of the

The notion of "pur-

therefore, can frequently serve as a filter for the observing sys-

tem; we prefer the view that sees all behavior as useful from the environ-

ment’s viewpoint, although not necessarily used by the environment.
10.3 Of particular interest to us are those outputs which either

directly or Indirectly affect the system’s subsequent behavior.

If output

directly affects the subsequent behavior of the system, we refer to it as
feedback

.

If feedback serves to amplify deviation from the prior state

of the system, it is positive feedback

.

If it serves to reduce deviation

from the prior state of the system, it is negative feedback

growth, and evolution are evidence of positive feedback.

.

Change,

Stability,

homeostasis, and steady state are evidence of negative feedback.

Open
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systems that grow and change by
developing new steady states have
an intricate Interconnected network of
feedback loops, both positive
and negative,
so that change occurs within
acceptable limits and does not
jeopardize the
survival of the system. Theorists
have stressed the importance of negative feedback in maintaining system
stability, but they have tended to
Ignore the significance of positive
feedback in promoting change.

They

have tended to see negative feedback as
"good" and positive feedback as
"bad."

This has been largely due to the influence
of cybernetics on system

thinking, since cybernetics has been largely
concerned with complex ad-

justing systems actuated by negative feedback.
10.4 Marayama, in his article "Toward a Second
Cybernetics" focuses

upon positive feedback, and gives, as a compelling
example, the growth of
cities over time.

2

The following illustrations use his method.

An "+"

over an arrow indicates positive feedback, and a "-"
over an arrow indicates

negative feedback.
10.5 The population of non— agrarian societies, like most animal
species,

was regulated by the available food supply;

Soppty

fopuu/lTiaN

As population increased, the food supply decreased, an indication of neg-

ative feedback.

As the food supply decreased, the population likewise

decreased, an indication of positive feedback.
the food supply Increased (negative feedback)

,

As the population decreased,

and as the food supply in-

The analysis which follows was stimulated by Marayama 's example, but
does not come from his article.
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creased, so did the population.

Thus, negative feedback held
the relation-

ship between population and food
supply in a delicate equlllbrlun,.
using
10.6
minor deviations to prevent major
deviations.
The advent of cultivation upset
this equilibria! mechanism:

^oPu i^ATio

poop Supply

i\j

cui-Ti vA?r/£)A/

When conditions were favorable, increased
population led to more cultiva10.7
tion, which increased the food supply,
which further increased the population.
\

However^^^s population increased, so did density and
disease;
D e/VS/T'Y

^

^

^

ropou nTiofJ

'P

Food

suPPLy

c.ounv^T’/ofsf

10.8
As disease increased, population decreased, density decreased,
and disease

ultimately decreased, thus leading to an increase in population once
again.
Here we see two independent feedback loops affecting population growth,
one

negative and one positive.
With increased population density comes increased division of
labor and specialization, including, presumably, medical services.
P
Prices

^

D€A/ siry

J-

T^oPoLA-rfoA/

^
G-ouTiv/9r/ofy

Food S uppf. /

—

We have here an example of how the deviation-counterbalancing relationship

between disease and population is itself counterbalanced by the deviation-
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counterbalancing relationship between
medical services and disease.
Two
Joined negative feedback loops have
the effect of positive feedback;
In this
case, in spite of disease, the
population will continue to grow,
what we
have today In over-populated poor
countries Is the negation of such nega10.9
tive feedback loops as may exist in
the system.
This observation is easily generalizable
to many areas of concern
to educators.

It has been supposed - and recently
re-advocated by the

President - that the massive application of
federal funds to deteriorating schools would improve the quality of
education in those schools.

Fua/oS

Ciof\ur'^

oP £ducatio^

This simplistic, linear input-output relationship
has not proven effective.

Poor schools continue to deteriorate in spite of
highly funded Title
projects.

I

Much of this can be explained by mis-application of funds
and

inadequate project design, but it is equally true that a host
of intervening
feedback loops can effectively negate the influence of federal funds
on
poor schools.
10.10 Positive feedback, thus, promotes change, while negative feed-

back promotes stability around assigned values.

Whether the change - or

lack of change - is desirable or undesirable depends largely upon the per-

spective of the observer.

If he desires to inhibit change, he must design

effective negative feedback loops.

If he desires to inhibit change, he

must design effective positive feedback loops.
10.11 In making this point, it is essential to distinguish between

feedback and other input.

Feedback is the direct input of the system's out-

put; it is the output that is fed back into the system.

There is a sign-

ificant difference between information from performance and information
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about performance.
this is Information

When a teacher corrects and
returns a student's paper,

^

her performance.

In neither case Is this
feed-

back, although we colloquially
refer to It as such.

It Is,

Instead,

Information Input from the environment
which the student or teacher
may
choose to use or Ignore. When
a student, though, sees that
a spelling
word doesn't look right, or when
he finds that a math problem
he has worked
doesn't check, or when a teacher
senses her class getting restless
or
finds that her class did poorly
on a particular test, this Is
Information
from performance and Is genuine
feedback.
It is, of course, quite possible
for the student or teacher not to
act upon this Information; human
beings

are learning systems, not adjusting
systems, but assuming that they wish
to Improve their performance,

they are more likely to use It and less

likely to question its reliability.
10.12 Many of a learning system's outputs
affect its subsequent be-

havior indirectly rather than directly.

A system, may, through its out-

puts, affect its environment so that the environment
will present it with

inputs it desires and to which it can more easily adapt.

The reader may

more easily conceptualize this by thinking of two systems
standing in

—

interaction, each of which is the environment for the other.

r
A

<

^

B

}

<
A's output "w" leads to A's input "y."
B's input "w" leads to B's output "y." )

"z."

^
(We could as easily have said that

A's output "x" leads to A's input

If A prefers "y" to "z" it will transmit "w" and not "x" to B.

If

it should happen that B prefers "w" to "x," it will transmit "y" and not
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"z” to A.

Thus each is inducing the other to behave
in such a way that it

can behave the way it prefers.

This is functionally the same as a pos-

itive feedback loop; A’s "w” behavior is
reinforced and leads to still

further "w" behavior.

A and B as reciprocal system and environment are

well-adapted to each other.
10.13 Life rarely works out so beautifully, however.
"x" to "w," while A prefers "y" to ”x."

give it ”x" is to give A "z.”

B

may prefer

The only way B can induce A to

In this instance, each must accomodate to

the other; A must give B a certain amount of "x” so that B will
give A
a certain amount of

y

.

This is functionally the same as a negative

feedback loop; A's "w” behavior is discouraged, so that at any given
time

w

behavior will subsequently lead to less "w” behavior.

In this

case, A and B, as reciprocal system and environment, each adapts to the

other through a subtle process of manipulation and negotiation.

Each,

through its outputs, is attempting to create the environment it wants.
10.14 This is the nature of most interpersonal encounters.

translate our model into interpersonal terms, so that A and

B

If we

become two

people, perhaps husband and wife, perhaps student and teacher, and if

we let "w” and "z” represent dominant behavior, and "x” and "y" represent

submissive behavior, our model would represent
situation.

a

not uncommon interpersonal

Both A and B wish to dominate the relationship and wish to

receive submissive behavior from the other.

But the more A transmits

dominant behavior, the more B transmits dominant behavior.

Each, to

receive the submissive input he desires has to transmit some submissive
output to the other.

However, each's submissive behavior reinforces the

other's dominant behavior, which in turn requires each to transmit sub-
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missive behavior.

This kind of spiral never ends.

Schools, too, modify

their environment by continually replenishing
it with "schooled" adults,
those who through the process of schooling
share the values of the school
so that the social environment which the
school inhabits has been, to
a significant extent, shaped by it.

10.15 There are, of course, many less subtle ways
in which systems

influence their environments through their outputs.

heating systems to modify the natural weather.
protect their bodies.

Men build houses and

They wear clothes to

Spiders spin webs to trap food.

The essential point

to be made here, however, is the reciprocal and mutually
causative nature

of adaptation; the system is both shaping and being shaped
by its environ-

ment.

From this perspective, the significant difference between adjust-

ing and learning systems is that adjusting systems use their outputs to

return to an initial or specified state, while learning systems use their
outputs to create new steady states.
10.16 Samuel Butler, in The Way of All Flesh

,

said it more simply,

more eloquently, and more powerfully than any theoretical language can.
All our lives long, every day and every hour, we
are engaged in the process of accommodating our
changed and unchanged selves to changed and unchanged surroundings; living, in fact, is nothing else
than this process of accommodation; when we fail
in it a little we are stupid, when we fail flagrantly we are mad, when we suspend it temporarily
we sleep, when we give up the attempt altogether
we die.
In quiet, uneventful lives the changes
internal and external are so small that there is
little or no strain id the process of fusion and
accomodation; in other lives there is great
strain, but there is also great fusing and accommodating power. A life will be successful or not,
according as the power of accomodation is equal
to or unequal to the strain of fusing and adjust-
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10.16
ing internal and external changes.^

What Butlar call "accomodation" we
call "adaptation," and perhaps
Butler
does not adequately stress the active
role the system plays In shaping
Its

environment through Its outputs, but he has
captured the essence of the
reciprocal relationship between system and
environment that this paper has

been about.

quoted by Menninger, Karl in The Vital Balance
Compass, 1963), p. 125.

,

(New York:

Viking

PART III
SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS
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11.1

CHAPTER XI
SYSTEM DEFINITION
11.1 In Part III we shall be testing
the usefulness of the theory

have developed by applying it to
some common areas of concern to
educators.

The test of its usefulness will be
whether or not it provides help-

ful and new ways of thinking about
educational problems and issues, not

whether it contributes to their solution.

Because a general theory is

just that, "general," it must be translated
into specifics before it can
be applied to a particular situation.

However, because it is a general

theory of concrete systems, its hypotheses
and propositions can be tested
and applied to particular situations, whatever
their complexity or con-

figuration.
11.2 We select the school and the student as the two
systems we are

looking steadily at because they can well test the
validity of a theory

which proposes to be applicable to all levels of systems.

If we can make

statements which hold true for both the organism and the organization

,

then presumably such statements may be equally relevant to sub— organismic

and supra-organizational levels as well.

If such is the case, scientists

will have a rigorous tool to supplement their use of analogy in dealing

with complex phenomena.
11.3 There is another reason why the school and the student well fit
our purpose in testing the theory.

From the analytical point of view,

they offer very different, but complementary, problems.

The individual

student is a well-defined concrete system with a clear physical boundary

which permits rigorous distinctions between system and environment, and
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specific delineation of outputs as
observable behavior.

The internal or-

ganization of the student, however, is
not observable, particularly in
the information-processing domain,
and can only be inferred from
observable

behavior.

This has led the behaviorist schools
of psychology to con-

centrate solely on the relationship of
inputs and outputs, and to assume
an essentially linear and causal relationship
between them, eschewing

any

mentalistic" explanation of behavior.

Essentially, this school

treats the individual as an adjusting system whose
outputs (observable

behavior) can be controlled from the environment
by the careful regulation of inputs.

This paper takes the position, instead, that while the

internal organization of the human organism may not be
observable, it
does exist, and is isomorphic with the observable organization
of learning

systems at the supra-organismic level.

This proposition is not currently

provable, although the tremendous strides taken by cyberneticians in
the

simulation of both behavior and learning lends powerful support to the
hypothesis

^
.

11.4 The school is such a supra-organismic system whose internal

organization is observable.

At the same time, it is not a well-defined

system; it does not have a clear physical boundary (9.18), and it is not

easy to distinguish between the school and its environment.

The delineation

of system outputs, as distinguished from the collective outputs of its

components, is difficult indeed.

We can talk with some assurance about how

a school is organized, but we cannot talk with assurance about how a

school behaves.

Faced with this dilemma, many theorists have assumed an

^see Apter, Michael J., The Computer Simulation of Behavior
Harper and Row, 1970).

,

(New York:
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anolcgy between the school and a
business whose outputs can be
.ore easily
Identified.
Educational organization theory has
been essentially based
upon research and theories drawn
from the world of business and
Industry.
Yet, it is a characteristic of the
school as a system that its outputs

are not clearly defined; any theory
which assumes that they are is

clearly not a theory dealing with concrete
schools.
11.5 Thus, the two systems we are dealing
with have complementary

analytical problems:

one has clearly defined outputs but
unobservable

processes; the other has poorly defined outputs
but observable processes.

A general theory, then, ought to help us think
about student processes
and school outputs in a way that conventional
discipline-bound theory

cannot
11.6 In this chapter, we shall deal with a series of
propositions

drawn from Part II which will help us define the system we
are looking

steadily at.

System definition is crucial; as we stated in 5.11, the

variables of a system are selected from a usually infinite collection of
attributes.
study.

The selection of variables thus defines the system under

"The term system does not refer to ’that thing over there,’

which may be described by an infinite number of systems, but to a particular list or collection of variables and relationships selected by the

analyst for a particular purpose." 2

We will not presuppose the analyst’s

purposes in this chapter; instead, we shall examine some of those issues

which the analyst must consider regardless of his purpose.

In the next

chapter, we shall consider a series of propositions concerning the rela-

tionship of the system and its environment.

In Chapter 13, we shall ex-

amine some propositions relating to system organization.

2

Hare, op. cit., p. 136.
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Our method in each of thse chapters
will be similar.

First, we

shall state and explicate the
proposition on a general level.

We shall

then, in paragraph "A” relate the
proposition to the school and in para-

graph ”B" relate the proposition to
the student.

The reader interested

in the application of a general
theory to systems at different levels
may

choose to read the chapters as written.

The reader primarily interested

in the school as a system may choose
to read all "A” paragraphs consec-

utively, while the reader primarily
interested in the student as a system

may read all "B” paragraphs consecutively.

In either of the latter two

cases the exposition will be as sequential
and self-contained as in the

first case.
11.8

^

c qncrete

systems are open

.

Not all systems are equally open,

but all conduct transactions with their environments, and
no system

definition or description can neglect these transactions; that is
to say,
no system can be defined without reference to the nature, range,
and

amount of its inputs.

Regardless of the analyst's purpose, the unit of

analysis must be the system-in-environment, not the system alone.

The

next chapter will elaborate upon this proposition, but for purposes of

system definition it is fundamental.
11. 8A The school is commonly analyzed as though it were a closed

system which could be understood solely in terms of its internal organization and relationships, and the internal dispositions of matter, energy,
and information.

120
11. 8A

iewed this way, the school is seen
as a totipotential system
existing

within the physical boundary of its
building walls.

More realistically,

however, the school should be viewed
as a partipotential system whose

components are also input transducers

Teaching and learning go on outside the school walls
as well as inside;
the nature of the environment:

rich or poor in stimuli, organized or

disorganized, placid or turbulent, will be a prime factor in
determining
the character of the school.
or causal one.

The relationship, of course, is not a simple

Because it is a kind of learning system, the school will

tend to reflect its environment; if the environment is rich in stimuli,
the school will be rich in responses; if the environment is highly organ-

ized (and predictable), so will the school be; if the environment is

placid and regular, the school's behavior will be placid and regular.

It

is generally the radical critics of schools who consider them to be closed

systems^ unresponsive to their environments, while at the same time

criticizing society in general on many of the same grounds that they
criticize the schools.

It may well be that many schools do not meet the

"needs" of children or of the larger society, but "needs" are not among
the parameters which comprise the school's environment.

ceptual, not concrete.

They are con-

Statements of needs, of course, are concrete.

as are statements of demands, expectations, and requirements.

Such

statements may well be part of the school's environment and be accepted
by the school as inputs.

If these statements are unambiguous, uncon-
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tradxctory, and congruent, they may
well be processed by the school
and
affect its outputs.
If, however,
as is frequently the case,
they are

ambiguous, contradictory, and incongruent,
they tend to cancel each other
out, or are filtered out by the
school’s boundary processes.

It is impor-

tant, too, to realize that the
school's output will play a significant

role in determining the nature of these
inputs.

Because nearly everyone

in the school’s environment has been
to school, the statements of needs,

demands, expectations, and requirements
will be shaped in large measure
by the culture of the school.

If,

for example, the environment places a

high priority on the development of "basic
skills" of reading, writing,
and computation, this is at least partially to
be explained by the fact
that the school has always placed high priority on
the development of

these skills.

Conversely, if the school appears to place high value on

docile, submissive, and conforming behavior, it is because the
environment, enculturated by the schools, places high value on such behavior.

Indeed, the general presumption must be that the school, like any other

open system that survives over time, is well-adapted to its environment.
The nature of this adaptation will be explored in subsequent sections of
this and the next chapter.

11.8b School people frequently resort to a curious dualism in thinking about student behavior.

On the one hand, formal "learning behavior"

is seen in an environmental context; in other words, learning is somehow

the result of teaching, or at least the result of the student’s inter-

action with persons and materials in his environment.

Non-learning be-

havior, however, as in "behavior problem" is rarely viewed in the same
way.

Any particular molecular behavior is related first to prior behavior
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and only secondarily and occasionally
to the environmental
situation In
which the behavior occured. Put
In another way. when
things adjudged good’'

happen to a child. It is because
he Is an open system and
the school can
take the credit; when things
adjudged "bad" happen, it is
because he Is
a closed system, and the school
abjures responsibility.

There are respon-

sive children (who conform to our
expectations), and unresponsive children
(who do not conform to our expectations);
there are bright children (who

are open to environmental Inputs) and
"slow learners" (who are relatively

closed to environmental Inputs).

It

Is, of course,

parameter value, whether a national norm on

a

true that for any given

reading test, or the teachers

expectation of classroom deportment, there will be
a wide range of deviations in any student population, but it is
equally true that any given

parameter value is but one of a myriad inputs which at
any time will be
part of a student's environment.

We are not arguing, of course, that

all students have the same learning competence or that all
students can

process the same degree of environmental variety, but we are
arguing that

an

students are open systems, that all behavior must be seen in its

interpersonal and environmental context, and that the individual student
is well-adapted to his environment.

This last proposition may appear

extreme and overstated, since we ordinarily talk so easily about "mal-

adjustment," since we all know children who are not happy in school and do
not do well in school, and since our jails and mental hospitals are full
of people who apparently could not adapt to the larger social environment.

Yet the proposition follows inexorably from the analysis of Part II; any

molecular behavior of an open system is an adaptation to its environment.
The proposition forces us to study the student-in-environment if we wish
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to understand his behavior.

If „e wish to do more than
understand - If „e

wish to control or change, or to
use the currently popular
term, "modify"
his behavior, we must be able
to exercise the appropriate
amount of control
over his environment.

We must remember, however, that
we will always

share this control with the student
himself.

We all recall the cartoon

of the two mice In the cage
commenting on how well they had trained
the

experimenter:

every time they stepped on a lever he
was conditioned to

give them food.

Such is the essence of open systems.

This topic will be

developed more extensively in the next
chapter.
11.9 A l earning system controls its own
transformations

^

njt rolled

^havior
environment

.

,

^ ^ _^vironment
while

m

;

:

an adjusting

therefo re a learning system can

adjusting system can only

changed

^ its

One of the paramount questions involved in defining
a sys-

tem is identifying the locus or locii of control.
is in the environment,

If the locus of control

that is to say, if the system changes its line of

behavior only in response to new parameter values, we can define
the
system as an adjusting system, particularly if the system’s
output does
not affect the parameter values.

If, at the other extreme, the locus of

control is entirely within the boundary of the system, that is to say, if
the system changes its line of behavior without regard to parameter

values, we can define the system as morphogenic.

If, as is most often

the case with living systems, there are locii of control both within and

outside the system, that is to say, if the system must accept certain
inputs but can refuse others, and if the system can process these inputs
in more than one way, and if the manner of processing these inputs is

selected by the system, and if, finally, the system’s outputs affect in
some way subsequent inputs, we can define the system as a learning sys-

124

11.9
tem.

The essential factor, thus, is whether
there Is a linear relationship

between Inputs and outputs.

If there is,

then the system can be entirely

controlled by the environment; If there Is
not, the system cannot be
®i^tirely controlled by the environment.
11. 9A The school is a learning system.

There are many among its

critics who wish it were not, that it could
be more readily controlled

by the environment.

There are other critics who claim, in effect,
that

the school is an adjusting system, controlled
by school boards, politicians,

and professional educators.

These critics would like, at the least, to

share control, and, at most, to wrest control from
these forces.

There

is no doubt that the environment imposes many
constraints upon schools;

legislators through statutes, school boards through budgets, central
ad-

minstrators through requirements; however, we must be careful to
distinguish between constraints and controls.
as controls,

If such constraints functioned

if schools could be designed to specifications as adjusting

systems are, so that given inputs would lead to predictable outputs,

most of the critics of education, from whatever point of view, would be
satisfied.

However, as we have seen (9.36), it is difficult to identify,

much less predict, the school's outputs.

Unlike business, where profits,

products, and gross sales can be identified, measured, and altered, or

hospitals, which deal with a circumscribed and measurable segment of the

human condition, public schools deal with a totality of complex, totipotential learning systems, and they attempt to deal with them in their
totality, even though in the concrete world, people spend only a small

portion of their time in school.

One of the most widespread trends in

schools today is the attempt to assert, as environment, greater control
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over the inputs and outputs of
their students through the use
and development of behavioral objectives.
We shall be analysing this trend
from a
systems point of view in Chapter
13.
Here we need only point out the
paradoxical implications of attempting to
facilitate learning by treating the

learner as an adjusting system.

The concomitant movement on the
level

of the school is generally referred
to as "accountability,” and while
the

term means different things to different
people, in system terms it also

means the establishment of a greater
linear relationship between inputs
and outputs.

The implications here, too, are for greater
environmental

control over the school as a system, to the point
where parameter values
are specified and output values can be measured
against them, and

deviations corrected.

As things stand now in most schools, it is possible

to assign parameter values

(national norms, for Instance), and to measure

some actual output against them (test results), but not to
correct the

deviation.

Most schools lack the mechanisms to utilize this information

as negative feedback to correct their performance.

In spite of this lack,

most schools still exert more control over their own behavior, for better
or for worse, than do their environments.

The great battles over aid

to education during the past decade have generally been over local versus

federal control of the schools.

The truth of the matter in most instances

is that no level of control has much influenced the school, whether national,

state, or local.
11. 9B The student is a learning system.

This may, at first, appear

to be an unexceptional statement, since the term "student" implies

"learning," as commonly used.

However, this is a catagorical statement

which in terms of our analysis in Part II has implications beyond the
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common use of these terms.

The salient characteristic of a
learning sys-

tme is not that it can learn, but
that it must learn (7.25).

evocative phrase, "man (is) a system
that needs to learn.
IS simply not an option open to
man.

To use Pask's

"Not to learn"

We must hasten to add that this

need to learn is not necessarily volitional.

We are not saying that all

men want to learn or seek to learn; we are
saying, instead, that all men
do learn, and while the rate of learning
and the amount of learning may

fluctuate over a lifetime, learning never ceases
entirely as long as the

brain is functioning.

The statement does not imply that the learning will

be necessarily appear relevant from the envrionment

'

s

point of view.

It

does not mean that a student will necessarily learn what
someone else, like
a teacher, wants or expects him to learn.

In fact, it implies quite the

opposite, since a learning system cannot be controlled by the environment.
The more control the environment attemtps to exercise over the learning
system, the less likely that learning will take place, or, to state the

proposition more clearly, the less likely that the output behavior will
result from learning.

This is not a value judgment; not all behavior of

learning systems can emenate from learning; if this were the case there

would be no point in learning since the environment would be totally unpredictable and no learning would be useful in any subsequent situations.
Those aspects of the environment which are predictable do not require

learning or re-learning; the school legitimately deals with these aspects
as well as the unpredictable aspects.

A student must have a repetoire

of learned behavior to apply in familiar or repetitious situations, much

3

Pask, Gordon, "Man As a System That Needs to Learn" in Stewart, ed..
Automation Theory and Learning Systems (Washington, DC: Thompson, 1967).
,
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as an adjusting system has built-in
lines of behavior to deal with
its

predictable input.

Learning is valuable only in situations
which are

unfamiliar or novel.

The Implication of the statement
that man needs to

learn, however, is that he requires
novelty and variety in his environment.
If the school as environment does not
provide sufficient variey for a stu-

dent to learn, he will behave in such a way
as to create variety in his

environment.

Such is the etiology of divergent behavior,
whether or not

considered creative or deviant by the environment.

From all of this, it

follows that environmental variety is a requisite
for learning.

Rich class-

room environments are better for learning than sterile
environments;

heterogeneous populations (along whatever dimensions) are more
conducive
to learning than homogeneous populations.

It is Important, in terms of

this analysis, not to confuse "variety” and "organization," two
very

different concepts.
variety.

There can be organized variety and disorganized

A relatively impoverished environment can be either organized

or disorganized.

We will deal with these issues in the next chapter, but

it is important to remind ourselves here that in arguing for the impor-

tance of environmental variety to learning we are not arguing for any

Particular degree of orgnaization, although we can anticipate our argument
enough to say that variety must occur within a matrix of higher level
organization.

Just as in a transformational grammar a finite number of

symbols and a finite number of combinatorial rules can generate an infinite

number of words and sentences, so, too, there must exist in the environment
some underlying regularity if the learning system is to survive in it.
This argument may appear to be evading the central issue that schools are

concerned with - not whether a student learns, but whether he learns what
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the school is intentionally
teaching.

The argument is frequently
advanced

that, for some students at least,
a rich and varied environment
distracts

them from learning certain skills and
concepts that they "need" to learn.
Our analysis denies the validity of
this argument; all students do, in
fact, learn what they need to learn,
although they do not necessarily

learn what we want them to learn.

The "abstracted student" may "need" to

have a "positive self-image" and a "respect for
others."

The concrete

student, negotiating his own environment, may
not have these particular
needs; he may need to be dependent, he may be fearful
of competence, he

may have a desk- top calculator at home, he may, as a condition
of his
survival, need to taunt, bully, and ridicule others.

needs to learn.

He learns what he

The only way the environment can change his learning

pattern is to exercise more control over him, but by exercising more
control, by reducing the variety in the system, it is actually reducing
the likelihood that the student’s behavior is the result of learning.
By focusing on specified outputs, the environment restricts the ability
of the student to cope with environmental variety when he encounters it.

11.10 The more probabilistic the system

organization

,

and the more changing its

the more difficult it becomes for

to send information about the system

probabilistic.

,

.

^

constrained transmitter

All open, learning systems are

This means that at any given time, the state of the system

cannot be predicted from its state at a prior point in time, and its sub-

sequent state cannot be predicted from its state at the given point in
time.

The system, in simpler words, will have a repetoire of behaviors

to select from, and if it cannot find a suitable behavior in its repetoire

it can,

through its associator and memory processes, create new behaviors.
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Again, the creation of granunatical
sentences is the clearest and best example of this. The number of unique
sentences that a human being can

generate is literally infinite, and except
for special circumstances such
as an actor playing a role, unpredictable.

Just as remarkable as the

ability to generate original and unpredictable
sentences, however, is the
ability of human beings to receive and immediately
understand and act upon
sentences that they have never heard before and
could not anticipate.

Most

human beings share an underlying linguistic competence
which governs their
linguistic performance, both as senders and receivers of
information.^
So ingrained is the competence that most people,
when instructed to talk

"gobbledygook," emit a series of gutteral and labial sounds totally unrelated to the structure of their native language, accompanied by emphatic
body gestures that they would ordinarily not employ.
a list of nonsense words,

If asked to create

they could probably do so, but if asked to

create nonsense sentences, their basic linguistic competence would make
this an arduous and slow task.

Men are "naturally” grammatical.

While

this competence permits the generation of unlimited understandable mes-

sages, therefore, it also inhibits the generation of messages which may
lie outside the canon and conventions of the language.

Put more generally,

and within the context of our theory, the capacity of a system both to

decode and encode information is constrained by the very competence which
allows it to generate and understand an infinite number of meaningful
messages.

Furthermore, the capacity of a channel to transmit information

is finite, and if its capacity to transmit information is less than the

"^see Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax
MIT, 1965).

,

ch.

2,

(Cambridge:
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capacity of the information source
to generate it, this capacity
will be
a constraint on its ability
to transmit information.
Still further, most

communication channels are ’•noisy;” elements
of uncertainty and distortion
not emanating from the information
source enter the channel at points
between the transmitter and receiver, and
this noise further constrains the

ability of the channel to transmit information
reliably.

Finally, and

particularly in the domain of interpersonal
communication, there are
frequently multiple channels simultaneously
transmitting incongruent
and even contradictory messages.

For any one such channel, the information

in the other channels will function as noise.

All of these constraints

serve to limit the reliability of transmitting information,
and the

greater the variety (information, uncertainty) in the information
source,
the more serious are the constraints on the transmission
process.

ll.lOA The school is a probabilistic system, and it generages a

greater variety of information than it can transmit to its environment.
The problem we are dealing with here is not, as school people often
like
to think, one of selection of data.

Rather, the data that is selected for

transmission will itself be subject to the systematic distortions of

constrained transmission.

One reason for this is that in selecting infor-

mation for transmission, schools are subject to the problem of infinite
regress.

The most Important information that the school transmits is

about its components (Miss Smith’s class, the football team, Johnny),
each of which is also a probabilistic system.

point

Pask makes this profound

in a somewhat different context when he asserts

that "the least

distinguishable or describable component of [an active control system] is
also an active control system."^

^Pask, op. cit., p. 138.

(Pask’s term "active control system"
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is isomorphic with our term
"probabilistic.”)

This means that the infor-

mation from these components which the
school wishes to transmit will
have been subject to the systematic
constraints we have described before
the school considers it as information
to be transmitted to the environ-

ment, at which point it is subject to the
same constraints at the system
level.

Another reason, endemic to all complex systems, is
the problem of

distortion through generality.

Any general statement conveys less infor-

mation than the less general statements from which it
is drawn (an instance
of the whole being less than the sum of its parts).

Every meaningful

message exists at some level of generality, and thus contains
this kind
of systematic distortion.

If a school reports that its sixth grade students

achieved a mean grade level score of 6.8 on a battery of achievement tests,
this conveys more distorted information than the report that the students

received mean grade level scores of 7.2 and 6.4 on the vocabulary and math
tests respectively.

Each of these scores transmits more distorted infor-

mation than the next lower level of analysis.

When we come to the scores

of individual students, they convey more distorted information than an item

analysis, and so on.

Schools searching for adequate reporting systems

must become aware that distortion is "built-in" to the process, and while
up to a point it can be minimized by reducing the variety of information,
or by increasing channel capacity, or by reducing the noise. in the channel,
or by reducing the number of simultaneous channels, it can never be entirely

eliminated without changing the system to a deterministic one.

Most

schools, faced with this problem, tend to deal with it by reducing the

variety of information.

They transmit information at a high level of
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generality; thus requiring fewer symbols,
reducing the likelihood that the

channel capacity will be exceeded or that
noise will distort the transmission.

They achieve this greater reliability
of transmission, of course,

at the expense of distortion through
generality.

report card, the traditional five-point system

If we consider the

(A,

B,

C, D,

F)

conveys

very little information but is likely to
convey it accurately.

At the

other extreme, an extended anecdotal, narrative
statement of as many aspects
of a student’s work and growth as the teacher
can discuss is going to con-

vey much more information about that student, but
will be much more sub-

ject to the first kind of distortion due to constraints
on the process
of transmission.

There is more opportunity for misunderstanding, ambiguity,

and incongruity.

In trying to devise reporting systems which strike a

balance between generality and specificity, between cognitive, affective,
and psychomotor concerns, and between generalized learning skills and

particular basic skills, schools should realize that their job, like the
job of the cartographer, is not to eliminate distortion, but to select
the distortion which is least likely to jeopardize the communication

process and to develop means of counteracting the distortion which is

inevitable to the greatest degree possible.
ll.lOB

The student is a probabilistic system.

This means that the

relationship between his input transducers (largely his sensory apparatus),
his channels, his associator and memory, and his output transducer is

subject to systematic distortion for all the reasons described in 11.10.
But most clearly and colloquially, we can say that there will always be

systematic distortion between the "real world" and the student’s experience
of that real world, as well as between the student’s experience and his
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behavior.

As schools and curriculum developers
place increasingly greater

emphasis upon behavioral objectives, this
point assumes increasingly greater
significance.

The "language” of experience and the "language"
of behavior

are incommensurate.

The first is semantically rich but syntactically

poor, the second is semantically poor but complex
in syntax.

In other

words, our behavior is by necessity more highly structured
than our experience.

When behaviorists attempt to translate "learning" into a
list of

active verbs, no matter how extensive the list it will never
accurately

reflect the image that the learner has of the information he has
processed.
We shall deal with this issue more extensively in Chapter 13.
11.11 The organization of learning systems tends towards increasing

complexity

.

definition.

The notion of "organized complexity" is important for system

System theorists have attempted to define the concept of

complexity with some rigor, in terms of the amount of information necessary to describe or control the system.

As we have seen (5.17 et passim),

this amount of information is not related to the number of components or
the size of the system, but rather to the degree of organization and to
the relationships among the variables.
of a system,

The more complex the organization

the more improbable its behavior (in a statistical sense)

and the more information about its organization is necessary.
time,

At the same

the more organized its complexity, the more likely that the amount

of information necessary to control the system can be attained at the

appropriate level with the appropriate effort.
"complexity" are independent concepts.

Thus, "organization" and

Systems can increase in complexity

without increasing in organization - can change in the direction of
"chaotic complexity" — and the only reliable information about the system
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becomes statistical and relatively useless
for controlling the system at
any given point in time.
If systems continue to evolve in
the direction
of chaotic complexity, at a certain point
they loose their systemic pro-

perties and become mere aggregates of systems.

Systems can also increase

in organization without increasing in
complexity, and the amount of infor-

mation required to control the system correspondingly
decreases.

If

systems continue to evolve in the direction of "organized
simplicity,"
at a certain point they can no longer be considered
learning systems, but

instead become deterministic.

Systems can increase in size and in number

of components without increasing either their organization or
the complexity, although this rarely happens with concrete systems if the
increase

in size or number is considerable or sudden.

The statement that the

organization of learning systems tends towards increasing complexity thus
says something significant about the properties of learning systems as

well as about the mode of analysis the observer employs in thinking about
the system he is looking steadily at.

If, as he observes the system over

time, he finds that he needs increasing less information to control the

system, he can infer that the system is not learning (taking into account,
of course, the problems of the constrained transmitter discussed in

11.10).

If,

on the other hand, he finds that the only reliable information

he can obtain about the system is statistical, he may infer that he is

operating at an inappropriate level of analysis and that the "thing" he
is looking steadily at is not,

in fact, a "thing" but an aggregate of

things

ll.llA If one defines the school as an open, learning, probabilistic
system, one can expect it to increase in organized complexity.

We will
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maintain that for most

schools this is the case, although there
are excep-

tions and the exceptions are significant.

Both of the current "trends"

in public schools, "behavioral objectives"
and "open classrooms," while

dissimilar in many respects, are movements towards
greater organized
complexity, and while the observer of any particular
school must be careful to distinguish between rhetoric and actual
practice, the evidence

appears to support the contention that these two alternative
approaches to

individualizing the learning process both require the analyst to have
more

information of a different order.
If a system is able to formulate its own goals
and plans, to switch goals and plans at will,
and to adjust internally its own allocation of
resources and priorities of action, knowledge
of current structure is less useful for prediction and control than knowledge of the guiding
goals and values which integrate and guide the
total system. Moreover, for very large systems,
a detailed definition may not be feasible, even
if it were useful.
In short, the analyst's resources must be redeveloped and his thinking
shifted to a different level if he is to make^
headway in an environment of true complexity.

Information about goals and values is difficult to obtain, since statements
about goals and values may or may not be reliable indicators of operational
goals and values.

Furthermore, in human organizations such as schools

there may be a multiplicity of conflicting and incongruous goals and values,
as well as conflicting priorities among common goals and values.

Decision-

making processes in actuality may differ significantly from those inferred
from an organizational structure.

When these considerations are taken

together with the constraints on information transmission mentioned earlier.
6

Hare

op

.

cit

,

p.

200.
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we can understand that gaining reliable
information about complex systems
IS an awesome task.

It is a possible task, however, since
if our analysis

is at the appropriate level, and if the school,
in fact,

tends towards

increasing organized complexity, fewer statements will
each contain more

information than a great many more statements would if the
school were

moving to chaotic complexity.

The amount of information needed must not

be confused with the number of data needed.

As Herbert Simon amusingly

put it, "Mother Hubbard did not have to check off the list of
possible

contents to say that her

cupboard was bare."^

The job of the school

analyst is to discover that level of analysis at which the fewest possible

statements will convey the most Information.

The increasing complexity

of schools means that the number of statements will have to be greater

over time and the level of analysis will have to become more general.

How-

ever, the increasing organization of this complexity means that a limited

number of these statements will do an adequate, if not optimal, job of

describing the system for the analyst's purposes, whether they be prediction, control, or mere understanding.

Chapter

9

provided the essential

elements of this level of analysis by identifying the subsystems of which

complex systems are composed.

If for our purposes we omit from consider-

ation matter-energy processing subsystems and focus only on information-

processing subsystems, we can see that systems characterized by organized
complexity can be described in terms of eleven subsystem processes, a

perfectly feasible analytical task.
ll.llB The growth of the organism and the evolution of the species are

both clearly examples of increasing organized complexity; from both the

p.

^Simon, Herbert, The Sciences of the Arti
110.

f

pi

(C ambridge:

MIT, 1969),
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biological and psychological points of view,
this point is beyond debate.
That the student as a learning system shares
in both the ontogenetic and

phylogenetic propensities of the species is at this
point
vation.

a trivial obser-

What is not trivial for our purposes is the
realization that for

the student, moreso than for the school, this
propensity is innate and

develops with a remarkable regularity.

With the exception of special cases,

all children appear to pass through developmental stages in
roughly the
same sequence and at approximately the same chronological ages.

The work

of Piaget, Bruner, and their colleagues strongly suggest that this develop-

ment has relatively little to do with ability or schooling.

From infancy

through adulthood, cognitive competence develops through increasing differ-

entiation and discrimination, classification, generalization, and abstraction, and the reciprocal processes of assimilation and accomodation.

This

is not to say that there will not be significant differences between

children and between cultures.

It is fair to say that the more the world

into which the child is born manifests organized complexity, the more his

own cognitive competence will develop in this direction.

But while there

can be significant differences in degree and rate of development, there
is evidently little difference in the characteristic of the developmental

process itself.

There is, furthermore, some neurological evidence

suggest that if the environment is

g

to

singularly deficient in variety

(complexity) or is markedly unorganized in its causal texture, the individual will compensate for these characteristics by creating an internal

representation of reality which is richer and more organized that the envir8

Pribram, Karl H.
Prentice-Hall, 1971).

,

Languages of the Brain

,

(Englewood Cliffs:
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onment.

Daydreams, fantasies, obsessions, and
compulsions may be explained

as compensatory strategies.

The student thus can be seen as a
morphogenic

system which, up to a point at least, will
develop increasing organized

complexity regardless of the characteristics
of his environment.

Colloquial-

ly, we might say that the student cannot
tolerate boredom or confusion.

What the school cannot provide in terms of variety
and sense, the student

will provide for himself.

Truency and deviant behavior are evidence of this

from children who cannot create rich and sensible
interior lives for them-

selves

.

11.12 In this chapter we have defined both school and student
as open,

learning, probabilistic systems which develop in the direction of
increased

organized complexity.

We have attempted to indicate some issues involved

in looking at schools and students as such systems.

issues at greater length in Chapter 13.

We will discuss these
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CHAPTER XII
SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT
12.1 For

c oncrete

learning systems there are no normative
environments

We recall from 6.1 that a system’s environment
consists of those parameters

which affect It (as Inputs) and which are affected
by Its outputs.

The

mere existence of a set of attributes or
phenomena outside the boundary of
a concrete system does not mean that these
attributes or phenomena are

necessarily parts of that system:' s environment.

Before the environment

can be Identified, the system must be Identified; that Is, we
must be

clear about the system we are looking steadily at.

We cannot make any

general statements about the environment of a concrete system, although we
can make general statements about the concrete environments that concrete

systems Inhabit.

We shall use the term "field” to describe the general

characteristics of concrete environments.

A concrete system's environ-

ment will be seen as that protlon of a field which at any given time affects the system or Is affected by It.

The characteristics of the field

will play a large, but by no means sufficient, part In determining the
nature of the system's environment.
12.1.1 There are three essential dimensions which determine the

character of the field.

The first Is the dimension of variety

;

we can say

that fields are either rich or poor In the number of distinguishable

elements they contain.

The richer the field, the greater the possibility

of variety In the environment.

But we must emphasize that It Is only the

possibility of variety that Is greater; the actual variety In the envrlonment may be a great deal less that the possible variety.

If It Is less.

.
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the difference between the
possible variety and the actual
variety will be
the measure of
undancy in the environment. Of course,
the amount of

r^

variety in the environment cannot be
greater than the variety in the field.
12.1.2 The second dimension is the
dimension of organization

.

Emery

and Trist have called this "the causal
texture of organizational environ-

ments."

We have remarked (6.3) that most
environments are loosely-joined;

they fall between being tightly organized,
in which every element affects

every other element, and being unorganized,
in which each element is unaf-

fected by any other element.

This is so because this is true of the field

in general; a change in any given variable will
ordinarily affect some

but not all other variables.

That it is true of the field in general,

however, does not mean that it is equally true of all
segments of the
field; there will be some segments in which elements
are tightly joined and

other segments in which elements are loosely joined.

The degree of joined-

ness in the field, therefore, will not play as large a role in determining
the concrete system's environment as the degree of variety, since the
envir-

onment cannot contain more variety than the field.
12.1.3 If we put these two dimensions together, we can have rich,

organized fields and rich, unorganized fields; we can have poor, organized
fields and poor, unorganized fields.

dimension of change

,

When we add the third dimension, the

we have a typology of eight kinds of fields.

Emery

and Trist use the picturesque terms "placid" and "turbulent" to describe
the dimension of change,

2

but we must be careful to note that this dimen-

^in Emery, F.E., ed.. Systems Thinking
241-257.
pp.
^Ibid.

,

(Baltimore:

Penguin, 1969),
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Sion exists on the next higher level of
analysis, since we are interested
in change in the degree of variety and
the degree of organization, and

not the change implicit in variety and
organization (5.18-5.20).

While an

unorganized field will be more turbulent than an
organized field, we will
use the term to refer to a field which changes
its organization and variety
at an observable rate and to a significant degree.

A field which is becom-

ing more or less organized, or is increasing or
decreasing its variety will

be said to be changing, whereas a field which maintains a
relatively fixed

level of organization and variety will be said to be stable, even
though

within that stability there can be a great deal of change.
12.1.4 The distinction between "field” and "environment" is frequently

ignored by analysts and observers.

They tend to assume that a description

of the field from their point of view is also a description of the envir-

onment that the concrete system inhabits, and because one can make general

statements about types of fields one can also make general statements
about concrete environments.

For learning systems that exercise control

over their boundary and input transducer subsystems, it is not possible to

assume that a description of their field from the observer's viewpoint will

necessarily be a description of their environment.

In a very real sense,

the analyst's description of the field is a description of his environment,
and, as we have said (7.34), concrete systems inhabiting the same field

may have very different environments.
12.1.A.1 It may generally be said that schools inhabit environments

which are less rich in variety, more organized, and less dynamic than the
field, although this will not necessarily be true of a specific school.

The reason for this generalization is rooted both in the history of American
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public education and the nature of the
learning system.

Until very recently,

the prevailing mythos of public schools
was the metaphor of the "melting

pot," wherein a common "American" culture
was created by conscientiously

reducing the variety which a culturally
heterogeneous population presented
to the schools.

The population which left the schools to
become part of

the schools' environment was (and for the
most part still is) less varied

than the population which entered the schools.

The human environment which

most schools inhabit is itself a product of the
acculturation process of

public schooling.

For a long time, we felt that this was true of the field,

too; school people tended to ignore those elements of the
population who

were not successful products of American schooling.

The American dream of

cultural homogeneity is no longer so firmly entrenched; "cultural Pluralism"
and "human diversity" are becoming familiar slogans in schools, and

I

believe that many schools are fumbling their way towards making them more
than slogans.

Yet it would be a profound mistake to assume that schools'

environments change as rapidly as schools may change.

There is a built-in

generation-lag; products of "heterogeneous" schools will not become significant parts of those schools' environments for several years.

School boards,

whether elected by majority or appointed by the community power structure,
reflect the previous generation of schooled people, not the current generation.

Adminstrators of schools, too, generally represent successful pro-

ducts of an earlier generation of schooling.

This is less true of teacher

candidates, although since teachers are usually selected by administrators,

successful candidates - those who actually enter the classrooms - are
generally less diverse in their characteristics than those who apply.
Because learning systems tend to project their characteristics onto their
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environment (7.43) as well as map characteristics
of their environment into
their internal processes (7.36), the
system and environment will generally
resemble each other much more closely than
will the environment and its
field.

Since the school is such a loosely-bounded
system, the character

of its environment can perhaps best be
ascertained by observing the
12.1.

characteristics of the school rather than the characteristics
of the field.
A. 2 One more important point must be made
in this section relat-

ing to schools as well as the next section relating
to students.

Because

we are dealing with concrete systems whose variables
must, in fact, exist

concretely in time/space (5.4), the absence of a variable is not

^

the system

system.

,

a

variable

and the absence of a parameter is not a parameter of the

In the language of education, neither system nor environment

can be characterized by its "needs.”

Certainly, the environment of a

school may contain many statements and assertions about needs, and those

statements may be part of the school's environment, but it is only the
statement and not the need that the school can deal with.

The reification

of "needs" is one of the prevailing fallacies of much social science,

and emenates from the confusion of abstracted systems which inhabit norm12.1.

ative environments and concrete systems which only inhabit concrete environments.

One of the simple tests of whether an analysis is dealing with

concrete systems and concrete environments is the extent to which statements of "needs" enter into the analysis.
B.1 It is relatively easy to distinguish among classroom envir-

onments according to the three criteria described in 12.1.

It would be

fallacious, however, to assume that the environment of the student in the
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classroom necessarily resembled the
classroom environment as the field.

We

can say that a rich, organized,
dynamic classroom is more conducive
to

learning than a poor, unorganized, static
classroom, but we cannot say that
a student in the first type of classroom
will necessarily inhabit an envir-

onment with those characteristics.

It is easier for a student in a
rich

classroom to Inhabit a poor environment than it
is for a student in a poor
classroom to inhabit a rich environment.

Likewise, it is easier for a

student in a loosely-structured classroom to
inhabit a highly-structured
’

environment than it is for a student in a highly-structured
classroom to
inhabit a loosely-structured environment.

Rich, loosely-structured, dynamic

classrooms can provide a greater range of concrete environments
than poor,

highly-structured, static classrooms, and are therefore more appropriate
for learning systems.
the more the

The more the classroom resembles the second type,

successful" student’s behavior will be adjustment behavior,

although, as we have seen (11. 9B), the student requires a certain degree
of variety for learning to take place, and he must learn.

Since the

classroom is only a portion of the student’s environment, it is not necessary
that it provide this variety, although to the extent that it fails to do
so the less relevance it will have to the rest of the student's life.

The theory of concrete learning systems thus powerfully supports the move-

ment towards greater classroom variety and less classroom structure as

being conducive for a wide range of learning environments for particular
students, without prescribing that these particular environments resemble
the classroom as a field.

12.1.B.2 We must stress here as we did above (12. lA), that "needs"
are not variables of either students or classrooms.

A teacher may detennine
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that a student may have a particular
need and may attempt to structure
the

field accordingly.

environment.

This determination thus may well
affect the student's

Likewise, the student may well feel a "need,"
and this feeling

becomes a significant variable, whether it is
a need to eat, to love, to
read, or to learn.
the variable.

It is the feeling,

though, and not the need, which is

We may state almost catagorically that a
system's feelings

of needs will result in particular behaviors
(the only exception being

when a particular need gratification is deferred
because of other more
pressing feelings of need)

.

The only needs that can be generally ascribed

to learning systems are the need for varied and
loosely-joined environments

and the need to learn, and we can only say this because we
are attempting
to develop a general theory.

At any given time, a particular learning sys-

tem may need less variety and more structure.

What we commonly talk about

as needs in this context are really "necessary conditions" of the same sort
as physiological "needs."
12 2 All concrete learning systems are well-adapted to their environ.

One of the consequences of adopting a non-normative analysis is the

abandonment of the notions of maladaption and deviance (in its ethical
sense).

A learning system may deviate from its prior behavior but it cannot

deviate from the way it ought to behave, since "oughts," like "needs," do
not describe concrete parameters.

This point of view allows us to divest

ourselves of much cumbersome analytical baggage, and also significantly

simplifies the analysis of complex systems by forcing the analyst to focus
on actual behavior which does exist while relieving him of the obligation
of inquiring into behavior which might exist, but does not.

To this extent.
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at least,

this approach conforms to a strict
behaviorism which studies

actual rather than desired behavior.

(It departs from behaviorism,
of course

by refusing to accept linear and causal
explanations of the relationship

between input and output.)

Most important, however, it forces us to
under-

stand situations before we evaluate them.

Perhaps the most significant

contributions of post-war psychiatry have been the work
of Laing,^ Bateson
and Ruesch,

4

Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson,^ and their colleagues
to

remove familiar but inhibiting evaluative labels from
human behavior and
to examine that behavior in the social context in
which it occurs.

Such an

examination reveals that behavior which we might ordinarily label
"disturbed

is an understandable adaptation to an environment which
manifests

the same characteristics.

disturbed
3-nd

The focus of investigation thus shifts from the

behavior of the system to the relationship between the system

its environment.

Just as an understanding of mental illness has been

profoundly changed by this change in focus, so too, our understanding of
other forms of disturbed behavior - crime, drug addiction, alcoholism is slowly changing to the point where we are beginning to recognize all of

these behaviors as adaptive rather than maladaptive.

Recognizing behavior

as adaptive does not require that we approve of it or that we should not

desire to change it.

To understand is not to justify.

But to understand

the situation makes it more likely that the situation can be changed, since

3

Self and Others The Politics of Experience Sanity, Madness and the
Family (with Esterson)
Interpersonal Perception (with Phillipson and Lee).
;

;

;

4
^

'

Communication;

The Social Matrix of Psychiatry

Pragmatics of Human Communication

.

.
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the field can play an important
part in changing the environment
and thus

changing the behavior of the system we
are looking steadily at.
12. 2A Schools are well-adapted to
their environments.

It was,

I

believe

Jonathon Kozol who first made this observation
several years ago in an article in the to York Times, in which he
argued that the "problem" with

American public schools was not that they worked
so poorly but that they
worked so well.

One need not share Kozol 's viewpoint to
acknowledge the

cogency of his position.

The environment that most schools inhabit is

the environment that they largely created and
continue to perpetuate.

We

might wish that schools might have a larger and more
creative vision of
their place in the social order; we may think that schools
should become

agents of social and cultural change.

What we are actually saying in this

case is either that we wish the school were less well-adapted
to its envir-

onment or that the school's environment could be expanded to include more
of the variety in the field.

It is ironic that so many critics and re>-

formers who are willing to absolve the individual of responsibility for his

anit-social acts are unwilling to absolve the school of responsibility for
its behavior, and yet from a general systems viewpoint there is no differ-

ence; all learning systems are well-adapted to their environments.

Whether

this calls for sympathetic understanding or catagorical condemnation is

purely a function of the observer's prejudices.

The rapid development of

alternative and free schools both within and outside the public school system is undoubtedly the healthiest and most encouraging acknowledgement of
the proposition that different schools can inhabit very different environ-

ments within the same field.
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12.2b Every student is well-adapted to
his environment.

If we start

from this assumption, some remarkable
changes in perception occur.

We

find, for example, that most of our
vocabulary for talking about students

disappears.

There are no more "over-achievers” or
"under-achievers," only

achievers.

There are, in fact, no "slow learners" or
"fast learners," only

learners inhabiting different environments
with different degrees of variety
and organization.

We must emphasize that we are not suggesting
that all

students, as learning systems, have similar learning competence,
for this
is certainly not the case.

We are saying, however, that each student's

learning competence will serve to limit or extend the variety and
organization of his environment, and that each student's competence and
environment

be reciprocally well— adapted

.

Neither is fixed or predetermined; they

will tend to expand and contract together.
12.2b.

2

A further implication of this assumption is that when teachers

choose or intend to change a student's behavior, either through teaching

him something or through "behavior modification," he is dealing with behavior which is already well-adapted and functional.

This is not to say

that all behavior is optimally functional, but rather that it is minimally

functional - it satisfies the minimal requirements for existing in its
environment.

If we choose to change behavior or to move a system towards

an optimally functional behavior, we must treat the system as an adjusting

system and make sure both that the inputs into the system are carefully
controlled and that negative feedback loops are fully functioning.

In

other words, the variety in the environment must be significantly reduced,
and the organization of the environment significantly increased, so that
the behavior that was satisfactorily adapted to its original environment
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no longer is well-adapted to a contrived,
more restricted environment.

The

assumption is that when the new behaviors are
"learned" they can be used
by the learning system in more expansive
environments.

This is the under-

lying assumption of schooling, and while the
first part of it is probably
true

learning systems are capable of adjustment behavior the second

part is questionable.

We have said that adjusting systems cannot learn;

whether learning systems can "transfer" adjustment behavior
to less predictable environments is by no means clear.

It is frequently the case that

what a student "learns" in restrictive classroom environments is
useful
only in subsequent similar environments.

Most people "forget" most of

what they "learn" in school because the environments in which they exist
are so unlike their classroom environments.

For most people, "learned"

algebra is useful only in algebra classes, "learned" history only useful
in history classes, and so forth.

If life was carried on in environments

that resembled most school rooms, then sophisticated adjustment behavior

would be the optimal kind of behavior.

If,

on the other hand, most

schoolrooms more closely resembled the environments that the real world
presents, adjustment behavior would be mal-adaptive since the environment

would be much less predictable.

At the same time, in such a classroom,

the control of the students’ behavior would rest much more with the stu-

dent than with the teacher, and learning would be less likely to be the direct result of teaching.

12.2B.3 The modification of well-adapted learned behavior is therefore more likely to occur in open classrooms, whereas the modification of

adjustment behavior is more likely to occur in restrictive classrooms.

Since

adjustment behavior is useful only in environments which repeat themselves
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with a high degree of regularity, „e
have theoretical grounds for
questioning the efficacy of schooling in
restrictive classrooms.
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CHAPTER XIII
SYSTEM ORGANIZATION

13.1
sense.

,.l

no £uch _thing as

'

good organization' in any absolute

The relativity of this proposition has been
implied throughout

this paper, but it is well to make it explicit
and to elicit the support
of so rigorous an inductive theorist as Ashby in
its behalf.

He continues,

I am prepared to assert that there is not
a single
mental faculty ascribed to Man that is good in the
absolute sense.
If any particular faculty is usually
good, this is solely because our terrestrial environment is so lacking in variety that its usual form
makes that faculty usually good. But change the environment, go to really different conditions, and
possession of that faculty may be harmful
Here are some examples in illustration.
.

.

.

The first is Memory.
Is it not good that a brain
should have memory? Not at all, I reply - only
when the environment is of a type in which the
future often copies the past; should the future
often be the inverse of the past, memory is actually
disadvantageous.
.

.

As another example, what of the "organization" that
the biologist always points to with pride - the
development in evolution of specialized organs such
as brain, intestines, heart and blood vessels.
Is
this not good? Good or not, it is certainly a specialization made possible only because the earth has
an atmosphere; without it, we would be incessantly
bombarded by tiny meteorites, any one of which, passing through our chest, might strike a large blood
vessel and kill us.
.Thus the development of organs
is not good unconditionally, but is a specialization
to a world free from flying particles.
.

In this spirit, then, we wish to stress that our typology and classification

"Principles of the Self-Organizing System" in Buckley,
^Ashby, W. R.
Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist (Chicago: Aldine,
112.
1968), p.
,

,

^

Ibid

.

,

pp.

112-113.
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of systems is descriptive and not
evaluative.

A learning system is in no

absolute sense better than an adjusting system;
a complex system is not

better than a simple system.

When we describe schools and students as

learning systems, we are not patting them on
the back or asserting that
the things they learn will necessarily be true,
good, or beautiful.

We

are merely saying that they have certain properties
which distinguish them

from other kinds of systems, and that it is useful to
understand these

properties if one is dealing with them.
13. lA Following Ashby’s approach, we can say that there is no
such

thing as "good school organization," in an absolute sense, although we

must be careful not to follow him too far down this road.

If a school is

intentionally attempting to reshape its environment, to be an "agent of
social change," it may be that its internal organization is deliberately

chosen to be at varience with the environment’s organization.

One thinks

of the rural schools in North Dakota consciously creating classrooms

distinctively richer and more complex than the social environments they
serve.

The impetus for this particular organization comes not from the

immediate environments of the schools but rather from a localized intention of the New School at the University of North Dakota to "change" the

environment by changing the schools which both create and reflect the
environment they inhabit.

There are many such examples of schools which

intentionally create organization which appears maladapted to their particular environment, although in other environments they might appear highly
adaptive.

The survival of such schools over time is by no means assured,

and not infrequently they succumb in a state of crisis and recrimination.

Roland Barth describes an instance of several Harvard graduate students
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attempting to introduce open classrooms
into an inner-city Boston school.^
In retrospect, their failure can be
ascribed to a combination of naivete,

stupidity, and insensitivity, but even had they
been more sophisticated,
thoughtful, and sensitive it is unlikely that their
efforts would have

been successful, since they were so clearly an
intrusion into

a

functioning

system with a very different mode of organization which,
for better or
worse, was well-adapted to its environment.

One is tempted to use the

analogy of the body’s rejection of an organ transplant, although
it is not

entirely apt.

To the extent that some transplants are not rejected, the

operation may be worth the risk in the light of the alternative, but the
rate of success is not reassuring.

The problem with so many major innova-

tions in schools is that reformers assume that because schools are "bad"
in some sense they are also mal-adapted to their environment; thus they

see no need to make efforts to reduce the risks of rejection.

Survival

may not be the highest purpose the school reformers aspire to, but it is
a necessary, if not sufficient, prerequisite if any higher purposes are to

be served.
13. IB A thoughtful,

if somewhat cynical, school superintendent once

observed that the crucial turning point in a schoolchild's life is
Christmas vacation of the second grade.

It is at that point that the

difference between work and play becomes crystal clear, and work becomes
closely identified with reading.

If he can read, he knows that if he works

the chances of his future success in school are good; if he can't read,

he realizes that there isn't much point in working; his chances for success

In a talk at a NESDEC Conference, Newton, Mass., March 23, 1972.
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are minimal.

For both the reader and the non-reader,
reading, work, and

school tend to go together, as do ”not-reading,''
play, and vacation.

Although this is an overstatement,

I

do not think it is wrong.

We know

that early readers are not necessarily better readers
later in life, but
it is probably true that children who learn to read
before reading becomes

the primary mode of learning in school will read more for
pleasure and

personal enrichment than those for whom reading is primarily associated
with
formal classroom learning.

We know, too, that success in reading is highly

correlated with success in school, and that success in school is highly

correlated to subsequent success in school.

One would like to think that

success in school is also correlated to success in life, but this is a

dubious proposition if one goes beyond measurements of income and status
.

into more subjective areas.

We would like to think that success in school

is correlated with happiness, creativity, productivity, co-operation, and

wisdom, but the evidence is not reassuring.

The student who succeeds in

school is not necessarily going to be happy, creative, productive, cooperative, or wise; he is likely to be able to read.

As particular class-

rooms change their organization by emphasizing the importance of other
input sources besides books and worksheets, and other output behaviors be-

sides writing and speaking, they may, ironically, be increasing the like-

lihood of success in life while decreasing the likelihood of subsequent

success in school.

In any case, the successful student is a learning

system who can adapt his level of organization to the requirements of his
classroom.

155

13.2

13.2

tiation
c)

mo^

s^sten^ devej^

^ subsystems;

^ the

;

a) more

differen-

b) more decentralization of decision-making

ijiterdependence of subsystems

£rocesses

direction of:

;

d)

:

more elaborate adjustment

and e) sharper subsystem boundaries .'^

Miller’s criteria above

pretty well characterize the notion of organized complexity.

A system which

manifests these characteristics is developing in the direction
of increasing organization.

A system which does not manifest these characteristics

is probably not a learning system.

A system which manifests the reverse

characteristics, i.e. in which subsystems are becoming less differentiated,

more independent, and less distinguishable, is moving towards decreasing
organization, and, at a certain point, will no longer be a system.

If one

of the above characteristics is observable, it is likely that most of the

other characteristics are also present.

In other words, if the observer

notices more differentiation of subsystems, he can expect to find that the
subsystems are more interdependent - that the state of any given, subsystem is

constrained by the state of other subsystems.

If he notices that subsystem

boundaries are becoming sharper and more easily defined, he can expect to
find that the decider Subsystem of the whole system is laterally dispersed

among many components and that, therefore, information input is subject
to increasing numbers of boundary and filter processes and is subject to

greater systematic distortion.

One further implication of this proposition

is that the more the system grows in the direction of organized complexity,

the more difficult it becomes to have a sense of the system as a whole.

The sharper the subsystem boundaries become, the vaguer and more diffuse

^from Miller, J.G., "The Nature of Living Systems," Behavioral Science
vol. 16, 1971, p.

297.

,
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the boundaries of the whole system become,
and the more difficult it is
for the analyst or change agent to deal
with the system as a "thing" rather

than a confederation of things.

Conceptually, it becomes easier - and

analytically it makes more sense

-

to treat the more sharply defined and

differentiated subsystem as the system we are looking
steadily at, and to
treat the rest of the system as environment.
13. 2A We shall in this section give brief examples
of Miller's five

characteristics as applied to schools.
a)

more differentiation of subsystems - As schools grow in population

and as knowledge increases, several kinds of increasing differentiation
occur.

Teachers become more specialized in subject areas, and schools

become departmentalized into semi-autonomous departments.

Specialists in

administration, curriculum, and psychology become regular members of
schools' hierarchial staffs.

Business managers deal with matter-energy

maintenance inputs and outputs.
b) more decentralization of decision-making - As subsystems become

more differentiated, the decider subsystems play a greater role in deter-

mining what inputs to send to the decider subsystem of the whole system.

If

we assume that in most schools the decider subsystem is localized in the

principal, the information he receives is Increasingly selective and in-

creasingly distorted.

His decisions will be subject to the decisions of

many others as to what information he should have and in what form that
information should be transmitted to him.

No matter how highly centralized

the decisionmaking process may appear to be, and no matter how routinized
the formal communication channels may be, the decentralization of decision-

making is a necessary concomitant of increasing organized complexity.
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ir^terdependence of subsystems - Specialization
and interde-

pendence develop concomitantly as schools grow more
complex.

However, we

must keep xn mind the distinction between
components and subsystems when
thinking about interdependence in schools; subsystems
may be differentiated

without being localized in particular individuals or
groups of individuals.
A school may consist of a number of self-contained classrooms
and still
manifest increasing interdependence of subsystems.

As specialization

increases, schools tend to place more emphasis upon the "inter-” and
less

emphasis upon the "-dependence."

The plethera of specialists frequently

has little actual effect upon the interactions taking place in schools,

even though the "team" approach is frequently used to deal with curri-

culum and personnel.

The increasing number of specialists requires

increasing numbers of meetings of people increasingly unable to talk with
one another using a common technical vocabulary.

The concerns of the

school psychometrist and the guidance counsellor and the classroom
teacher become increasingly separated from one another.

The classroom

teacher accuses the counsellor of being unconcerned with a particular be-

havior problem she cannot cope with; the counsellor accuses the classroom
teacher of being insensitive to the needs of the child; they both accuse
the psychometrist of being concerned only with research and statistics.
In schools, as in society as a whole, interdependence based upon special-

ization produces stress, conflict, misunderstanding, and resentment
quite different from the abstracted picture of the team approach

-

happy

specialists working together, sharing their expertise, and solving problems to their mutual satisf cation.

It is not surprising that schools, as

society as a whole, are currently undergoing a reaction against special-
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ization.

The movement towards "community" in
schools is a movement away

from increased dif fentiation

;

all members of a community are expected
to

deal with the total range of inputs, both
signal and maintenance.

There

are no domains reserved for administration
or governance; the whole com-

munity becomes involved with such domains; expertise
is an object of
suspicion.

From a systems point of view, this is a movement away
from

the interdependence of differentiated subsystems and
towards the inter-

dependence of undifferentiated components, each of which combines
the

subsystem process of the whole within itself.

If all members of a school

community are equally responsible for administrative and curricular decisions, for establishing priorities and policies, the physical and temporal

proximity of the members becomes crucial, as does the size of the community.

Communities of undifferentiated members must be relatively small,

and closely bound in time and space, or interdependence is lost and the

system as a whole becomes fragmented and factionalized

.

In human systems,

then, personal knowledge and personal contact among components is essen-

tial when subsystem processes are shared and diffused, whether or not they
are differentiated.

and precarious.

Interdependence under these conditions is fragile

The more totipotential components become, the less they

need or desire other components to survive.

It is no wonder, then, that

schools which attempt to diffuse subsystem processes laterally in the

name of "community" are prone to fragmentation and conflict when their

membership grows too large or too dispersed over space.
d)

more elaborate adjustment processes - We refer here not only to

the adaptation of the school to its environment but also to the internal

adjustment processes which must occur with increasing specialization and
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interdependence.

A mundane example would be the problem of
scheduling in

a school wherein different individuals
have special functions in dealing

with a common school population.

Not only is the creation of a schedule

a specialized administrative function, but the
schedule itself must reflect

the special needs of the specialists.

In a school where all classes

regardless of subject or organization meet the same number of
times and
class periods are all the same length, this is merely a problem
of avoiding as many conflicts as possible in scheduling classes.

But when time

itself is a variable - when different classes have different schedules the internal adjustments become exceedingly complex, and frequently com-

puters must be called upon to create a master schedule.

In the inter-

personal domain, too, adjustment processes must become more elaborate.
As soon as schools acknowledge that both students and teachers have

different learning, teaching, and personal styles, the process of "matching" these styles becomes very intricate.

Ability grouping is a common

adjustment process employed by schools when the population becomes large
enough! to allow such differentiation.

Sex and age groupings are, of

course, so common in schools that it may be difficult to see them as

adjustment processes.

All grouping, whether by subject, age, sex,

ability, or interest, is an adjustment to the increasing complexity of

system organization.

That the rationale for various kinds of grouping

are of questionable educational validity does not question their efficacy
as internal adjustment processes.

As'^the growth of the system makes pos-

sible greater variety of adjustment process, so does it require more

elaborate adjustment processes to deal with the greater range of variety
in the system.

At the same time, this increased adjustment flexibility
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of the school as a whole is at the expense
of diminished adjustment flex-

ibility of the components, whether individuals,
classes, or other groupings.
A school

consisting of undifferentiated, quasi-autonomous
self-contained

classrooms does not require elaborate adjustment
processes, but the opportunxty for elaborate adjustment processes within each
of these classrooms
is great.

On the other hand, a school with highly differentiated
and inter-

dependent classes requires - and is capable of elaborate adjustment
processes, while the adjustment processes of each of these classrooms
is greatly

constrained.
e)

sharper subsystem boundaries - Schools have typically not sharpened

their subsystem boundaries to the same extent that they have sharpened
the distinctions among components.

Particularly if the area of information

subsystem processes, the school by necessity continues to combine and
laterally disperse these processes among its components.

Since we have

dealt with this issue extensively in secs. 9.27 - 9.37, we shall not repeat
it here.

It is worth noting again, however,

that the formal organization

of the school as an institution, as reflected in organizational charts

and job descriptions rarely reflects the actual organization of the school
as a concrete system.

The formal organization will frequently suggest

sharper subsystem boundaries than in fact exist.

l*Jhile

this is true to

some extent of all human organizations, in few organizations is the

functional infra-structure more at variance with the formal structure than
it is in schools.

Many analysts have seen this as pathological, and

have attempted to reduce the inconcruence between the formal and functional

organization of the school by sharpening subsystem boundaries.

Whether

or not this would be desireable, it does not seem possible without changing
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the school Into an adjustment system.

No human organisation which
attempts

to deal with human beings as totlpotentlal
systems without Itself being
a totlpotentlal system can do this.

In this regard,

It Is Instructive to

compare the public school with other instructional or
training contexts
in which both formal and functional subsystem
boundaries are sharper.

army provides such a context.

The

It is a totipotential system which deals

with human beings as partipotential systems.

Its training is for immediate

and specific purposes, and its hierarchial organization sharply
defines

subsystem boundaries.

Soldiers are trained for very specific functions

within the whole, and these functions are clearly related to specific
subsystemf processes

.

While all soldiers receive an initial basic training,

subsequent training is highly specialized according to which subsystem
process the individual is participating in.

Typically, information pro-

cessing and matter-energy processing are both hierarchically organized
but are rarely combined.

Personnel in the motor pool and the warehouse

will have totally different jobs than personnel in the orderly room or
intelligence office.

In all subsystems, decision-making is highly

localized, while at each echelon there is a specifically delineated

sphere of responsibility and power.

Those responsible for maintaining

records have no responsibility for decoding or encoding the information
in those records, and so forth.

There is something seductive about such

a highly organized system; it appears to be efficient and productive.

Schools frequently aspire towards such
and productivity.

ai

model in the name of efficiency

Without arguing the case as to whether the army is in

fact efficient and productive, we can nonetheless state that its organiza—
tion is based upon the assumption that its personnel are partipotential
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that they are trained to perform rigidly
circumscribed functions, and that
the individuality of the role incumbants, to the
extent that it cannot be

eliminated, is made irrelevant to the performance of
their duties.

This

would appear to be a pre-requisite of sharply defined
subsystem boundaries.
In system terms, we can say that the more sharply
defined these boundaries,

the less the vairiey in the system, and the less the variety
in the system,
the less it will be able to adapt to Increasing variety in the
field.

This is an essential reason why military and, for that matter, industrial

models are inappropriate for comprehensive public schools which take
seriously the job of educating individuals rather than role incumbants.
13. 2B

Most of the evidence in support of this proposition at the

level of the organism comes from neuro-physiology and neuro-psychology

and is beyond the competence of this paper to deal with.

Moreover, that

human beings develop in these directions is generally agreed upon by
specialist and non-specialist alike.

Since this is essentially a morpho-

genic process, one which follows inexorably from the organismic template,
we shall not elaborate upon these characteristics here but shall accept
them as "givens” and shall comment upon their implications for the student
in secion 13. 6B.

13.3 "The capacity of a complex organization to learn depends upon
a)

the quantity and variety of information stored in the system;

b) the structure of the communications network

;

c)

the pattern of the subsystems within the whole

d)

the number

,

location

,

;

and function of negative feedback loops

in the system and the amount of time-lag in them

;
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e)
f)

the nature of the system's memory facility

t^

operating rules

ture and behavior
1)
2)

rules

.

.

.

or program , determining the system's struc-

including

;

determining range of inputs

,

rules ^sponsible for the routing of information
throughout
the network

3)

,

,

;

,

rules about the identification
of information

,

analysis

,

and classification

,

4) priority rules for input

analysis

storage

,

5)

rules governing feedback mechanisms

6)

instructions for storage in system's memory

,

7)

rules regarding the synthesis of information for the output
of the system

,

,

and output ,

,

.

Cadwallader's admirable synthesis provides a useful analytic tool for looking steadily at systems which manifest the characteristics noted in 13.2.

Analysis is made easier by focusing strictly upon internal system organization and disregarding system-environment interaction.

Analysis is made

more difficult by the fact that in concrete systems each of these areas
of focus is systemically related to all others and cannot really be

analysed separately.

Nonetheless, each of them suggests useful questions

the analyst can ask, and we shall examine them seriatem

.

13.4 The quantity and variety of information stored in the system

.

Deutsch suggests three kinds of information which a complex system must
store if it is to be able to learn:

1)

information of the world outside;

^Cadwallader Mervyn L., "The Cybernetic Analysis of Change in Complex
Social Organizations," in Buckley, Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral
Aldine, 1968), p. 439.
(Chicago:
Scientist
,
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2)

information from the past, with a wide range or
recall and recombination;

and 3) information about itself and its own
parts. ^

Information of the

world outside comes from inputs; some inputs are acted
upon immediately
and produce outputs with little time-lag; some inputs
are acted upon but
are also stored for future use; some inputs are stored
without being acted
upon.

Information from the past was originally brought into the system

the input transducers but was stored in either the long-term memory
or

external memory for future use (see sec. 13.8).

It thus is the basis of

the system's "image" (13.9) of reality, against which subsequent input is

evaluated and upon which subsequent input is mapped.

The range of recall

and recombination will depend in large, measure upon the ability of the systme to break up stored information into smaller discrete chunks.

the job of the associator subsystem.

This is

The third kind of information is

uniquely associated with human systems and implies a certain level of
consciousness that does not exist in any non-living system and only in
a few non-human systems.

Awareness of "self" is essential for any system

whose self-regulation extends beyond physiological homeostasis.

Further-

more, systems which have the capacity for self-awareness must use this

information if they are to learn and survive.

As an example, we can point

to the relationship between hunger and nutrition.

will "feel" hunger and will eat to satiation.

All sentient systems

In systems without the

capacity for self-awareness, diet and nutrition are homeostatically controlled; an animal will eat only what his system needs and only as much
as his system needs.

The same is true of human infants, to a large

^mentioned by Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 56.

,

(Engle-
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extent.

However, as consciousness and self-awareness
develop, human beings

must apply them to this basic physiological
area.

Proper diet is no

longer something which the body itself regulates.

Human beings can overeat

and can have nutritionally deficient diets.

If a system,

therefore, has

the capacity for processing information about itself,
it must do so.
13. 4A The school stores a vast quantity and variety of
information

in a great many different forms.

Each human component of the schools

is a repository of information from the world outside; the
school's

library and archives contain large amounts of information from its past.
The school also has a quantity of information about itself and its parts,

although this Information is so dispersed among the components that it
is more difficult to Identify.

It is also difficult to validate this kind

of information; the school’s consciousness of itself may be at varience

with the perceptions of its components or of those in its environment,
just as an individual's view of himself may be at varience with the views
others may have of him.

Nonetheless, the school as a system acts upon the

basis of its self-awareness, and anyone who would wish to change a school
must first change the school’s image of itself.
13. 4B Of the student in the school we can say much the same as we have

said of the school, although the range of individual differences will be

greater than the range of differences among schools.

All students pro-

cess information from the world outside, although l the range and variety
of that information will vary significantly from student to student accord-

ing to the acuity of their sensory apparatus.

which store information from the past.

All students have memories

The capacity of the memory sub-

system not only varies individually, but also varies with age, as does the
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associator subsystem.

The capacity of the student to abstract
properties

of phenomena, essential to recombination,
is developmental, and while all

students will develop it, not all will develop
equal facility or predispos-

ition to do so.
to be crucial.

It is the third kind of information, again,

that appears

"Self-image" and "self-concept" have become such overused

terms that it is important to emphasize that they have
a specific place
in systems thinking which extends beyound how a
person "feels" about him-

self to what a person knows about himself.

The two, of course, are closely

related; the information a person receives about himself through
his

engagement with his social and physical environment will be the basis of

both his thinking and feeling about himself.

However, his ability to

learn depends upon his consciousness of his self-concept, and the degree
of consciousness will vary tremendously from person to person.

"Self-

consciousness" is not generally considered to be a deslreable trait; the
person who dwells excessively upon his self is frequently considered
"poorly adjusted."

Our culture prizes the extrovert over the introvert.

This is particularly true of children, since self-consciousness in young

children is unusual and frequently symptomatic of incipient pathology.
We want children to have a "positive" self-image, but we do not want
them to be conscious of it.

Neither conceit nor inferiority seems

appropriate for school-age children.

Schools have thus stressed competence

rather than identity as the basis for self-concept, and the information
a

student stores about his self is information about what he can do,

rather than what he is.

The effect of this frequently is to reinforce

areas of greater competence and to constrain the development of areas of

lesser competence.

This approach to self-concept thus serves to con-

strain the range and variety of information from the outside world and
from the past which is likely to be stored in the system.
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structure £f the communication network - We
have already

seen (9.29) that the processing of information
inputs depends upon the

particular configuration of the network of channels,
their capacities and
characteristics.

The capacity of a complex organization to learn
depends

upon its ability to regulate the flow of information
and to monitor the

reliability of its channels.

Since complex organizations will have mul-

tiple overlapping channels, and since human organizations will
have both

formal and informal channels, such regulation will always be difficult
and will never be total.

Not only will the communication network be

subject to systematic distortion, but the informal channels will frequently
operate out of the range of awareness so that they are less controllable.
Formal communication channels are generally verbal, oral or written,

while informal channels are frequently non-verbal and non-intentional
If there is incongruence between the verbal and the non-verbal communica-

tions being sent simultaneously, we generally take the non-verbal commun-

ications more seriously, precisely because they are less subject to
the conscious control of the sender.

pency by exhorting others to "do as

We familiarly recognize this discreI

say, not as

I

do,” but most of us

still remain largely unaware of the discrepancies between our own verbal
and non-verbal behavior.
13. 5A Schools generally pay strict attention to the structuring of

the formal, verbal communication network and pay very little attention to
the informal, non-verbal communication network which overlaps the formal

channels.

"Official” communications are put forth in written memos or

bulletins and disseminated to the appropriate individuals.

Teachers

regulate formal communication in classrooms by recognizing raised hands
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and by prohibiting unrecognized verbal
communication.

Communication net-

works in small groups have been extensively
studied by social scientists,
and while such networks as teacher talk in
the Teacher's Lounge and student

talk over the lunch table are not "official," their
typologies have been
so well documented by small-group theorists that
they must be considered

formal.

It is the "silent language"^ of non-verbal behavior
which is so

generally ignored in schools.
not to communicate.

All behavior communicates; it is impossible

As Hall has persuasively pointed out, "time talks,"

and "space speaks;" how we organize time and space in schools is a potent

form of non-verbal communication.

We shall not enlarge upon this topic

here, since it is so large, but we shall reiterate that the non-verbal

communication in schools is so frequently at variance with the verbal com-

munication that what is often described as a "lack" of communication is
instead a multiplicity of overlapping, incongruent messages.

As a con-

sequence of this, the capacity of the school to act upon any specific

information is constrained by the simultaneous transmission of contradictory or incongruent information.

value of transmitted information.

The resulting ambiguity vitiates the
From- a systems viewpoint, ambiguity

inhibits learning; in any situation which allows a variety of interpretations of available information, the system will invariably select the

interpretation which is most comfortable and familiar and which requires
the least strain.

Life may be full of ambiguous situations, but they do

not tend to be the situations from which we learn.
13. 5B The first job of the student in the classroom is to discover

which of the myriad messages he receives simultaneously he should pay

^Hall, Edward T., The Silent Language

,

(Greenwich:

Fawcett, 1959).
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attention to.

He quickly learns that what the teacher
says or does is

more important than what his classmates say
or do; he also learns that
what the teacher says may or may not be more
important than what the
teacher does.

Outside the classroom, the reverse is generally true;
what

his classmates say or do is more important than
what his teacher has said
or done.

Likewise, in the classroom eyes and ears, rather than
nose,

tongue, or hand, will be the important input transducers;
the student must

learn to ignore information from these sense organs.

The student is

always processing information carried by multiple channels simultaneously.

Messages are always tri-partite:

they have a "content" dimension, a

"metacommunication" dimension, and a "relationship" dimension.
to say,

That is

they are about "something," they are about "themselves," and they

are about the relationship between the sender and the receiver.

Conven-

tional discussions of communication processes concentrate on the "content"
dimension.

"Information," in its colloquial usage refers to the "some-

thing" the message purports to be about.

The other two dimensions, however,

are less frequently remarked upon, and because they are always present,

they deserve close attention.

Furthermore, because they are frequently

non-verbal, they tend to be out of the sender's awareness, although not
out of the receiver's awareness.

Any theory which focuses on "intentional"

message-sending and neglects "non-intentional" message sending is dealing
with an abstracted notion of communications networks, not a concrete
notion.

Intentional and non-intentional messages are always sent simul-

taneously; the non-intentional messages are usually non-verbal, metacommun-

icational, and dealing with the relationship between sender and receiver.

Metacommunication says of the message content that it is important or
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unimportant, serious or humorous, fact or
opinion, certain or dubious,

interesting or uninteresting, statement or question,
demand or request,
and so forth.

Metacommunication is rarely verbal; we may occasionally

preface a message with a metacommunicational comment,
as when

a teacher

says "this is important," or when President Nixon
says "let me make one

thing perfectly clear," but more usually metacommunication
is accomp-

lished through inflection, intonation, stress, gesture,
and timing.

If

the metacommunication is congruent with the content, it
provides powerful

reinforcement of that content; if it incongruent, it can lead to
confusion
and anxiety in the receiver.

A joke told with a straight face may or may

not be a joke; should one laugh?
of many a teacher.

Sarcasm is a weapon in the arsenal

How is the student to interpret a sarcastic comment?

A lecture full of brilliant insights delivered in a flat, monotonous style
provides metacommunicational incongruence which students are quick to
perceive.

When there is incongruence between content and metacommunica-

tion, it is the latter which has the greater potency.

The third dimension

of messages, the relationship dimension, is equally potent.

Every message

implies a particular relationship between sender and receiver; relationships are construed either as symmetrical or complementary.

In complemen-

tary relationships, one part holds the super-ordinate position and the

other party hold the subordinate position.

The two parties may or may not

agree about the nature of their relationship, but every message sent

between them will include their perceptions of their relationship.

Again,

this is rarely verbal or intentional, although in times of stress or

crisis it may become so.

If students question the authority of the teacher

or dean, the content of their messages may in fact be their relationship.
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but more generally the relationship
dimension of messages is implicit

rather than explicit.

The person making a demand of another
is concomit-

antly asserting his right to make that demand.

The other, by acquiescing,

confirms the right of the first to make demands,
or by not acquiescing,

challenges that right.

Leadership may be asserted by one party, but it

may either be confirmed or rejected by the subordinate
party.

Students

are continually processing all three dimensions of
messages, whether or

not intentional, and whether or not verbal.

If they are incongruent,

the

student as a learning system may well learn more from the
metacommunicational and relationship dimensions than from the content dimension.
13.6

The pattern of the subsystems within the whole - It will be

helpful to think of two prototypical systems; in the first, subsystem
processes are highly localized in discrete components, while in the second,

subsystem processes are widely dispersed and combined among the components.

It is easy to see both the advantages and the disadvantages of

both kinds of organization.
speed, and uniformity.

The first has the advantages of efficiency,

Each component, having a specialized sub-

system function, can concentrate its energies on the performance of that
function without being distracted.

Decision-making for the whole sys-

tem is highly centralized; decisions can be made quickly and dissemin-

ated with a high degree of accuracy.

Both matter-energy and Information

inputs can be regulated and allocated with efficiency and dispatch.

System malfunctions can be quickly identified, located, and repaired.
Job descriptions can be specified with a minimum of confusion and ambiguity.

When such a system is working well, it is working very well, indeed.
The disadvantages, however, are concomitants of their advantages.

Such

systems rarely work well, since the malfunction of a single component will
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jeopardize the performance of a critical subsystem
process.

Highly special

ized systems are so highly constrained that
the performance of each sub-

system is 'dependent upon the performance of all
other subsystems, and

when these subsystems are localized in single components,
a malfunctioning
component will affect the entire system.

Such systems are, therefore,

vulnerable and fragile; they are dependent upon maintenance
inputs to

maintain the components in working order and upon boundary
processes to
filter out any inputs which might jeopardize the functioning
of the components.

At the other extreme is the second propotypical system in
which

subsystem processes are widely dispersed and combined.

This system has

the advantages of dependability, flexibility, adaptability and
durability.

Because it is not dependent on discrete components for the performance of
specific subsystem processes, the malfunction of particular components

will not so easily jeopardize the performance of the system as a whole.
Because individual components are involved in more than one subsystem
process they can allocate their attention and energy to different tasks

depending upon the exigencies of the moment.

Such systems are capable of

maintaining steady states in a wide variety of environmental conditions,
since components will be capable of different lines of behavior.

If the

needs of the situation require extreme boundary vigilance, the system
can deploy its components to boundary maintenance.

If the needs of the

situation require greater decoding capacity, the system’s components can
all participate in this process.

Because the system has the flexibility

to re-organize itself as needed, its ability to survive and function is

enhanced; it can endure.
however.

Such systems have significant disadvantages,

They tend to be inefficient; while they will dependably perform
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at a satisfactory level, they will
rarely perform at an optimal level.

The energies and attention of components
are too diffused and changeable
to allow for more than a portion of their
time to be devoted to any given

task.

They tend to be slow; the decision-making process
is the clearest

example of this.

When decision-making about the system as

a

whole is

diffused among many components the process is cumbersome
and time-consuming without any guarantee that the decision will be
better for the situa-

tion at hand.
repair.

Such systems, when they do malfunction, are difficult to

They are not susceptible to either analysis or testing, since
the

components are only minimally constrained.

Any dysfunction might well

reside in many places or in many relationships among the components.
Finally, such systems have so many modes of critical interaction that they
are less likely to adapt speedily to new situations presented by the

environment.

Their very cohesiveness mitigates against significant alter-

ation in their internal organization.

Most systems fall midway between

the two extremes described above and will have, to some degree, the

advantages and disadvantages of both.

In terms of learning, it is not

possible to give priority to one type of organization over the other.

The

first may have the advantage in terms of executive decision-making, while
the second may be better able to integrate new patterns of behavior

throughout the system.

The first may have a more specialized and elabor-

ate memory facility with a more efficient recall capacity, while the

second may have an associator subsystem with greater creative potential.
As we have seen in 13.2, as systems develop, they tend to become more

like the first prototype.

Whether or not this is desireable, or course

depends upon the nature of the environment, as Ashby points out.
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Schools vary widely in their patterns of
sub-system alloca-

tion (9.16-9.34).

To some extent, pattern of allocation will
be correlated

with size; a small school will necessarily tend towards
more combined
subsystems while a large school will tend towards more
localized subsystems.

The fabled one-room school house, in which the teacher
would come

in early in the morning to stoke the furnace, go out to
drive the school

bus and return to teach all subjects to all pupils, would be at
one extreme
of the continuum; the large comprehensive high school, highly depart-

mentalized with a wide range of special services would be at the other end.
However, as we have seen in Chapter Nine, regardless of how localized
and specialized subsystem processes may appear to be from an organizational
chart, the actual allocation of significant subsystem processes is highly

combined and dispersed, moreso than in other kinds of human organizations

with which schools are frequently compared and from which organizational
theory is largely derived.

As long as schools deal globally with compre-

hensive inputs and intend to transmit, as outputs, "educated men," their
real organization as concrete systems will be at variance with their

formal organizations.

In terms of their defined functions, they will

be partipotential systems, sharing the education of their students with
the society as a whole.

The effort to more closely relate the school to

the larger community it serves is thus more than a rhetorical flourish;
it is an expression of an educational reality.

As long as the education

of children takes place both in and out of schools, the school

is only

a part of the concrete educational system for any given child.

What this

means practically is that the techniques of management, planning, budgeting,
and producing which are appropriate for organizations tending towards the
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first prototype will be less appropriate for schools.

PPBS, for example,

may be an excellent management tool for organizations
whose subsystems are
highly localized, but it will be exceedingly difficult to
apply honestly
to organizations in which these processes are combined
and dispersed.

13.6b

Physiologically, the human organism includes both combined

and localized subsystem processes dealing with matter-energy inputs;

psychologically, the same statement may be made about the processing of

information inputs.

In thinking about the student as a learning system,

however, we shall be more interested with how he organizes the information
he processes.

We shall avoid a neuropsychological discussion not by choice

but by necessity as beyond our competence at this time.
to say,

It is possible

though, that there does appear to be neuropsychological evidence

to support the important assertions made in this section.

g

We shall

begin by suggesting that two types of learning must co-exist in a learning system.

We shall call one type "reactive" learning and we shall

call the other type "pro-active" learning.

Reactive learning requires

the existence in the environment of a stimulus which elicits some line of

behavior not already in the system’s repetoire.

When the system discovers

the behavior that reduces or eliminates the stress or strain presented

by that stimulus, it has learned, and presumably whenever that stimulus

reappears it will "trigger" the successfully learned behavior, unless
the behavior has been forgotten, in which case it must be relearned.

The

frequency with which the stimulus reappears in the environment will in
large measure determine whether or not the behavior is forgotten or stored

^see Pribram, Karl H.
Prentice-Hall, 1971).

,

Languages of the Brain

,

(Englewood Cliffs:
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in the system's memory.

Reactive learning is stimulus-dependent;
without

the concrete presence of the stimulus in the
environment the learning will

not occur.

Most formal schooling calls for reacive learning.

is provided by the teacher or curriculum materials;

The stimulus

the student provides

the appropriate line of behavior, whether novel or familiar.

Reiteration

of the stimulus elicits repetition of the successful behavior.

Generaliza-

tion and abstraction are developed as the student discovers that
a given
line of behavior will successfully respond to more than one stimulus,
and
that more than one line of behavior will successfully respond to a given

stimulus.

Depending upon the frequency with which stimuli are likely to

recur in the environment, reactive learning can be a sufficient mode of

adaptation for a learning system.

It is essentially a problem-solving

mode and is appropriate to situations which are problematical.

One the

other hand, "pro-active" learning occurs in the absence of concrete

stimuli in the environment, and, as far as we know, is limited to only a
few species of living systems.
is pro-active learning.

Most of what we refer to as "creativity"

The interior life of the mind which deals not

only with the here-and-now but also with the past and future, with

imagination and fantasy, is pro-active.

We have commented throughout

this paper on the capacity of the learning system not only to map aspects
of the concrete environment into its internal organization but also to

project aspects of its interior representation on to the concrete environment.

This is pro-active learning, and it is the way in which learning

systems compensate for deficits in their environments.

The propensity

for investigation, invention, and discovery cannot adequately be explained

by any theory of learning which is predicated upon the presence of concrete
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stimuli in the concrete environment.

Von Bertalanffy, in his oft-repeated

criticism of behaviorism, refers to the "robot model of human
behavior"^
and includes in his indictment the S-R theories of Pavlov
and Skinner,
the environmentalism of J. B. Watson, and even Freudian
reductionism which

explains adult behavior on the basis of early childhood experiences.
Indeed, the theory of open systems was initially extended to human
behavior
as an alternative to the "robot mod^l," just as in the biological sciences
it was an alternative to the equilibria! assumptions of closed systems

models.

The question we must ask ourselves is what kind of system organ-

ization is most conducive to pro-active learning, one in which subsystem
functions are highly localized or one in which they are highly combined
and dispersed.

We limit our discussion of information-processing, since

matter-energy processing is regulated largely by homeostatic mechnaisms.
We can point to two extreme kinds of information processing, similar to
the two prototypes discussed in 13.6.

In the first kind, in which sub-

system processes are highly localized, all sorts of information enters
the system.

which

,

What reaches the memory are highly diverse and varied data

depending upon the memory’s storage capacity, are available to the

associator and the decider subsystems for use in constructing the internal

representation of reality.

This internal representation is likely to be

rich in detail and rich in potential for association.

It is also likely

to contain more information than, oat any given time, the system is likely
for
to use, although at any given time there is more information available

^von Bertalanffy, Ludwig, General System Theory
1968), p. 188.

,

(New York:

Braziller,
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use than is present in the immediate environment.

There is more likelihood

for unique associations of seemingly unrelated
data and thus more likeli-

hood for creative and fresh internal representations
of reality.

The

student, therefore, who is capable of processing and
storing a wide variety
of potentially although not immediately useful or
pertinent information
is more likely to have that information available
at a time when it is

useful and relevant, even if it does not pertain to the environment
as
it exists at that time.

extreme.

Contrast this student with one at the other

His input transducers are highly selective and admit only

information pertinent to the situation at hand. He is
ner."

a "focuser" not a "scan

His senses are disciplined to exclude the extraneous. Sense-data are

classified by the time they reach the brain. These built-in classification
schemes restrict the data that the associator subsystem can process.

The

second student’s memory may have just as great a capacity as the first

student’s has, and there may be just as much data stored in it.

However,

the data are so highly organized into such rigid classification schemes

that the possibility of novel or fresh associations is minimal.

While

both of these examples are extreme. Individuals do tend towards one
extreme or the other.

Those tending towards the first type are more

likely to have the capacity for proactive learning than those tending
towards the second.

mentalized.

Curriculum in schools tends to be highly compart-

Math is math, and reading is reading.

separate time periods and in different ways.

They are taught in

The opportunity for the

student to discover that they are both symbol systems, both languages,

ordinarily does not exist in the classrooms.

Even subjects that might seem
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to have an even greater natural affinity, like
literature and social

studies, are ordinarily presented as separate domains.
though, do not fall neatly into subject areas.

Life's experiences,

The mind which is accus-

tomed to processing pre-classif ied data will have difficulty
in processing

information which is not so neatly arranged.
13.7

The number

,

location

,

and function of negative feedback loops

in the system and the amount of time-lag in them.

We recall from 10.3 and

10.11 that negative feedback is a portion of the system's output which

re-enters the system as information to regulate the system's subsequent
performance.

Both adjustment and learning systems require negative

feedback, although while the adjustment system must act upon its feedback,
the learning system may choose not to act upon it.

Without feedback,

however, the learning system could not distinguish between successful
and less successful behavior; it could not change its line of behavior to

accomodate a changing environment.

Indeed, we are justified in claiming

that the ''feedback loop" is the basic behavioral element in a learning

system.

If we recall Pask's contention (ll.lOA) that the least distin-

guishable or describable component of an active control system is also
an active control system, we are now in a position to identify this ele-

We can think of a learning system with its

ment as a feedback loop.

critical subsystem processes as a set of Interrelated feedback loops
through which, at any level. Information about performance flows.
Galenter, and Pribram have called this feedback loop a

Miller,

TOTE unit,

"TOTE" standing for "Test-Operate-Test-Exit

^^Miller, George A., Galenter, Eugene, and Pribram, Karl H. Plans and
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960),
(New York:
the Structure of Behavior
,

,

TTTT.
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TEST

Ex IT
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1
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The action is initiated by an ’incongruity* between the
state of the

organism and the state that is being tested for, and the action
persists
until the incongruity is removed.

The advantage of thinking of the

feedback loop as a TOTE unit is that it can easily be applied to any

hierarchial level by considering the "Operate" phase to include as many
smaller TOTE units as is convenient for the inquiry.

11

Ibid

.

,

pp

.

25-26
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Miller, Galenter, and Pribram use the simple
act of hammering a nail to

illustrate

12

X ESr
(flush)
(sdlchs op)

(cioutnj

Of course, if the major activity were conceived as building a bookcase,

this whole TOTE unit would be one small part of the operational phase
of a much larger TOTE unit.

The TOTE unit has another great advantage;

it need not be applied only to motor activities of the system.

The "Test"

phase can be construed as developing a plan for behaving and the "Operate”
phase as executing that plan.

Or the test phase can be construed as

developing the program which generated plans, while the operate phase
includes the plans thus generated.

On whatever leve of generality we

may choose to apply the TOTE analysis the important feature is the circular
and reciprocal relationship between testing and operating.

Over time,

the sequence always looks like this:
.

.

^

.Test

Operate

^ Test

> Operate

^

Test.

.

.

.Exit

Two testing phases are always separated by an operational phase; two

operational phases are always separated by a testing phase.
12

Ibid.

,

p

.

36

The time-lag
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between the operational and testing phases thus
becomes
in the performance of the system.

a

crucial factor

If the time-lag is too great - part-

icularly between the operational and testing phases - the
feedback will

effectively disappear and the system must perform without
information
about the efficacy of its performance.

determine the effects of time-lag.

There is no general rule to

In some situations, writing a disser-

tation, for example, a certain time-lag is inevitable and, while frustrating, managable.

inefficient.

Too great a time-lag, though, is counter-productive and

In general, we can say that time-lag is least harmful in

situations where subsequent operations can be deferred without jeopar-

dizing the attainment of the desired state.
13. 7A

Schools do not lack feedback loops; what they lack in many

instances is the capacity to improve their performance even with the

information that feedback provides.

In terms of student performance,

too

often the school will go through one TOTE cycle and then exit, regardless of the information that the student, or class, has not achieved the

desired congruence with the goal.

Learning systems, we know, may choose

not to act upon feedback, although rarely do school people realize that
they have, in fact, made this choice.

Frequently, too, schools couch

their goals and purposes in such global and amorphous terms that they

make it impossible for themselves to test their operations.

The perfor-

mance objective movement has attempted to construe the learning process
in terms of specific TOTE units, and this is all to the good, although

proponents of this approach have too often focused so finely on specific
overt behaviors and have construed the conditions under which those be-

haviors are to occur so narrowly that they make it difficult for success-
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ful behaviors to become part of future operational
phases in other TOTE

units.

The main problem that schools have with feedback,
then, is not

the lack of it but the lack of means to apply it to subsequent
perfor-

mance

.

13. 7B

The student in the school, on the other hand, has a very

different sort of problem.

Students learn very early that the important

information is not feedback from their performance but feedback about
their performance from anotherr person, usually the teacher.

Viewed one

way, this inhibits the development of TOTE units, since the "test" of
an operation is external to the system.

Viewed another way, the test

becomes - not the success of the operation

-

but the attitude of the

teacher, the grade, or the gold star; the operation itself is externalized.

The student learns first to distrust and second to suspend his own judg-

ment or capacity to test his operations.

What he has done is neither good

nor bad, right nor wrong, successful nor unsuccessful, until the teacher
has so indicated.

Moreover, the pseudo-feedback the student receives from

the teacher rarely occurs at a point when it can do him any good.

Evalu-

ation is too frequently at the end of a unit of instruction; tests may

indicate that a student has performed poorly, but by then it is too
late - the class has moved to another unit.

The test phase of a TOTE

unit is diagnostic; the test phase in schooling is all too often

"terminal."

Until students in schools can depend upon feedback from their

performance, the assumption that specific behaviors are the result of

learning is questionable at best.
13.8
and Simon,

The nature £f the system’s memory facility - Following Newell

we postulate three kinds of memory, an internal Long-

Solving^
^\ewell, Allen and Simon, Herbert A., Human Problem
(Englewood Cliffs:

Prentice-Hall, 1972).
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Term Memory (LTM)

Memory (EM).

,

an internal Short-Term Memory (STM)

and and External

,

The LTM has, as far as we can tell, an infinite
capacity

to store symbols and "chunks"

(patterns of frequently associated symbols).

Information stored in the LTM is quickly accessible, although
the process
of accession isi not understood.

The learning system evidently does not

have to scan the LTM to have access to information stored in it.^^
Curiously, conscious attempts to scan the LTM, as when a person tries to
find the precise word he wants, or has a name "on the tip of his tongue,"

usually do not work; focussing on symbols in the LTM seems to make them
less accessible.

Little is known about the capacity of information to

remain over long periods of time in the LTM.
is, of course,

there.

If it can be accessed,

it

If the human learning system is conscious of having

"forgotton" something, it may or many not be there, but at least some
chunk is there or the person would not know what it is he had forgotten.
At one time, I had in my LTM the names and dates of all the ancient kings
of Assyria.

I

no longer know them, but the fact that

I

was able to draw

from my LTM the category "ancient kinds of Assyria" to use as an example

here means that there is a residual chunk in my LTM.

The names and

dates could be re-entered with ease.

The STM is the learning system’s working space.

limited capacity.

George Miller suggests that the STM has a capacity to

store about seven symbols or chunks,
^^

Ibid

.

,

p.

It has a very

and even this small number is

793.

^^Miller, George A., The Psychology of Human Communication, (Baltimore:
Penguin, 1969).
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reduced to about two if other information processes
are interposed between

presentation and recall.

Fortunately, information can be retrieved and

returned to the LTM with ease and rapidity, so over time
the information
in the STM can be very great, even though at any given
time it is very

small.

Information in the STM decays rapidly.

Whether the decay is a

time-dependent process, or whether it is due to the interference
among
symbols in the STM is a matter of controversy among psychologists.^^

There is no doubt, though, that the storing of information in the STM
over time requires conscious rehearsal (what we call memorization), and
that when the information is not needed it decays rapidly.

It is not

necessarily true that information processed in the STM is stored in the
LTM even if it has been assiduously memorized.

Nor does it appear to be

true that all information stored in the LTM must enter it through the
STM.

We can, however, offer the hypothesis that as long as the informa-

tion is being used in an uncompleted TOTE it will remain accessible to
the STM.

Put another way, as long as a system is executing a plan, the

information it needs to execute that plan will remain available to it,
even if the execution is interrupted or deferred.

The capacity of a

learning system to construe particular plans as sub-units of larger plans

will thus inhibit the decay of information and maintain its accessibility.
External Memory (EM) resides outside the system and may be as simple
as a piece of paper and pencil or as complex as the New York Public

Library.
16
17

EM is an auxilliary of the STM and compensates for the STM's

Newell and Simon,
Ibid.

cit

.

,

p.

795
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limited capacity.

Certain kinds of tasks, which could be carried
out by

the LTM and STM exclusively are made much easier and
quicker with the help
of EM.

As an example, the computation "7 x 6" can be retrieved
from the

LTM immediately whenever it is needed.

The problem ”42 x 6” can be worked

out by the STM withou the aid of EM, although it will take more
time and
the probability of error is greater.

The problem "252 x 46" could, with

considerable difficulty be worked out without EM, although the difficulty
in remembering the intermediate products illustrates the limited capacity
of the STM.

The problem-solver would have to work hard to remember the

intermediate steps, since subsequent processing would tend to obliterate
the previously arrived at product.

The problem "11592 x 252" could prob-

ably not be accomplished without the aid of EM unless the problem-solver

had a heuristic for reducing the over twenty-five separate products and
sums to approximately seven.

With paper and pencil, however, this becomes

It is, of course, possible to store limitless information

a trivial task.

in the EM and transfer information from the STM to the EM.

Retrieval of

information from the EM depends upon the size of the relevant EM and its
A book without an index, or a library without a cross-

organization.

referenced subject catalogue, makes information retrieval from the EM
cumbersome and time-consuming.

Newell and Simon point out that viewed

functionally, the STM is both the internal STM and that portion of the EM

available to the system at any given time.
t^Tft's

18

That is to say, that the sys-

memory facility should be construed to include the EM.

To expect

all information used by the STM to come from the LTM is foolish.

18

Ibid

.

,

p

.

801
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Most schools are foolish.

there is greater virtue

School people appear to feel that

in having the names and dates of the Assyrian

monarchs in the LTM than having this information in the EM.

Their folly

is compounded by their assumption that the presence of
such information

in the STM at a given time (when the unit test is given, for
example)

indicates its presence in the LTM.

In an age of such information overload,

it seems ludicrous to expect learning systems to store vast data
in their

LTMs.

What we can expect, and what schools bhould be helping students to

learn, is to store accessing processes in the LTM so that when the need
for particular information is present the learner can search the EM for
it efficiently and effectively.

This is, in effect, what schools as

learning systems must do, for there does not seem to be anything analogous
to the LTM at the supraorganismic level.

Human organizations must rely

on the EM to provide the function of the LTM in the organism.

Individ-

uals within the school, or course, will have LTMs, but since the school’s

memory subsystem is so widely dispersed, the individual LTMs taken
collectively cannot be construed to constitute the LTM of the system.
This is why minutes are taken of important meetings and why important

decisions are written down and entered in policy books.

The school, thus,

must rely on EM for its information, and in a paradoxical sort of way
this is probably a good thing.

We have remarked elsewhere (9.33) that

what schools may need is not more efficient memories but more efficient
"forgetters."

The existence of LTM may be dysfunctional in Ashby’s

sense (13.1) if the environment changes with great rapidity and tends not
to repeat itself.

That a school does not have an LTM means that it can
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more easily create new lines of behavior and is less
fixated upon old
behaviors that are no longer functional.

It may reasonably be objected

that many schools do appear to be fixated on dysfunctional
behaviors that this, in fact, is the ''problem'' of American schooling.
that schools act as though they had LTMs

,

It is true

but in fact the problem really

lies with their reliance on an obsolete and dsyf unctional EM.

culum of the school resides in its textbooks and worksheets.

The curriAn easy solu-

tion to the problem of an outmoded curriculum is to throw the books away.

The fact that the EM is part of the environment means that it is more

susceptible to external control than is the school itself.

The reader

may note a conceptual contradiction in considering, the EM to be both part
of the system's memory and part of the system's environment.

This would

seem to violate our practice of looking steadily at the system and not
changing levels in mid-analysis.

James Miller helps us out of this con-

fusion by introducing the concept of an "inclusion."
Sometimes a part of the enviornment is
surrounded by a system and totally included within its boundary. That is an
The inclusion is a cominclusion
ponent or subsystem of the system if
it carries out or helps in carrying out
a critical process of the system; otherwise it is part of the environment.^^
.

In other words,

.

.

the EM is an example of an outwardly dispersed subsystem

(9.15).
13. 8B

We have said that the STM, supplemented frequently by the EM,

is the functional working space of the memory.

We have also noted the

Basic Concepts" in Gray, Duhl,
^^Miller, James G., "Living Systems:
Little, Brown,
(Boston:
and Rizzo, General Systems Theory and Psychiatry
1969), p. 106.
,
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extremely limited capacity of the STM
chunks at any given time.

- on the

order of seven symbols or

We have finally observed that information in

the STM can come either as input from the environment
or from the LTM.

The interesting question is what happens to the symbols or
chunks when
the work in the STM is completed?
STM.

We know that they cannot remain in the

There appear to be three alternatives:

they are stored in the LTM

for future retrieval; they are stored in the EM for future retrieval;

they decay.

We can offer the following hypotheses related to these

alternatives
First, data stored in the EM are unlikely also to be stored in the

LTM simultaneously, although they can subsequently enter the LTM via the
STM.

A student taking notes from a lecture will probably not remember the

material in his notes, although after the lecture he can review his notes
at his own pace and the material can enter the LTM.

Underlining passages

in a book is not an aid to remembering, it is an aid to subsequent access
to the information underlined.

Second, data retrieved from the LTM are more likely to be returned
to the LTM for storage than data from the environment.

Likewise, the

more frequently data are retrieved from the LTM the more likely thay are
to be returned to it.

If a student makes continued use of the names

arid

dates of the ancient Assyrian kings he will be more likely to remember
them.

Most important, data that are used in the execution of a plan will
be returned to the LTM until that plan is either successfully executed or

until it is relinquished.

A plan, as we have said, is any process, or
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combination of processes, in the system which controls the
sequence of
behaviors which constitute the system's output.

As we shall see in the

next section, a plan is analogous to a computer's program.

It is a set

of rules or strategies which controls the sequence of TOTE units.

same time it is itself a TOTE unit of a higher-order plan.

At the

Plans follow

the same heirarchial principles of roganization that appear to be oper-

ative in the natural and social worlds.

We shall soon be discussing the

various types of higher order plans which are stored in the LTM.

Here,

we would only suggest that this hypothesis seems to argue against the

construal of performance objectives to be such molecular units that the

satisfactory attainment of the performance criteria leads to the relinquishing of the plan.
a unit of learning,

has achieved it.

The more self-contained a unit of instruction of

the less likely the student is to remember it once he

If the purpose of learning the Assyrian kings is to pass

a unit test, once the test is passed, the plan for learning the Assyrian

kings is likely to decay rapidly.

If, on the other hand,

the study of

ancient Assyria is part of a larger plan - to study comparative political
forms or the process of political change or the relationship between

political and religious beliefs, the information is likely to remain
available in the LTM for future retrieval
semester.

- at

least until the end of the

If the semester of Ancient History can itself be related to

other concerns of the student, the data will remain in the LTM even longer.
In other words, the higher the order of the plan that that student is

executing the less likely the successful execution of lower order TOTE
execution.
units will result in the decay of the information used in their

particular objectives
In the language of schools, if the performance of
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is construed as a step in the attainment of long-range goals,

the skills

developed in the performance of the objectives will remain in the student's
repetoire.

It stands to reason, of course, that the long-range goals must

be the student's, not the teacher's or the school's or the community's.
13.9 The operating rules

,

or program

,

determining the system's

structure and behavior - What Cadwallader calls rules or programs we have
called "plans."

They are the highest level plans, those that govern the

processing of any and all information by the learning system.

We shall

discuss each of the briefly in this secion and then consider them together
in sections 13. 9A and 13. 9B.
1)

rules

.

.

.

determining range of inputs - The learning system has

an internal representation of reality - an imaged of the way things are -

and this image serves as a high order plan for determining the range of
inputs into the system.

Whether there is an objective reality to which

this image corresponds either closely or loosely is an epistimological

issue we shall skirt.

We shall assert only that we act on the basis of

how we think things are - our subjective knowledge of reality.

Our image

controls not only the way we act but also controls the range of messages

we receive from the field.

determines our environment.

In other words, our image in large measure

The presidential campaign of 1972 appears

reality
as though it is going to pit two radically different images of

against one another.

The views of President Nixon and Senator McGovern

the way the
start from such different unquestioned assumptions about

different environworld is that it is fair to say that they inhabit two

ments.

supporters accept as
The inputs that Senator McGovern and his
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compelling messages from the environment will probably not
be inputs
into President Nixon or his supporters.

Learning systems tend to accept

inputs that are congruent with their images and tend to resist
inputs which
are incongruent.

Sometimes these inputs enter the system and are then

rejected by the decider subsystem.

It is just as likely,

though, that

they will be outside the range of inputs which the system will accept.

Because the learning system cannot deal with them, they are excluded from
the system entirely.
2)

network

rules responsible for the routing of information throughout the
-

Particularly at the organization level there must be

the internal transmission of information.

a plan for

The existence of multiple

overlapping channels could lead to a hopelesss morass of messages if

information flowed promiscuously over them.

The capacity of the system

to process information is not the sum of the capacities of its channels.

The capacity of a channel is the upper limit of the bits of information
it can handle, not the optimal limit.

Given a network of channels of

varying capacities, all of which must partlciapte in the processing of
information, the channel with the least capacity will determine the

capacity of the network.

In such a system, the communication network

resembles a chain which is as strong as its weakest link.

may operate with a "message dispatch center."

Other systems

All messages entering

the system are routed through the dispatch center.

It is then the cap-

acity of the dispatch center which determines the capacity of the system.
principal
Some systems have alternate channels to relay messages if the

channels are at their capacity.

All of the above are examples of differ-

ent plans for the routing of information within the system.
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3)

rules

j^n format ion -

^bout

the Identification, analysis

,

and classification of

The patterning of information into usable chunks is
the job

of the associator subsystem.

Without such high level plans, the learning

system would have no capacity for dealing with novel information or

unfamiliar configurations of familiar symbols.
dence for the existence of

The most compelling evi-

such plans has been oft cited in this paper

the human being's linguistic capacity to generate and understand entirely

new sentences instantaneously.
high order plan.

This linguistic competence is just such a

It is intriguing - and mystifying - to watch this com-

Petencedeveloping in young children.

The gradual realization that words

have meanings, that meaning can be combined to produce new meanings, that
language is a means of control over one's environment, that it is an
active meaning-producing facility, that it is an act of volition, is

testimony for the existence of a high-level plan in the LTM which, as a
single chunk, can govern the associations and classification of particular
data from the environment.

We can hardly conceive of how the world
It is not only that all

might appear if we did not have such plans.

phenomena would be unexpected and unfamiliar, it is also that we would
not have the catagories "unexpected" and "unfamiliar" within which to

classify them.

Classification, indeed, can be considered the pre-eminent

plan which learning systems must have; classification and re-classification,
for if classification plans are not themselves subject to modification

and alteration they can become rigid and ossified.

internal representation of reality

When that happens, the

- the image - cannot be changed,

it can only be shattered.
4) priority rules for input

,

analysis

,

storage and output - The
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learning system's information processing is serial; it can
deal with things
only one at a time.

Input into the system is not serial, but output is.

One of the great advantages of chunking is that when the "one
thing" that
the system is dealing with is a chunk, it is really dealing with many
re-

lated things at once.

Nonetheless, the system must always have a plan for

determining the priority of inputs which may impinge simultaneously upon
the input transducers.

It must, at the other end of the process, have a

plan for determining in which order outputs will be extruded.

This has,

of course, implications for storage, for those inputs not immediately

processed must be held in storage for future processing.

If they are

held in the STM they are taking up precious, limited space.
5)

rules governing feedback mechanisms - We have tried to make the

case for the importance of feedback; now we must add the importance of
the selective use of feedback.

Whereas in some areas time-lag in feed-

back would be fatal to the system or to its performance, in other areas
simultaneous feedback is neither possible nor desireable.

When the sys-

tem is executing a high order plan, it must often do so without the know-

ledge of whether its intermediate steps are successful in meeting its
goal.

An author writes a book in the hopes that it will be published and

reviewed favorably;

a candidate runs for office in the hope of being

elected; an administration institutes wage and price controls in the

hopes of curbing inflation.

All of these are long term plans which are

not ordinarily susceptible to feedback control.

The author may attempt

book is
to publish chapters of his book in magazines, but unless the
reliable
essentially episodic the reaction to the parts will not be a

indicator of the reaction to the whole.

The candidate may get "feedback
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from public opinion polls, but the feedback early in the campaign
is not

necessarily a reliable indicator of the feedback at the end of the
campaign.
Were he to adjust his campaign strategy every time a poll was published,
the final result might well be more disasterous than had he stuck to his

course.

The long-term consequences of wage and price controls might well

be contrary to their immediate consequneces

.

There are, in other wprds,

large arenas of human affairs in which behavior cannot or should not be

guided by feedback.

Those who are too dependent upon immediate feed-

back - who will not take the second step until they are assured that the
first step was successful - are considered overly cautious or compulsive.

They are people who are dependent upon the opinion of others before they
can have an opinion of themselves.

They may have learned this in schools.

Thus, the learning system must have a plan for determining when immediate

feedback is possible and desireable and when feedback is inhibitory.

Without such a plan, the system would be incapable of executing any other
long-range plans
6)

Instructions for storage in the system’s memory - The learning

system must have plans both for entering and retrieving information in
the system’s memory, whether LTM or EM.

These plans are themselves

information, of course, so they must be guided by still higher-order
plans which determine when and under what conditions the plans for storage are to be executed.

be quite different.

The plans for storage in EM and LTM will have to

The plans for storage in EM are usually under the

conscious control of the system.
tion are time-consuming tasks.

consciously controlled.

Both entering and retrieving informaThe LTM, on the other hand, need not be

The process of retrieval, particularly, seems

196

13.9.6
to be Inhibited by consciousness.

the more elusive it becomes.
".

.

The harder we try to remember something,

As Miller, Galenter, and Pribram put it,

it is not storage, but retrieval, that is the real bottleneck
in

.

verbal learning.

Building the connections seems to be far simpler than

finding them later.

.

.The time and effort that goes into a job of

memorization is devoted to ensuring that there will be some way to get
access to the particular association we want when the time comes to revive

it."“
7)

rules regarding the synthesis of information for the output of the

system - Analysis and synthesis are opposite and complementary processes
requiring different plans.

The process of synthesizing is really the

process of forming new plans from the available bits and chunks of information.

We must admit that we really don’t know much about how this is

done, but there is no doubt that it is done, by all learning systems all
the time, and with skill and rapidity.

No doubt some systems are better

at it than others, and no doubt some systems actively attempt to shape

their environments to minimize the necessity for creating new plans.
Some systems will resist as long as possible the creation of new plans

even when environmental parameters clearly call for them.

Finally,

there are some systems which refuse to create new plans, even though they
could.

There are individuals and organizations who, on principle, per-

sist in following traditional lines of behavior, who choose not to adapt
to a current environmental condition in the hopes that the condition

itself will revert to a prior state.

^*^op

.

cit

.

pp.

137-138.

From the observer's viewpoint it
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may appear that such systems are incapable of
change - that they cannot
formulate new plans to replace old ones.

In a rapidly changing environ-

ment, however, such conservatism may make great good
sense.

It is often

difficult to distinguish between passing fads and enduring
fundamental
changes.

A system which adapts to every new condition which confronts

it may be expending so much energy in accomodation that it
forfeits its

ability to play an active role in shaping the environment to its own
goals and purposes.
In looking over the vast array of plans we have discussed in this

section, two kinds of distinctions will be helpful in maintaining perspective.

First of all, we will want to bear in mind that at the organismic

level most of these plans are part of the genetic template, while at the

organizational level there is nothing corresponding to a genetic template.
Constitutions, charters and by-laws, which are the closest analogies,
are still artifacts of the organization and may or may not accurately

describe organizational processes.

In the second place, we want to make

a distinction between plans and the data plans control.

using Cadwallader

*

s

We have resisted

term "program” because it is too closely tied to a

strictly cybernetic model of system processes.

Because computer technol-

ogy has developed the sophisticated capacity to simulate human learning,
it is tempting to turn that around and to assume that human learning

simulates computer processes.
however.

There is a great and fundamental difference,

At some level, even the most sophisticated computer receives

its program from the environment.

Computers are designed in particular

ways and are slaves to their designers.

They may manifest remarkable

abilities for self-control and program modification, but these abilities
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have been built into the system.

The most amazing computer, as we have

said, is an amazing adjustment system.

Just the reverse is true of

learning systems; at some level, even the most
"adjustable" learning system controls its own plans.

In the truest sense, learning systems can

never be completely controlled from the environment and
adjustment systems
can never completely control their own plans.
13. 9A

Where does the observer find the operating rules, or programs,

which determine the school's structure and behavior?

He might begin by

the school s EM for statements of policy and regulations, but

this is a highly unreliable source of information which describes, not

the actual operating rules, but the ideal operating rules.

Just as the

old-time civics books in describing how a bill becomes a law omit the actual back-room by-play which is an essentail part of the legislative process, so, too, the policies and the organizational procedures of a school

omit the actual day-to-day processes of the school which may or may not

resemble the abstracted regulations.

The observer or analyst cannot

assume that the school actually behaves the way it says it does; he must,
instead, observe over time the way it actually behaves, and infer from
its behavior what its jplans must be.

However, this task is made extreme-

ly difficult by the problem of deciding what, in fact, the school's be-

havior is.

Because it is such a poorly-defined system, it is virtually

impossible for the analyst to look steadily at it.

It has been tempting

throughout this paper to decide that the school is not a system, since
we could resolve our analytical difficulties by ignoring them.
school

a system;

But the

the fact that it is difficult to analyze - and

difficult to change - does not mean that it does not act systemically
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The school has an internal representation
of reality which functionally
limits the range of inputs it can process.

which are easily observable.

This image will set priorities

Which is more important to the school,

reading or music, work or play, obedience or
initiative?
these questions can be gained by observation.
in fact, travel through the school?

How does information,

If a person wants information treated

confidentially, how does he go about it?

If he wants information dis-

seminated widely, how does he go about that?
of interaction in a school?

The answers to

Where are the critical nodes

Who are the people who always seem to know

what’s going on? Who represent the short-cuts which by-pass the formal
channels?

These are but a few of the questions that can reveal the plan

which controls the routing of information.

Plans for the classification

of information are likewise ascertainable.

In schools, information is

frequently classified according to its source.

Information from the

textbook is true; it is the standard against which all other information
is judged.

Information from students is dubious unless it corresponds to

textbook information.

Information from the superintendent is supported

by the power he has to control the destinies of others.

Information in

writing is treated as more definitive than information transmitted
orally.

The organization of the curriculum will also indicate the school's

plan for classifying information, as will the sorts of records schools
keep about student progress and behavior.

The school

is really a

prisoner of its classification plans; they are the most difficult to
change without a conscious decision on the school's part to change them.
The school's rules for establishing priorities are evident in the school's

allocation of time.
the first things?

When the school puts "first things first,
The students know.

what are

The observer can ask them.

Plans

200
13. 9A

governing feedback mechanisms can be discovered first by asking
whether
the school really allows intrinsic feedback - feedback from
performance to occur, or whether students must await the teacher *s evaluation,

teacher must await the principalis evaluation.

the

Can ~ and do ~ members

of the school community evaluate their own performance and have confidence

in their own judgments?

Can - and do - they establish their own criteria

for assessing their performance?

It is particularly easy to discover the

plans for storage in the school's memory, since the school has no LTM and

must store information in its EM which is accessible to the analyst.

Pupil personnel records are one source of information about the school's
plans for storage.

Not only the kind of information in the records is

significant but also who can have access to that information?
ever, is information discarded?

and retrieving information?

if

Who makes the decisions about entering

Finally, the analyst can obtain information

about the school's plans for formulating new plans.

decide to do something different?

making process?

I'Jhen,

Who participates?

How does the school

How widespread, in fact, is the decisionWho is bound by the decision?

How

are subsystems restructured to facilitate the new plan?

We can thus see that even with a poorly-defined system it is possible
to gain information both about its processes and about is plans for

carrying out these processes.

It is these processes and plans which

constitute the system's organization.
13. 9B

With the student, our set of questions must be different.

We

though
can assume the existence of these plans, or operating rules, even

we cannot observe them.

Because the student is a well-defined learning

many different
system, we can observe, analy-ze, and compare outputs at
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levels.
^^mat

We can make valid inferences about his plans from his
behavior,

educators and school people must ask, is how students can be helped

in developing plans for planning - how, to use the cliche, to "learn how
to learn."

Whatever their ideologies or personal biases, most thoughtful

people would agree that our age is one of information overload, and that
the purpose of education should be less the transmission of specific

data and more the development of processes for acquiring, analysing and

synthesizing relevant data.

Most people would also agree that our times

are perplexing and oun perplexities are full of ambiguities and anxieties.

The situations in which individuals find themselves are unlike the

problems in school which have solutions.

Schools may inhabit the realm

of right answers, but most human beings do not.

One of the reasons that

so many people have difficulty in coping with life’s perplexities may

well be that their schooling prepared them only for dealing with unambiguous problems in the realm of right answers.

In the face of uncertainty

they become fearful, in the face of complexity they become frustrated, in
the face of ambiguity they become immobilized.

Some people, sustained by

faith or conviction, manage to carve out sheltered realms of certitude,

simplicity, and clarity to inhabit, but most of us cope as best we can.

hoping to find in sharing a sense of community what we cannot find
through mastery of the perplexities we face.

Schools could be more

helpful than most of them are in preparing students to cope with uncertainty,
complexity, and ambiguity.

They could, for example, move out of the realm

enough
of right answers and admit that any question that is important
"I'm not sure.
to ask has, as a legitimate answer, "I don't know," or
"right" or
For every question that can be answered "yest" or "no,"
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"wrong," "true" or "false," there is always the possibility of
"maybe,"

"both," or "neither."

Schools could also admit that there is no datum

so important that everyone must know it nor any datum so trivial
that it

could not reshape some student’s image of the way things are.

For the

student, ideally, schooling should be a process of "making the strange

familiar

and "making the familiar strange."

The teacher, curriculum

materials, peers, and other components of his environment can provide
the inputs, but he himself must develop his plans.

Schools can help him

do so by making it important for him to be developing plans rather than

merely processing data according to someone else’s plan.

To the extent

that the plans he is executing are his, and the criteria for success are
his, the student will be learning how to learn and will develop the

capacity to face the unfamiliar with confidence and the familiar with

wonder
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